

JPRS-UPA-89-021

4 APRIL 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

19980126 186

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-89-021

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Lipetsk Obkom First Secretary Manayenkov on Oblast Perestroyka

18000477 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 8 Jan 89 p 1

[Article by Yu. Manayenkov, first secretary of CPSU Lipetsk Obkom, under rubric "Party Committee and Perestroyka": "People Will Say What Is Better"]

[Text] On my desk is a pile of letters. People's thoughts, alarms, and advice about perestroyka, about what kind of a reading it will have on our oblast's "clock." This is how they responded to the obkom's request, which was made in the local press, to evaluate our work, to say their word to the oblast party conference to hear reports and hold elections. The mail enriched the conference with collective thinking and responded with an unprecedented rate of activity among the delegates. It is as though people are completely different: they have an aroused conscience and a sharpened attraction to the truth, and they are genuine and uncompromising. And even the thoughts of those in whom the inertness of the past is strong or who are fettered by daily inconveniences are more and more in consonance with the affairs of the collective, the party, and the state.

Here are some lines from an "angry" letter: "I am writing unpleasant things and am overcome by doubts as to whether I am right, and whether my position is sound. But do the people at the obkom have any doubts. What is your position?" Speaking figuratively, the pointer on the political barometer has turned away from the previous omnivorous "unanimity" to the democratic difference of opinion, but everyone is united in one thing—finding one's place in perestroyka. Our time will not allow us to sit and wait: act, be bold, show yourself!

In the shops of Lipetskaya Magnitka, there were re-elections of chiefs having five or more years of longevity in that position. Two people were deprived of their positions. Party committee secretary A. Teplenichev says that the comrades were dumbfounded: the plans had been fulfilled and the workers' earnings were within the standard limits, so why had they not been re-elected? Well, the people simply could not forgive people for taking toward them an attitude of arrogance, or of disdain and spinelessness toward the superior leadership. But N. Nochevkin, chief of the motor-transportation shop, was re-elected without a single "black ball." That is rather surprising, because he is strict and demanding. But he is also just and humane. With his arrival, shadowy tree-lined lanes appeared on the shop territory, and the areas were decorated with wood carvings, modeling, and embossed work. The motor-transportation workers now have their own personal-services building with shower rooms, a sauna, a dining hall, a recreation area, and a stadium. They resort to the services of doctors less frequently than other people at our Magnitka. Concern for the person of labor—that is the credo of this Communist manager, a credo that is bringing him to the front line in perestroyka.

Sometimes people express the opinion that, in order for perestroyka to be victorious, a prolonged period of time has to pass and a new generation must grow up. Some starry-eyed dreamers believe that it is possible to bring in a harvest without having planted seeds. Without a doubt, we still observe today a shaky supremacy of deeds over words. Where it would be appropriate to take action, we sometimes see the holding of rallies. Even in the party organization one sometimes hears, "Nothing is changing for us," "Perestroyka didn't give us anything." The sensation is that the comrades had gone out for an easy stroll, but it has turned out that it will be necessary to make a difficult climb up a mountain. Hence the utter confusion and the unobligatory speechifying. But true champions of perestroyka are now getting, as it were, their second wind. They have not been wasting time—the present gains have been prepared as a golden reserve of yesterday's lessons and affairs and have already been aimed at tomorrow.

A. Roldugin, director of the Lebedyan Construction-Finishing Machinery Plant, has no grounds for pessimism. He accepted a "stagnant" production entity and in one or two years improved the situation in such a way that people are drawn here to borrow the experience. Recently Aleksandr Ivanovich experienced in full measure the collective's trust and good feelings: he was elected director for a second term. Essentially speaking, the workers voted for his socioeconomic program. The plant workers—of them there are only a thousand—received 16,800 square meters of housing, a young people's center, and a store. An entire avenue has appeared in the rayon center and, because of its similarity to the Moscow street, it is called the local Arbat.

A greater and greater number of people are taking advantage of the opportunity to work in an emancipated and creative way. One hopes only that the period of being a student will not drag out. A rather large number of lances have already been broken in discussions about the extreme difficulties there exist in materializing the Law Governing the State Enterprise (Association) and about the fact that, quite frequently, the labor collective councils do not have a voice. Why is that so? Many ministries and departments have not involved the labor collectives in the formation of the plans or quotas. That is a major error. And not only an economic one. A plan that is being developed must touch the heart, must grow in the awareness of every worker. Otherwise its implementation will not become a matter that is close to their heart. And that is why people are sometimes cool toward the labor collective council: this is just another fad that will go away, they say. But wherever the councils were elected seriously, in order to get things done, and wherever cost accountability has been accepted, they rapidly get to know the taste of independence and no longer make any compromises.

In the middle of the year the construction workers at the Svobodnyy Sokol Plant in Lipetsk extended the turning over of the pipe-casting shop where imported equipment

was to be installed. If the deadlines had not been met, the payment of interest for the credit would have eaten up almost half the plant's total profit. It would have been better if some of the managers had made some efforts previously. But now the collective's council took steps. They invited representatives of the construction-and-installation organizations and, dealing head-on with the situation, came to an understanding about everything. It proved to be possible to avoid the losses.

True, I will admit that this kind of independence sometimes also ends up as the satisfying of local interests and as collective selfishness. The council of the labor collective at the Metallurgstroy Trust accepted and then declined the plan of the Lipetskstroy Territorial Association for the construction of a hospital in the city of Zadonsk: it would be too costly for them, they said. Or take another situation. The oblast ispolkom decided to squeeze various offices out of the center of Lipetsk, and to replace them with stores, personal-services shops, cooperative cafes, pharmacies, and a literary museum. The public welcomed this move enthusiastically. But not all the people in the apparatus at the offices were happy, and that view was also shared by the councils at collectives with their negative opinion.

There is no need to dramatize this, but it is dangerous both to fail to notice the need for adjustments in our work, especially ideological, and to fail to make them. It is necessary to take a healthy, critical look at oneself and the world, and to do something. As, for example, S. Minkholin, chairman of the Pobeda Kolkhoz, did. Under rental terms, he estimated that driving a personal car over the kolkhoz's dirt roads was extravagant (it is a different matter to drive to the oblast or the rayon), so he changed to... a horse. That action, more convincingly than words, advertised to the kolkhoz members the merits of the rental system and showed them how it is necessary to save the kopeck that belongs to everyone.

But certain other managers are still fencing themselves off from people by their rostrum, by their office doors, and by papers. The reduction of the inflated apparatus has not been going smoothly. Various dubious reorganizations are presented as being the fight against bureaucratism. USSR Minstankoprom [Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry], for example, was on the point of creating the Lipetsk Machine-Building Association, when, suddenly, it disbanded it. What were the reasons? It had been "created" by the mechanical fusion of enterprises and was incapable of yielding any benefit. Or take another example. In 1983 RSFSR Mintrans [Ministry of Transportation] renamed the oblast motor-transportation administration, giving it the new name of the Lipetskavtotrans Association, and, four years later, State Production Association. But now, all of a sudden, it is the Lipetskavtotrans Territorial Production Association. What is this, if not arrant bureaucratism, which replaces the real restructuring of matters by the "restructuring" of the signboards?

Many people apparently do not yet recognize that the entire danger of bureaucratism lies in the shaking loose of the foundations, in the corruption of the individual. And if they

do not recognize that, then they do not oppose it or fight against it. Yes, perestroyka has prevented the slipping into the chasm of total bureaucratism. But the diktat of the formalist and the bureaucrat continues to be a diktat so long as they flourish in the twilight spider web of the administrative-command system, the threads of which are strongest in the dark corners. They rush around in an atmosphere of openness and democracy, in the light of glasnost. Just mention an incident "by name and patronymic" and the effect arises all by itself. For example, we announced publicly at the conference on scientific practice that the party's Terbunskiy Rayon Committee had considered during the year 29 major questions and almost half of them dealt with economic matters, and this is clear to everyone: this is doing the job of the soviets, and it borders on formalism.

The formalist is possessed by the thirst to regulate absolutely everything. And so you give the freedom of initiative to apparently new and thinking people, but sometimes there is almost no one who wants to take advantage of that freedom. Some do not want to "assume the responsibility," and others do not know how—they have lost the knowledge of how to work. For example, at the 50 Let Oktyabrya Kolkhoz, during the past three years, the partkom secretaries have been replaced three times. Why? They say that things did not work out right. Those secretaries include S. Dorokhin, former instructor at the party's raykom. "It is strange," the kolkhoz members say, "that the person could instruct others how to command, but when he himself was given that job, it proved to be beyond his capabilities." How can one not agree with them? And so, today, in the fourth year of perestroyka, we have not yet eliminated the shortage of business efficiency, the social infantilism, the habit of hiding under the canopy of one's official position or the guardianship of one's bosses. And when arousing in people their independence and the firmness of their position, it is necessary for the educators themselves to display that same firmness and consistency.

After the conference to hear reports and hold elections, the composition of the obkom was renewed by almost half. More workers and kolkhoz members became part of it. A considerable number of the apparatus workers and the oblast managers yielded their mandates to representatives of primary party organizations. The obkom did not force any candidacies on anyone—this was the expression of the will of the oblast Communists. It is becoming a real and constructive force, and this, I daresay, is our chief gain.

Local Election Procedures Cause Confusion, Complaints

*18300303a Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Jan 89 p 1*

[Article by S. Stepanov under rubric "Learning Democracy": "Tempest in a Teapot"]

[Text] Gradually we are beginning to get accustomed to the fever pitch of passions which frequently accompany a particular socially significant event. At such a time we say,

"Yes, everything is proceeding properly, everything is the way it should be, people are being aroused from the long hibernation of the years of stagnation, and now they can be involved in everything..."

But if one looks closely at the conflict around which lances are being broken and in which people are straining their voices, well, there is not much to talk about, and the whole ruckus does not amount to a hill of beans. It is simply that no explanation was given promptly to people, and they did not interpret what was going on... Who failed to explain, who failed to interpret? Most frequently that question remains in the shadows: it is the price of the transitional period, people say. But isn't it time to make people fully accountable for such miscalculations?

This is the situation that occurred. The editorial office received a letter from the workers at Shop No. 7 of Alma-Ata Machine-Building Plant imeni S. M. Kirov. Here is their letter (with slight deletions):

"On 22 December 1988 there was a meeting at the shop to nominate a candidate for election as a USSR people's deputy. We would like to comment that the meeting was conducted in a hasty manner, without any preparation. The announcement of the meeting was posted 3 hours before it began. The meeting was conducted at the end of the lunch break, and the second shift and some of the people who had not had time to get back from lunch were absent. After the election of the presidium, the first person to speak was shop chief A. N. Pronevich. He briefly described the procedure for conducting the election in accordance with the new Law Governing Elections of USSR People's Deputies, and then said that the plant's trade-union committee had entrusted to our shop the honored mission of nominating a candidate for election as a USSR people's deputy from the plant's trade-union organization. In response to a question from the auditorium as to why it was precisely our shop that had been given that mission, the shop chief's reply was simple: in view of the fact that the shop is one of the best ones at the plant. In our opinion, this is a violation, since the candidate from the plant is supposed to be elected at a plant-wide trade-union conference with a consideration of the candidates who have been nominated from each shop.

"After the statement made by the shop chief, shop committee chairman V. I. Karnaukh took the podium. He reported that, at a shop committee session that had been held before the meeting, A. N. Pereverzev, a milling machine operator in our shop, had been nominated. Then a discussion period had begun. In the course of the discussion, another person was nominated—boring machine operator V. A. Strashenko. When the discussion period ended, the meeting passed a motion to submit both candidacies to a vote.

"The vote was carried out openly. The count was taken three times, since the results of the first vote did not satisfy the shop administrators. On the basis of the vote

results, V. A. Starshenko's candidacy was sustained. Despite the fact that less than half the meeting participants voted for Comrade Pereverzev's candidacy, the meeting's minutes were submitted for examination by the plant's trade-union committee in such a way that two candidates had been nominated from the shop.

"We did not begin to learn what decision had been made by the plant committee until, on 27 December, we made inquiries of A. S. Sudin, head of the organizational department of the party's city committee. He reported that the person who had been nominated as a deputy from our plant's trade-union organization was Pereverzev.

"On 5 January on an information program on Kazakh television it was reported that Kazsovprom [Kazakh Council of Trade Unions] had submitted for consideration by the AUCCTU plenum the names of three nominees, one of whom was Comrade A. N. Pereverzev, as a candidate from the Plant imeni S. M. Kirov. But at a meeting of the plant's primary trade-union operation, Pereverzev's candidacy had been rejected by a majority of the votes! How could that be?

"On 6 January there was a meeting at the shop. At that meeting A. N. Pereverzev stated from the rostrum that when the first meeting was being conducted, the plant management had been misinformed, that his candidacy had been recommended by the oblast council of trade unions, and it turned out that, when the meeting was being conducted, there was not even any need for us to conduct a vote, much less nominate another candidate. All we were supposed to do was to discuss Pereverzev's candidacy and pass a motion stating whether or not we supported him.

"Unfortunately we cannot submit a copy of the minutes, since they were transferred to the plant's trade-union committee. Comrade Sheryuble, deputy chairman of that committee, declined to speak with representatives of the collective. We have repeatedly requested the shop committee to conduct a trade-union meeting with the participation of L. F. Bukayeva, chairman of the trade-union committee. However, Bukayeva has also declined a meeting with the shop collective, stating that she is too busy.

"On the basis of what has been stated, we feel that Articles 13, 37, and 39 of the Law Governing Elections of USSR People's Deputies were violated. Inasmuch as A. N. Pereverzev's nomination was made without a consideration of the collective's opinion, we have sent a telegram to the Central Electoral Commission, requesting the removal of that nomination from consideration at the AUCCTU plenum.

"Kabeyev, Burtsev, and others—a total of 60 signatures."

The first sensation after reading the letter is bewilderment. Haven't they read the new Law Governing Elections? Certainly they must have, because there are references to articles of that law. Or had they read it inattentively? Presumably that is the situation.

The paradox consists in the fact that the authors of the letter made correct conclusions from an incorrect premise. They viewed the meeting that had been held at the shop as a meeting to nominate a candidate for election as a people's deputy, and they behaved accordingly. However, the Law Governing Elections states quite precisely (Article 39): "Candidates for election as USSR people's deputies from public organizations (in this instance, trade unions—S. Stepanov) are nominated at plenums of their nationwide agencies." Nationwide!

It is necessary to make a slight explanation here. This is the first time that an election campaign based on the new principles is being conducted in our country. The Law Governing the Elections of USSR People's Deputies, naturally, cannot foresee or regulate all the stages in this campaign. Therefore the procedure for nominating candidates from public organizations has been stipulated by the higher agencies of those organizations. In particular, AUCCTU at one time requested all the trade-union organizations in the country to carry out a preliminary discussion and selection of nominees. It was felt that this would give the nomination campaign a more democratic nature and provide the opportunity for broadly discussing the merits and shortcomings of the nominees... And the number of nominees was not limited—people could nominate ten people if they wanted, and then the empowered representatives of the labor collectives who were part of the superior trade-union agencies would conduct meetings at which they would decide which of the nominees was worthy of continuing the struggle for the deputy mandates.

I am convinced that if all this had been explained to people at the very beginning of the meeting of the collective at Shop No. 7, no conflict would have arisen. There would not have been any completely unnecessary vote, which was completely devoid of any meaning. And the workers had nominated their candidate alongside of the person whom the plant's trade-union committee had recommended? Excellent. But then let us decide in a democratic manner which of them is truly worthy. Because no one regulates the actions when resolving such moot questions. And if they do arise, the plant's trade-union committee has the right to conduct even a plant-wide trade-union conference in order to hear the workers' opinion...

Unfortunately, none of this was done. And so now we approach that part of the letter in which its authors are completely correct. Did they have the right to find out what decision had been made by the trade-union committee? Definitely. They had to carry out a fierce struggle to learn this "supersecret" decision. Could the workers have counted on the attention and complete support in

such a complicated question on the party of the trade-union committee, the party organization, and the plant's administrators? They did count on that, but it turned out that they were rebuffed by them. The question that arises here is, as a minimum, the question of the managers' political responsibility for the inability (or was it the lack of desire?) to speak honestly and openly with people.

One can also understand the workers' bewilderment because the candidate from the plant's trade-union organization had been discussed at a meeting intended only for the shop where he worked. One can argue here about the perfection and the democratic nature of the recommended procedure for making nominations, and even the situation that arose did not serve as a warning signal that the people at the plant had rejected that procedure and had attempted to find a nontraditional resolution. Here they started out along an old, time-tested path: ignoring the opinion of the shop's collective, the trade-union committee retained the candidacy that had been recommended by the oblast trade-union council and rejected the one that the majority had voted for. And then it preferred to remain silent and tell the workers nothing...

The results of all this were unfortunate. This is the third week that Shop No. 7 has been seething. There has been a noticeable drop in its production indicators. A serious telegram has been sent to Moscow. Various city, oblast, and republic-level agencies have been involved in analyzing the conflict. It must be thought that they will make the necessary conclusions from what has happened. But let us hope that this story will serve as a lesson for all of us. Democracy is a complicated science, and the first thing that it requires is the rejection of yesterday's yardstick. Because what happened is a typical situation that seems to have been taken entirely from the period of stagnation...

[Editor's note] When this material had already been prepared for the press, we got in touch with A. V. Vladimirov, head of the organizational department of the Alma-Ata Oblast Trade-Union Council, and asked him to discuss the further development of events.

"On 12 January," Anatoliy Vladimirovich said, "the shop had another meeting in which I took part. The workers agreed that their candidate (Strashenko) was not suitable as the candidate from the trade unions—he did not have any experience in trade-union work, or had not performed any other meritorious services for the trade-union organization. Starshenko himself withdrew his candidacy. Another vote was cast for Pereverzev's candidacy. Out of the 132 persons present, less than half—60 persons—voted against him. In this situation Pereverzev also stated that he would withdraw his candidacy."

Well, then, is this a happy ending? One could scarcely call it a happy one. The uproar has died down, but certainly people have been left with a bitter feeling. After

everything that has happened, will people continue to have faith in glasnost and democracy? We would like very much to think that they will. Otherwise we shall never win the battle for perestroika.

Editorial Emphasizes Nationality Issues, Planned Changes

18300303b Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Jan 89 p 1

[Editorial: "We Need Specific Work"]

[Text] The country is proceeding toward the CPSU Central Committee Plenum "Improving Interethnic Relations." Our republic is continuing to prepare actively for it, by carrying out work to fulfill the CPSU Central Committee's resolution entitled "The Work of the Kazakh Republic's Party Organization to Achieve the International and Patriotic Education of the Workers."

In our republic's economic and social development we have seen the appearance of positive tendencies, and this has had a favorable influence on the nature of interethnic relations. A democratic system for administering the processes in this sphere is forming: national-relations sectors have been created in the republic's party committees, and for purposes of coordinating the activities of the party, soviet, trade-union, and Komsomol agencies in resolving vitally important questions in developing interethnic relations, commissions to deal with national and interethnic relations are in operation. Corresponding public formations exist also in the soviets of people's deputies and the trade-union and Komsomol agencies. For example, in the nine oblast soviets, permanent commissions and 56 deputy working groups have been formed. These groups represent the interests of the Azerbaijani, Greek, Dungan, Korean, German, Polish, Uzbek, and Uighur population.

A republic sociopolitical center for propagating Leninist national policy has been created, and work is under way to create such centers in the oblasts.

In a word, much is being done. But a lot remains to be done. It is necessary to carry out specific work in all areas of international education, and people must see and experience within themselves the results of this work. Many people continue to have an erroneous idea of international education as being entirely ideological work, and they do not link the tasks of improving the interethnic relations with the day-by-day labor in their own production sector.

Much will have to be done to fulfill the comprehensive program that has been created in the republic, entitled "National Cadres of the Kazakhstan Working Class." At such time it will be necessary to consider the fact that the bringing in of replacements into the leading branches of production must be guaranteed not only by drawing upon Kazakhs, but also Uighurs, Koreans, Uzbeks,

Dungans, and representatives of other nationalities. There have been positive shifts in this direction in the coal and metallurgical industry, machine-building, construction, and transportation. But it is too early to be complacent, and this work must be continued. A large number of unresolved questions in this respect exist at the deposits in the petroleum and gas industry in West Kazakhstan. It will also be necessary to resolve questions of training cadres of local specialists and workers for the subway that is under construction in Alma-Ata.

Problems in the formation of national working-class detachments arise primarily as a result of the lack of any clear-cut system or planning in this matter. Therefore it would be desirable, at the level of USSR Gosplan and the union ministries and departments, to develop for the long-term period a program for training and retraining worker cadres with a consideration of the real requirements of all branches of the national economy on a countrywide scale and for the individual regions. Moreover, these programs must be implemented only in interrelationship with the tasks of the social development of the labor collectives. Incidentally, under conditions of the development of republic-level cost accountability, sooner or later there will inevitably arise the question of transferring to the jurisdiction of the republic's agencies the enterprises of union subordination.

A very large amount of specific work will also have to be carried out in the socioideological sphere of interethnic relations. The party and soviet agencies in the oblasts, jointly with the ministries and departments and the trade-union and Komsomol agencies, will have to guarantee within the near future the active functioning of the national languages and the creation of the conditions for national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism, and will have to take additional steps to improve the study of the Kazakh and Russian languages, as well as the Uighur, German, and other languages being studied as native languages. In 1989 it will be necessary, for example, to provide simultaneous-interpretation systems in facilities where official measures are being carried out in all the republic's oblasts, cities, and rayons. KaSSR Gossnab, jointly with the local agencies of authority, must define the real need and must guarantee the fulfillment of purchase orders for typewriters with Kazakh, Uighur, and German fonts.

The appropriate ministries and departments must demonstrate concern for improving trade advertising and printing commodity tags in Kazakh. It will be necessary to provide bilingual announcements in transportation—at airports and terminals, in trains, airplanes, and motor buses. It will also be necessary to train cadres to assure that telegrams, parcels, and letters addressed in the Kazakh language are accepted everywhere.

It is planned to carry out large plans in the cultural and educational sphere. It will be necessary to resolve questions of improving the training in the republic of teachers of Kazakh, German, and Uighur, and, in cooperation with other republics, Azerbaijani, Korean, Polish, Chechen, Turkish, Dungan, and other languages.

It is proposed within the next few years to open up at Kazakh State University a School of Eastern Languages—Chinese, Arabic, and Persian, and, in the long term, Japanese. For graduates of Kazakh schools, in higher and secondary special educational institutions instruction in Kazakh will be available in the first two years. In schools using Russian as the language of instruction, an examination in the Kazakh language will be introduced.

A decision has been made to building in Alma-Ata buildings to house a Uighur, Korean, and German theater. The appropriate agencies are considering various questions: the introduction on Kazakh television of broadcasts in German; the showing of motion pictures in the national languages in the republic's movie theaters; increasing the publication frequency for the Uighur PARVAZ almanac; and the publication of literary supplements to the newspapers FREUNDSHAFT, KOMMUNIZM TUGI, and LENIN KICHI, and the publishing of albums with a description of the ceremonies, traditions, everyday life, and costumes of the nationalities living in Kazakhstan, and collections of popular folklore.

The appropriate ministries and departments will also have to study in detail the questions the population's employment rate in the republic's areas with an excess of labor, and questions of the ecology and the protection of the public's health in all regions of Kazakhstan.

In a word, the work that lies ahead in improving the interethnic relations in the republic is tremendous and very important. And it pertains to each of us. In every production entity, at every work station, there is something to be done to resolve the vitally important problems of socioeconomic development which are linked in the closest manner with the problems of international education and interethnic relations. The specific decisions require specific work and specific responsibility.

KaSSR Council of Ministers Discusses Economic Issues

18300303c Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 18 Jan 89 p 1

[KazTAG report: "At the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The results of the republic's socioeconomic development in 1988 and the first three years of the five-year plan were discussed on 17 January at a session of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers.

The restructuring in the relations within and among the departments and the changeover of all the production branches in the republic's national economy to self-financing, those who spoke emphasized, have been introducing dynamism into the economy. The introduction of the new management conditions was preceded by a

major amount of work, as a result of which the effectiveness of industry increased last year. Labor productivity increased by 13.4 percent during the past three years, as compared with 9.2 in the five-year plan. This resulted in a 93-percent increase in industrial output. The overall volume of that output increased by 14.2 percent, as compared with 14.1 in the five-year plan.

Pledges for contract shipments were fulfilled by 99.3 percent last year, as compared with 98.2 in 1987. The value of the unshipped output decreased to 43.47 percent of the previous value. National income increased by 2.6 percent, and the average annual rate of its increase during the three-year period came to 1.9 percent, as compared with 1.3 in the 11th Five-Year Plan.

The opinion was expressed at the session that the development of the national economy was hampered by a number of factors. One of them is the high materials-intensity of the articles. At the Pavlodarskiy Traktorny Zavod Association and the Kentau Excavator Plant it has even increased. In all branches, resource-saving technological schemes are being introduced unsatisfactorily. There has been underfulfillment of the assignments for the economizing of raw and other materials and of energy, and little use is being made of secondary resources.

The rates of return on the remodeling of enterprises have been insufficient. For example, the Garment Production Association imeni Gagarin, by installing imported equipment, planned to have a volume of production of articles this year at last year's level. This is by no means the only example of this kind. A matter of special concern is the state of contract discipline. Many enterprises not only have not been increasing their production of output, but are even attempting to reduce it.

"The reason for this negative phenomenon," Ye. F. Bashmakov, first deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, said, "lies in the enterprises' desire to obtain more profit. Because the smaller the assignment, the greater the opportunities for selling output produced in excess of plan, and consequently for supplementing the labor-payment fund. Thus one collective's prosperity is achieved at the expense of the 'underconclusion' of contracts with others, and the disturbing of the equilibrium in the economy."

In order to eliminate this, it is necessary to make more dynamic use of the economic levers, including the considerable opportunities provided by arbitration.

The reason for the uneven operation of the associations and enterprises, the session participants also noted, lies primarily in the undemandingness on the part of a number of managers of ministries, departments, and enterprises, and their inability to make complete use of the internal reserves, and especially the existing capacities.

The following example was cited: out of 172 recently activated projects, only one-third of them achieved the rated labor productivity and production volumes. A negative role in this was played by the mistakes that had been made during construction planning; the failure to link the capacities; equipment defects; delays in being supplied with materials; and the incompleteness of the personnel staff because of backwardness in the social sphere.

"We are continuing to observe the shameful practice of the dissipation of funds in a large number of projects, and, as a result, the underuse of those funds," K. A. Abdullayev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and chairman of Kazakh SSR Gosplan, said in his statement. "Out of 42 projects scheduled for start-up in the next planning period, Gosstroy was able to activate only 24. The contract organizations and customers have not learned how to work in close contact."

Kazakh SSR Gosstroy continues to show little concern for tomorrow. And yet, in the future, the quality and rates of construction of projects will definitely be influenced by the weak development of the base in the construction industry. Out of 36 such capacities, only 19 were activated.

The list of projects scheduled for start-up in the next planning period sometimes includes construction sites that have not been provided completely with equipment. This pertains, in particular, to the capacities at the Petropavlovsk Electrical-Insulating Materials Plant imeni M. I. Kalinin; and at the Karatau Production Association. A similar situation was allowed to occur at the Large-Panel House-Building Plant; at the mining and concentration combine; and the knitted fabrics factory in Tselinograd. Unfortunately, the oblast ispolkoms on whose territory these enterprises are being erected proved to be casual observers.

During the past two years the republic achieved considerable success in housing construction. The implementation of the Housing-1991 program made it possible to improve the living conditions for more than 310,000 families. However, there have also been unused reserves in this area. For example, the erecting of housing along the lines of the local soviets has been lagging behind, and individual construction is underestimated.

The problems in the social sphere are being eliminated slowly. Although the assignment for activation of schools, kindergartens, and public-health institutions has been fulfilled, the shortage of those projects continues to be felt. The development of the republic's municipaleconomy has been lagging behind the rates of industrial and civil construction. A difficult situation has developed with the supplying of water and heat to certain populated places and with the condition of purification and sewage structures. The lagging behind at the projects in this sphere since the very beginning of last year failed to cause any

alarm on the part of the republic's Ministry of the Municipal Economy or the ispolkoms. They failed to make prompt claims against the contractor subdivisions of Gosagroprom and Gosstroy.

There were considerable changes for the better in the agroindustrial complex. The gross increase in output there increased by 16 percent. Output with a total value of more than 2 billion rubles was produced during the three-year period in excess of the assignments in the five-year plan. But that increase is insufficient to satisfy the needs of the republic's population. It is necessary to work steadily to use the available reserves, the session participants remarked. And it is necessary first of all to increase the efficiency of vegetable and animal husbandry and to expand the irrigated areas. Special attention must be devoted to increasing the rates of constructing structures in which to store or process the output. Because of a shortage of such structures, many potatoes and vegetables are lost.

The speakers did not limit themselves to stating shortcomings and omissions or to pointing a finger at the guilty individuals. They also stated specific ways and opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of cost-accountable relations, for introducing the rental contract on a broader and more effective scale, and for creatively using the valuable experience that exists. The new economic mechanism will not operate with complete efficiency unless the planned reforms in material-technical supply, pricing, and credit-and-financial relations are completed. It was re-emphasized that the practice of fulfilling the plan at any price is unacceptable under the new conditions. However, recurrences of this diseases have not been completely cured. For example, the rate of turning over of meat increased by reducing the number of head of livestock, rather than by a rise in the livestock's daily weight increases.

The introduction of intensive technological schemes did not always have a positive effect on the work results. In Kokchetav and North Kazakhstan oblasts, for example, there was a reduction in the harvest yield of grain crops, and that, naturally, led to an increase in expenditures of funds in excess of plan. There was also an increase in the wages there, which increase was not reinforced by the necessary increase in labor productivity.

There is a disbalance between the public's monetary income and expenses. This is promoted by miscalculations in organizing trade, and by the narrow assortment, poor quality, and the insufficient quantity of consumer goods for which there is a mass demand.

The participants especially discussed questions of carrying out the wintering-over operations for the livestock, and the operation of enterprises during that season of the year. The managers of the ministries and departments were advised to take exhaustive steps to create favorable conditions for the activity of all the production collectives. It was noted that not much time remains until the

sowing of grain and fodder crops. It is necessary to speed up the repair of the equipment, to provide it with spare parts, fuels, and lubricants, and to bring the seed stock up to specifications.

Sharp criticism was leveled at the administrators of the Alma-Ata City Ispolkom and the Pavlodar and Kustanay oblast ispolkoms, who allowed the carrying out of the new management methods to proceed under their own momentum. The roadblocks on the path of socioeconomic acceleration, the session participants said, will not just disappear by themselves. The bureaucratic, authoritarian system has been yielding its positions unwillingly, but the new, bold decisions evolving from the pluralism of opinion and from the enterprises' growing independence, are gradually replacing the obsolete stereotypes. The development of rental and cooperative relations, the setting up of the cost-accountable mechanism, and the rigid coordination of all its elements must become the field of action for every branch, every ministry and department, and every labor collective.

M. S. Mendybayev, second secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, took part in the work of the session.

TaSSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman on Electoral Nominating Process

18300356 Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA* in Russian 6 Jan 89 p 1

[Interview with I. F. Dedov, deputy chairman of the TaSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, by *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA* correspondent M. Lebedev under the rubric "As We Go to the Polls": "At the Nominating Stage"]

[Text] How the ministries, departments, and organizations under them have entered into the election campaign was the subject of discussion at a meeting of the TaSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Leading representatives described the work that had been done. It was noted, according to the views expressed by some, that the tempo had slowed down.

The meeting was conducted by I. F. Dedov, deputy chairman of the TaSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The following specific questions concerning the current election campaign were addressed to him by our correspondent.

[Lebedev] The election campaign is now at the critical stage of nominating candidates for deputy. It is at this point that citizens feel the particular impact of the Law on Elections of USSR People's Deputies. Practical experience is now being gained in applying the provisions of this law. The nomination of candidates for deputy from social organizations and throughout the voting regions will continue through 24 November 1989. Obviously, it is worth while to note the basic milestones along the way of the voting campaign.

[Dedov] The particular periods set for the election campaign require precision and coordination of efforts by all engaged in this vital work. The soviets of peoples deputies, as well as state and social organs, must galvanize themselves into action, so that the campaign is carried out in full compliance with the law. Here is the basic schedule. By 24 January, as the nominating process comes to an end, the voting districts should be formed; and the voting district commissions should be in place no later than 8 February. A period of a month is allotted for registration of candidates and the conducting of regional election meetings, while almost two months in all are available for candidates to meet with the voters. The elections are scheduled to be held on 26 March 1989.

The process of the election campaign indicates that many questions are arising in the minds of organizers locally and in the collectives, where the nominations will take place. This, of course, is understandable since the upcoming elections are to be carried out on a completely new basis. To assist the regional voting commissions, labor collectives, and social organizations, a special election campaign staff for the republic has been established in the TaSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Advice on all campaign questions may be obtained by telephoning its information section at 23-26-87.

[Lebedev] There are certainly a lot of questions. According to reports received by our editorial staff, not all people are familiar with the fundamentals of the Law on Elections. Few people are aware of their rights and opportunities. There is even the stereotypical expectation that everything, as in the old days, will be staged. And, of course, this prejudice could turn the nominating process in the election campaign upside down. It must be acknowledged that even the booklet now in the stores containing the USSR Constitution and the Law on Elections is not being purchased.

[Dedov] In spite of the fact that these documents have been published in the newspapers, there is still a shortage of information. At times I can see that the people I talk with about the new documents are relying on provisions contained in drafts and not in the laws themselves. Today the booklets may be on hand as they should be, but we are not relieved of our concern. All the documentation on the elections should be ready on schedule. Major responsibility in this respect rests with the subdivision of Goskomizdat.

A vital issue is providing documents necessary for citizens of various nationalities living in areas of dense resettlement. Documents and literature of this kind are to be obtained on an exchange basis with the neighboring republics.

[Lebedev] Taking into account the interests of diverse population groups in the election campaign is an urgent task. Obviously, there are questions that arise in connection with the fact that there are people who work in

outlying areas situated in other republics. Moreover, there are meteorologists on duty in remote weather stations that are not easily accessible. And an election campaign, including the nominating stage, is not supposed to take place without such people participating.

[Dedov] A distinguishing feature of our mountain republic is the difficulty of access in places. Special concern is required on the part of the local election commissions for the people living in these areas. The State Agricultural Committee and the TaSSR Hydrometeorological Bureau, together with the local soviets, should come to their assistance. Much of the work falls on the shoulders of the subdivision of the Ministry of Communications and the Civil Aviation Administration. Special attention is to be given to the collection and transfer of communications marked with the watchword "Election." Channels of communication will be available from any place where there are airports with pilots available. Helicopter crews are on hand to make runs at the instructions of the regional commissions. And wherever it is impossible to communicate by telephone, special vehicles with radio transmission equipment can be dispatched.

[Lebedev] The Tajik Civil Aviation Administration is operating on a full cost-accounting basis, and each hour that a helicopter is in use costs 530 rubles. Communication services are also costly. And, of course, the election campaigns of the candidates are soon to begin. These, too, will require financial resources. Here, we come up against the question of how the election campaign is to be financed. I suspect that the spokesman for the Ministry of Finance is not prepared to provide detailed information.

[Dedov] This is indeed the case. The commissions, as you know, have already spent money on their own needs. Some people, who cannot be left without funds, have already been released from their jobs and have started to work as members of the commission. Still, we have not received word of when the financing the election campaign is to begin.

More than 2 million rubles have been set aside to spend on the republic election campaign. Article 12 of the Law on Elections stipulates that neither the voters nor the candidates for deputy are to bear the costs connected with either preparing for or holding the elections. All expenses are to be paid by the state. Enterprises, institutions, and organizations together with state bodies are to place accommodations and facilities necessary at the disposal of the election commissions.

In the distribution of funds, population density, size of the territory, and of course its accessibility are to be taken into consideration. Local financial bodies acting as creditors are called upon to prepare travel schedule

estimates. There are going to be a lot of expenses. But the regional commissions are nevertheless constrained to keep them within reasonable limits.

A large share of the funds is budgeted for typographical reproduction. In addition to bulletins and posters of various kinds, fliers must be printed giving biographical data on the candidates. Funds must also be set aside so that candidates, following registration, may be free from their work for a month. They are to be compensated for their average pay and also for travel in the region. In the capital it is simpler to compute travel costs—tickets are sufficient evidence. But expenses in the outlying areas are altogether different.

[Lebedev] The staff that has been set up in the Supreme Soviet Presidium will be in a position to coordinate the activities of many organizations and resolve many issues. The possibility is not to be ruled out that there will be controversial issues as well. Are you not exposing yourself as a target? Are you not taking the place of the election commissions?

[Dedov] Our task, as we see it, is one of consultation and coordination only. Our activities in this respect are regulated under the provisions of Article 31, which states that state and public bodies, including institutions, enterprises, organizations, and their officials are required in the exercise of their authority to provide the election commissions with the information and materials they require for their work.

How the elections will be conducted depends on the current level of energy and effort exerted by the regional election commissions and the people who make them up. In the first place, it is incumbent upon them to familiarize themselves with the elections law, and to know Article 25 by heart, so that they may fully use the authority they have. All the organizational power is in their hands. And, of course, they must keep informed of how the nominations of candidates are proceeding; they must know in advance of the meetings of workers, and in case of necessity they must appeal to the collectives to nominate candidates for deputy. In short, the role of the election commissions in the current elections is one of unusual importance.

Of course, it is not only the election procedures that are being changed. The election law has a whole series of provisions designed to bolster the democratic basis for preparing and carrying out the elections. In the final analysis, we are concerned with the nomination of people and their election as USSR people's deputies who are the most businesslike, competent, and worthy candidates, committed to speaking for and representing the interests of society and the people who elect them, and able to set high standards in the fulfillment of their duties to the state.

**Chief Editor on Growing Popularity of
ARGUMENTY I FAKTY**

*18000296A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Jan 89 p 4*

[Interview with Vladislav Andreyevich Starkov, editor-in-chief of the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, by V. Gorlov; date and place not specified]

[Text]The popularity record among our country's publications was set this year by the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY.

You do not feed journalists on honey; give them sensations. But it looks like they are not so willing to talk about sensations in their own milieu. Could this be professional jealousy? Possibly. According to the results of the all-Union subscription for 1989, the newspaper that moved to the front was one which many people had not even heard of a few years ago—ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. And the rate of growth in its circulation is simply astonishing: it has doubled each year.

It is clear that this is not an accident. Does this mean that it was natural and predictable? How? How are our colleagues from ARGUMENTY I FAKTY enjoying their surging popularity?

To answer these and other questions I walked three times by Building No 12 on Malaya Bronnaya Street where, according to the newspaper's publication data, its editorial office is located. Finally I did find a tiny sign with the newspaper's name. It was pinned up so high and written so small that anyone deciding to visit ARGUMENTY I FAKTY would need to have sharp vision. Was this from modesty? Or poverty? I decided to ask Vladislav Andreyevich Starkov, editor-in-chief of the newspaper, that question later.

First the background.

[Gorlov] How old is your newspaper, Vladislav Andreyevich?

[Starkov] It was 10 years old last year.

[Gorlov] Where did it originate?

[Starkov] In the Sokolniki region in one of the basements of a residential building.

[Gorlov] You have moved to the center of Moscow...

[Starkov] Yes, and as you can see we are no longer in the basement. Our office is three former communal apartments.

[Gorlov] What was your initial circulation?

[Starkov] 10,000 copies.

[Gorlov] And today?

[Starkov] 20.5 million.

[Gorlov] Average pay of associates?

[Starkov] About 200 rubles.

[Gorlov] Your personal pay?

[Starkov] 300 rubles plus 50 personal supplement.

[Gorlov] Your personal car?

[Starkov] It is an editorial car. A Volga with 200,000 kilometers behind it.

[Gorlov] The newspaper's annual income?

[Starkov] About 30 million rubles.

[Gorlov] Where does it go?

[Starkov] To the state budget and the fund of the All-Union Znaniye Society, which is our parent organization.

[Gorlov] Of course, you are for cost accounting.

[Starkov] Of course. Even the half-way kind we have today.

[Gorlov] How were you able to do it, to jump from a circulation of 10 million last year to 20.5 now?

[Starkov] Blame the readers.

[Gorlov] Do you receive a lot of mail?

[Starkov] 1,000 letters a day.

[Gorlov] How about in 1978?

[Starkov] In that year we received 36 letters.

[Gorlov] What questions are paramount with the readers?

[Starkov] Ordinary, everyday things. More precisely socioeconomic matters. But questions of history are beyond the competition.

[Gorlov] The most competent contemporary historian, in your opinion?

[Starkov] Roy Medvedev. You will soon be reading his main articles and books.

[Gorlov] Do you receive complaints?

[Starkov] Rarely.

[Gorlov] Does that mean that the newspaper's articles are not very effective?

[Starkov] Our effectiveness is in information for the readers. There are hundreds of state organizations whose direct duty is to act for the good of the people.

[Gorlov] Your newspaper is basically done by two types of writers, readers and journalists. Who do you consider paramount in the newspaper's success?

[Starkov] The reader asks questions which sometimes do not occur to journalists, but the reader often does not know where to find answers to his questions. Journalists have incomparably greater opportunities here.

[Gorlov] Are there reader's questions which you still have not answered?

[Starkov] Yes. For example, how much we spend on defense. Or what place the Soviet Union holds in the world for personal standard of living.

[Gorlov] Does the editorial office have material on file which has not yet found its way onto the printed page?

[Starkov] We would like to print Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress. I think that our subscribers will read it all the same.

[Gorlov] The articles which you print are sometimes very sharply worded. Do you have problems with the censor?

[Starkov] Practically none. We are finding a common language. The censors have a sense of curiosity also.

[Gorlov] Judging by your publications you have a very broad network of "agents." It is not easy to keep them together. How many associates are there at the editorial office?

[Starkov] There are 20 creative workers.

[Gorlov] That is not too many.

[Starkov] Bloated staffs do not keep correspondents in shape.

[Gorlov] I see foreign magazines on your desk...

[Starkov] Yes, I read English and French.

[Gorlov] Are you a professional journalist?

[Starkov] Yes, I am now. But at first I was an engineer. I graduated from the school of journalism at Rostov University later.

[Gorlov] What event will ARGUMENTY I FAKTY be devoting attention to in the upcoming issues?

[Starkov] Elections to the Supreme Soviet.

[Gorlov] Do you listen to Western radio stations?

[Starkov] Of course.

[Gorlov] In many broadcasts about the elections it is said that this campaign is being coordinated from above and candidates for deputy are being carefully filtered just as before.

[Starkov] That is not true. And the main thing is that some listeners to the "voices" are easily won over because they are not familiar with the new election system. I recently witnessed how a respected candidate, the poet Yegor Isayev, who until very recently would have won 100 percent of the vote, was "tested." The questions were simple, such as "Tell us what are you for? What kind of program do you propose?" But Yegor Isayev was not ready for them. Generalities are not respected today. For different reasons the respected chairman of the board of directors of the All-Union Znaniye Society, Academician Basov and Academician Ambartsumyan did not receive support from the voters.

[Gorlov] Information is not cheap in our day. But an annual subscription to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY costs less than three rubles. For OGONEK, for example, it is more than 20.

[Starkov] Information should be accessible to everyone.

[Gorlov] Do your associates get into extraordinary situations?

[Starkov] Yes, and ridiculous ones too. One of our reporters recently found himself accidentally in the middle of a street fight and an excited militsiaman whacked him with a club. So hard that it broke. When the militsiaman found out his victim was from ARGUMENTY I FAKTY he got very upset: "Who will pay for my club now? After all it costs 250 rubles!"

[Gorlov] You are very hospitable. Tea, coffee, and candy. Do you have many guests?

[Starkov] As you noticed there are no militsiamen or guards at our entrance. Therefore life here is sometimes like a railroad terminal. This is disrupting, but not annoying. Although, of course, we do not have enough candy for everyone.

[Gorlov] Your newspaper is very different from the others. It is dry, compressed in the grip of fact. Do you think that it is the newspaper of the future in our country?

[Starkov] Why not? Contemporary newspapers have been conservative with newspaper space for a long time. The reader is demanding information. And he himself wants to think it through and interpret it. The reader has become tired of moralizing.

[Gorlov] Have you noticed the rubric "We Buy Facts" in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA?

[Starkov] Yes, and also that you intend to pay pretty well for the best facts.

[Gorlov] We are making a business proposal to cooperate.

[Starkov] I am for it.

[Gorlov] And the last thing. What about that little sign at the entrance with the newspaper's name. Is that modesty? Or is it poverty?

[Starkov] Modesty, the people say, is attractive. But we would not be opposed to getting a little richer.

[Gorlov] But facts remain facts...

[Starkov] You cannot beat the facts. But life has its own reasons...

BSSR TV Chairman on Improving Republic-Level Television

18000296b Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 89 p 3

[Interview with G. N. Buravkin, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, by L. Pavlyuchik]

[Text] At the 19th All-Union Party Conference the role of the mass information media, including television, in patriotic indoctrination of working people and further improving interethnic relations was emphasized. But while the broadcasts of the all-Union programs today are seen by everyone, the concerns, achievements, and omissions of local republic television and radio committees often remain somehow outside the framework of public attention. At the same time, though, there are many unresolved problems and much interesting experience in their work.

How is cooperation between central and local broadcasting being carried on today? Is the television screen properly promoting the beneficial processes of restructuring? What is being done on republic television toward interethnic indoctrination of people? These are subjects that G. N. Buravkin, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, reflects on in a conversation with our correspondent.

[Buravkin] The question of questions for republic broadcasting is its ability to compete with the best programs of Central Television, and therefore also the possibility of

fighting for its audience. In this sense Belorussia and the Ukraine are known to be at kind of a disadvantage. For example, while in Tajikistan, Moldavia, Armenia, or Estonia part of the population, in any case the rural population, continues to experience the so-called language barrier for understanding all-Union programs, such difficulties do not exist for any inhabitant of our republic. And by one turn of the dial he "votes" for "Viewpoint" or "What? Where? When?" if we cannot offer anything "competitive" at that moment.

I will be frank and say that we do not have the conditions and resources—material, technical, and also intellectual, which Central Television has. And the most serious problem, in my own opinion, is personnel. I do not want to say that we do not have enough personnel, but in our republic recently we have not had figures who are "equal in stature" to people such as L. Voznesenskiy, V. Beke-tov, A. Tikhomirov, and V. Molchanov. The journalism school at Belorussian University, whose graduates fill most of our editorial positions, has operated in a stereotyped way for many years now, diligently "pumping out" students based on obsolete theory and giving them very rough professional skills.

I also cannot ignore our technical backwardness relative to Central Television. At Ostankino they have mostly equipment made in Japan, West Germany, and the United States, but most of our equipment is our own domestic equipment, and it is not as good as the foreign equipment.

Our working conditions are different too; for a broadcast on which Central Television people spend, say, two weeks, we sometimes can only spend three days. We simply do not have more time. You just try to maintain a high "competitive" level everyday...

I say this with bitterness because Central and regional television do not exist in isolation; they come to the viewer from the same screen. And if something is poor, if republic broadcasting is poor, all of our television loses, which means that we have less ability to influence the hearts and souls of the people.

[Pavlyuchik] And all the same, under these unequal conditions you try to uphold your "name" and even, judging by my own viewing experience, you often come out on a level with the best Central Television programs. How, through what means are you able to do this?

[Buravkin] By sticking to our own, unique things. No matter how Central Television journalists may try to broaden their geography and how much they may want to "embrace the unembraceable," in a country of such vast scale as ours and in a state with so many nations, peoples, and language, ethnic, and cultural-historical differences republic television has an irreplaceable role. It is another thing that republic television must be able to use its "trump cards." While we probably lose in terms of elegance and vividness to the best Central Television

broadcasts, we can "take revenge" by prompt and comprehensive coverage of the problems and pains of our own republic which are close to and understood by everyone who lives here. And if on top of this our journalists are able to distinguish in the specific "local" situation patterns which are typical and important for nationwide processes, then the broadcast may be on a level with the programs of Central Television for all parameters.

[Pavlyuchik] Well, all right, what is your "company" pride these days?

[Buravkin] I am now going to express an idea which will be unexpected and possibly a little insulting for my Moscow colleagues, but in fact we in republic television have captured some trends and problems of our day before the center. I have in mind so-called open screens, considerable attention to social issues, and the critical orientation in commentary. Central Television journalists are doing many of these things better and more thoroughly than us. But we began earlier, 5 years and more ago.

The central press has written, for example, about our cycle "Business Meetings," which did a good service in preparing for restructuring. We gathered knowledgeable and widely known agricultural specialists, not in the studio but at the kolkhozes (usually average and lagging farms) and there, in unvarnished life, among the pressing problems, we "measured" their progressive know-how against practical experience. There is no need to say how concrete and informative the lesson was from those real business meetings.

Unfortunately, important party officials of the republic appear much less often on the open screen, and the department heads and secretaries of the Central Committee of the Belorussian SSR Communist Party are practically unknown to television viewers. Furthermore, with the arrival of glasnost their appearances on television have been reduced. I think that this fact also has an unexpected, more or less pleasant feature for us: whereas formerly some people looked at the press and television from above, so to speak, and would read or give the editors a hurriedly written text and evade answering difficult questions, such things cannot happen today. The "tube test" can have a serious impact on reputation and on public opinion. This makes them afraid to appear foolish or show their inadequate competence in front of millions of stern eyes.

[Pavlyuchik] Economic and socio-political broadcasting is, in my opinion, the strongest aspect of Belorussian Television. Programs such as "Dissatisfied With Your Job?," "Free Microphone," "Centers of Misunderstanding," and "Serving Your Mood" get right into the thick of life, which is how they have won regular audiences. And how are things going with the most mobile audience, the young people, whose problems are being raised with unprecedented sharpness by many press organs and

Central Television. I have heard viewers comment that many broadcasts of Belorussian Television devoted to young people are repetitions of "Viewpoint" and "Twelfth Floor."

[Buravkin] I do not deny that we are within the "force field" of these interesting, problem-oriented broadcasts, but while not departing from the critical questions that they raise, we still try to go our own way. For example, let us take our "Youth Television Center," one of the most popular programs figured for those just entering the real world. It is on the air for a total of about four hours. This considerable length was suggested to us by characteristics of the youth audience who, as we know, spend many hours together. So we decided that young people should get together in the studio and by their televisions rather than in the entryways of buildings and on crowded dance floors.

"Youth Television Center" consists of several units, kind of clubs according to interest: debate, politics, film lovers, amateur song, sports, dancing, and so on. In other words, we want to offer an engaging program for anybody who "drops in on us."

The broadcast has its own character, its own "biography." It is developing, changing, and maturing. Whereas in the first shows a certain bravado in the statements of the young people clashed with the protective reticence, and sometimes direct rejection, of representatives of the older generation, now a dialogue usually gets going between them.

One interesting and heated discussion, for example, arose in the studio concerning the attitude of young men and women toward the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. There were college and secondary students, representatives of party and Komsomol organs, and social science teachers at the microphone. And they held a sharply worded, unusual, and even impossible in past times, discussion about how young people understand Marxism, why the subject is so boring in schools and textbooks, and what creative application and elaboration of the great doctrine means. I am sure this debate was a demonstration of glasnost and a lesson in open discussion of critical issues for both the participants and for the television viewers.

Our broadcasts on informal organizations, which we decided to take a closer look at, drew very diverse responses. The activity of Toloki, which is much discussed in the republic, demands a varied evaluation. The kids' interest in history, their desire to help preserve cultural monuments, and their striving to understand the tragic events of the 1930's and pay tribute to the memory of innocent victims of repression deserve understanding and support. But then a certain extremism in their demands, the categorical nature of their statements, and the superficiality of their conclusions need serious and

well-supported criticism and polemic. This requires painstaking, thoughtful, and responsible work and many ideological leaders are not ready for that.

Our journalists often hear angry shouts from high offices concerning certain youth television and radio broadcasts, but there have been practically no suggestions from there or any willingness to participate in these broadcasts, enter into direct debate on critical problems, and enlighten young, troubled minds with the force of persuasion and knowledge. The people in power are still drawn to the usual and favorite method of prohibition. But it only gives rise to new doubts and hurt feelings.

In short, it seems to us that we are capturing the moods of young people. It is another matter that our broadcasts sometimes lack consistency and depth. While capturing the "high points" of a critical topic we quite often do not dig down to the roots and do not give answers to the main questions: Who is responsible? What should be done?

[Pavlyuchik] One of the significant flaws of Belorussian Television, viewers note, is that some heroes of the broadcasts, and unfortunately also certain moderators and announcers, do not speak the language properly. The ear of people who are sensitive to the beauty of Belorussian speech is often offended a kind of linguistic "hybrid."

[Buravkin] It is very bitter to talk about this, but for many years the situation with the native language in the republic developed in such a way that it began departing from the schools, auditoriums, meeting halls, and worker and other meetings. Many people appeared who did not know either Russian or Belorussian and offended against both languages by their semi-illiteracy.

Back in the times of stagnation it seemed to some of our ideological officials that rejection of one's native language was the highest form of internationalism. And they began putting this "idea" into effect with enthusiasm. The normal human demand for a respectful attitude toward the Belorussian language was declared a manifestation of nationalism! And because my countrymen had, and even today some still have, a fear brought down from the time of the cult of personality where the label "nationalist" was equivalent to a death sentence, people in general began demonstrating that their nationalistic feelings were dying away or gone. It reached the point where the only school subject which one could legally refuse to study was the Belorussian language. After this, is it any surprise that only now are Belorussian classes in nursery schools being organized in the capital of the republic, that only now has the question of training teachers in the native language and publishing the necessary literature and dictionaries been taken up seriously.

Lack of respect for the language led to indifference to Belorussian history, which our secondary students do not know at all, while people of the older generation

know in a one-sided, selective way, which is to say, in a false way. Therefore, I consider that the challenge of curing people of their historical amnesia and national nihilism and awakening the sacred feeling of national pride—not arrogance but pride!—is entirely applicable to Belorussian Television as well.

The programs "Lyre," "Public Opinion," and "Native Language," in which figures from Belorussian science, literature, and culture take an active part; programs about folk artisans and folklore collectives; searching for and publicizing stage performers who are sensitive to the traditions of national culture—all these things, in my opinion, serve to awaken an active interest in the history of our republic and in its present day. And all these things are in no way separate from the all-Union process of mutual cultural enrichment. We have, for example, a special cycle called "In One Family," which talks about the literary and cultural ties of Belorussia with the fraternal republics of the USSR. We constantly exchange programs with other large studios in the country.

I am gratified that the party has taken up the national issue seriously, that it received proper attention at the 19th party conference. The process of revising certain mistaken ideas of national problems has finally begun in our republic too. I hope that it will lead to an understanding by everyone (including officials) of the need for development and flourishing of the cultures of all nations, preservation of their uniqueness, and their movement toward one another. Our response to the great Russian culture and the magical Russian language for their noble role as unifiers of culture should be a grateful rise, not a decline, in our own spiritual life.

Chita Oblast Newspaper Printing, Distribution Problems Reviewed

18300289a Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 21 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by L. Fadayev, member of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Readers' Club Council, and A. Gamov, staff correspondent: "But the Newspapers Are Still Late..."]

[Text] To tell the truth, when we started the discussion of the unsatisfactory delivery of the newspaper to subscribers in the Chita club of readers of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, recalling the prehistory of the issue over many years, we did not expect such a speedy reaction. But it was nice to be wrong: just a few days after publication of the account of the club's meeting a large group of specialists arrived in Chita from the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, the RSFSR Ministry of Communications, RSFSR Goskomizdat, and the production association "Rospoligraftekhnik" and other interested organizations. The commission from Moscow visited Irkutsk, where copies of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA are printed for Chita. An expanded conference was

held there of officials of the CPSU obkom, representatives of the "Pravda" Publishing House of the CPSU CC, communications people, aviation people, and printing people in which the problems related to delivery of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and other central newspapers to Chita were thoroughly discussed once again.

All of this instilled hope that the issue would finally be settled. Especially since in response to the critical article published in our newspaper last 18 November S. Rodionov, first deputy chairman of RSFSR Goskomizdat, RSFSR first deputy communications minister, and L. Ilchuk, chief of the Main Administration of Air Operations and Traffic of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, assured readers that every step had been taken to ensure the prompt delivery of newspapers on the day of their publication. Beginning on 1 December, this problem ceased to torment subscribers.

Alas, December has passed, January is coming to an end, and the local bureau of the newspaper is once again receiving numerous agitated telephone calls from subscribers; the newspaper is just as late as it was before. According to figures of the communications administration of the Chita Oblispolkom, between 1 and 18 January SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA arrived in Chita late 11 days.

So, what is happening?

During its visit to Siberia, the members of the impressive commission from Moscow saw for themselves that the whole trouble lay in the erratic work of the publishing house "Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda." That is where the chain of delays usually begins. Last year, central newspapers were printed behind schedule 79 times through the fault of the printing plant alone! The reasons? The low skill level of personnel and organizational oversights. In the new newspaper building, whose conveyor belt delivers the copies of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, there were only 10 brigades working instead of 12. And indeed even the newsprint used here, which is made by the Krasnoyarsk Pulp and Paper Combine, does not withstand criticism—it often breaks, so that the equipment has to be stopped continually.

"As for the quality of the paper, there are still problems," A. Chernyayev, director of the publishing house "Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda," reported to us a few days ago. "Our own problems have been practically solved: equipment has been adjusted in the new rotary shop, all the brigades have been staffed with skilled personnel, and their organizational level is rising."

As a matter of fact, improvements have been noticeable in this respect. In 18 days of January, for example, the print schedule for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA was missed only four times through the fault of the printing plant.

Which means that the aviation people have been falling short? Their share is more than half of all the delays.

Much that has to do with this situation is clarified by a telegram that arrived a few days ago from the Irkutsk communications people. It says that the Chita aviation group, in violation of an agreement set down in a protocol dated 14 October of last year, is continuing to carry newspapers in An-24 airplanes, which have limited capacity. As a consequence, remainders of central newspapers have been piling up at the airport. How in this case is one to understand the statement made in a session of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA club by V. Solomonov, chief inspector of the Main Administration of Air Operations and Traffic of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, to the effect that printed matter, the volume of which has grown considerably this year, will be carried on the larger An-26 cargo planes?

Of course, all of this squabbling to some degree "clears" the Chita communications people, who have not been receiving the precious bundles of fresh newspapers on time. Still, judging by their own statistics, they delivered newspapers to Chita without delays during the first 6 days of January. Why in that case were they not in the mailboxes of our subscribers on time? For example, only once this month has "today's" SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA been delivered to the bureau, which for some reason post office personnel treat with "special attention." Cases are not uncommon when newspapers which have reached the post office "on the right day" lie there until the next morning. In the RSFSR Ministry of Communications, as we see, they were a bit premature in giving high marks to the trans-Baykal communications people.

Members of the readers' club have been trying persistently to draw attention to reconstruction of the Chita printing plant. For they are convinced: this measure would make possible in the very near future the printing of at least five central newspapers in Chita. Unfortunately, O. Titova, deputy chief of the periodicals administration of RSFSR Goskomizdat, has sketched a gloomy picture in this regard: there is no equipment, and there will be none in the near future.

But after all, she did not have to make a trip thousands of versts to Chita to make that announcement! If they had sent a copy of the official report from 5 years back—the response would have been the same.... But since the representative from the capital did come nevertheless, perhaps the reason was to seek a way out of this desperate situation through joint efforts on the spot?

In general, the upshot is that the promises made to our readers have remained a dead letter....

Periodical Subscription Limits 'Boomerang' on Glasnost Opponents

18300289b Moscow *OGONEK* in Russian No 2,
7-14 Jan 89 pp 2-3

[Article by Semen Gurevich, doctor of economic sciences and professor in the School of Journalism at Moscow State University: "Newton's Third Law, or Reflections on a Lesson Learned"]

[Text] "So when am I going to read all this?" I thought as I pulled the pile of newspapers and magazines from the mailbox after New Year's. "And what an anxious business it all was!"

It certainly has been a long time since millions of our people had to spend so much nervous energy during the subscription season as during the few months of last autumn. There were things to remember! The race in the morning to the post office to be there as soon as it opened! The repeated exhortations and begging of postal workers, already worn to a frazzle, to somehow find a way to subscribe to at least one copy of a magazine, and the humiliating refusals. The letters in the newspapers from indignant readers. And the faces of senior officials of the USSR Ministry of Communications on the television screen, imbued with awareness of their own dignity and rightness, calmly repeating that there had to be limits on subscriptions, that there was no paper, that printing capacities were insufficient, that there was a shortage of mail carriers, that there was no...well, there was absolutely nothing and nothing at all was possible....

I also recall a telephone call I received at home. My sister asked me anxiously: "You don't happen to have subscription blanks? You see, there are no more blanks at our post office. They say: look wherever you like, they did not send them to us...." And, having straightforwardly expressed her opinion about the way subscription had been going, she concluded wearily: "What are they up to? Who stands to gain from all this?"

"Who indeed stands to gain from this?" I repeated, thinking about the troubles that had been involved with the subscription season, which had now come to an end. How familiar it all was and how bothersome.... And suddenly I became alert. Memory unexpectedly suggested an association. It could not be...! Check it out at once...! Fingering past several volumes on the bookshelf, I opened one of them. There it was!

"...The shipping department began to receive letters complaining about poor delivery of the newspaper, about certain issues getting lost, and so on. The stream of complaints grew by the day: the system of repression implemented by postal officials began to yield results."

So, of course, exactly the same thing. But it is interesting the way the editorial staffs reacted then toward this attempt to deprive their readers!

"The editorial staff has filed suit against certain post offices. It has turned to the community for help, it has published letters to the editors revealing the methods the reactionaries have resorted to in their fight against the newspaper.... In its answers to subscribers, the shipping department emphasized the organized nature of the base campaign conducted against it: "It seems that the post office, having received orders from above, is exercising a kind...of censorship over our newspaper or these people harbor plans of destroying it by means of systematically bad delivery. We are applying our energies to exposing those intentions in the very near future."

What a prankster Clio is—the muse of history! Every now and then she reminds you of something that seemed to be forgotten without a trace. She raises topics which when you examine them put what happens in front of your eyes in a completely different light. If only this bit of history, which took place exactly 140 years ago, in October-December 1848 in Cologne, one of the largest cities of the then Kingdom of Prussia. The story of how in the turbulent times of the German bourgeois-democratic revolution the Prussian reactionaries tried to smother the *NEUE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG*, the very newspaper which Lenin later called the best and unsurpassed organ of the revolutionary proletariat. And of how its editor-in-chief, Karl Marx, defended its existence. What an instructive story! And so topical! To be sure, some of it is out-of-date. Some of the means which the Prussian bureaucrats used to destroy the *NEUE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG* and its editor have been "lost" with the passage of time. Yet, out of curiosity, what means did they use?

The post office bureaucrats did not deliver the newspaper to subscribers, they destroyed copies of it, they opened and inspected letters to the editors, and then they simply stopped delivering them.

They harrassed the editors with a court trial. They continually accused its managers and collaborators of treason, of insulting the dignity of the king, and of slandering government officials, judicial authorities, the police, and deputies in parliament.... They called them in for questioning, and they conducted searches.

Anonymous letters filled with foul language and threats of physical violence against those who worked for the paper were sent to its editors. They constantly collected and stored up compromising material against the editor-in-chief, even then they understood that the simplest way to get rid of a publication that does not suit you is to compromise and then remove its editor.

Does the list have to be continued to give an idea of the "arsenal" at the disposal of a newspaper's enemies? Give them their due: they used it with exceptional purposiveness, cold calculation, truly Prussian methodicalness, insidiousness, and savagery. And, be it noted, they achieved what they set out to do....

I hear irritated voices: What is the point of this story that is 1.5 centuries old? How can such flimsy analogies be made to the present time, to the situation that has come about in our society?

Yes, the analogy is unexpected, but, I note, a legitimate one. One does not need an academic degree to understand that if one and the same phenomenon occurs in a situation of the same kind, even though in different periods, then we should speak of the pattern of this process, which has a most direct bearing on the existence of glasnost and the press.

In the most critical periods of history, when the interests of different social groups collide sharply, one and the same thing recurs. There is a sudden increase in the role of the press as an instrument of glasnost and its most important offender. At the same time, the fight against it is stepped up. As soon as the reactionaries recover from the shock they have experienced following the first successful onslaught of the democratic masses, they strive to limit glasnost. To do this, they first have to strike a blow against the progressive press—to silence it or at least to limit its influence at first by any means available.

To tell the truth, after the limits on subscriptions were adopted and everything that ensued thereafter, I became strongly convinced, as did many others, that we were dealing with an assault on glasnost. Everything seemed to line up in a logical chain. First, the publication of N. Andreyeva's "Manifesto." Then, resistance to the economic reform, the organization of the shortage, and so on.

The logic of reflections was interrupted. It was explained to me, as to others, with authority that all the things that had happened with subscriptions were not someone's sinister plot, were not an operation that had been well-thought-out. It was simply a departmental oversight. And that when the time came, there would be intervention from above, and they would correct the people responsible.

One would have liked to believe it. Especially since as a matter of fact, as we recall, when the hot passions of subscribers reached their peak, the issue was taken to the very top. Having soberly evaluated the situation and its possible consequences, the people there made a decision. The USSR Council of Ministers removed the limits on a number of central publications. They corrected the mistake.

But there are mistakes and mistakes. An accidental oversight is one thing, someone's carelessness, which is easily detected and not hard to correct. But a mistake which is a blow to the interests of millions of people and whose results could last for an indefinitely long time is an altogether different matter. How can one speak of an oversight when we are dealing with thousands of tons of paper necessary to supply all the readers of newspapers

and magazines? Didn't those responsible for subscriptions have initial data adequate for evaluating readership and prospects? The results of the previous subscription season offered them fully adequate information for that purpose. It is ridiculous to say that some bureaucrat was not farsighted enough or failed to comprehend something, and then, guided by the interests of his own department, he made a decision that was a blunder. I will never believe that a bureaucrat, no matter how highly placed, would decide on such a step. He is not so stupid as to place his position at the slightest risk. He knows perfectly well that he is invading the sphere of ideology, the sphere of politics. And he would issue the instruction only after he received approval.... It would be interesting, however, to know who gave the approval to conduct the subscription season that way?

In actuality, that kind of error is not a bit better than malicious intent. And if we are to evaluate its consequences, we need to study them very carefully.

Everything would seem to have ended well. It all became a thing of the past: the limits were rescinded, and the conclusion of the subscription season was relatively calm. And already its first results are becoming known. Some of the figures are impressive, but not surprising. We are not even surprised by the nearly 20 million subscribers to the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY; people need the facts. But one has to be surprised by the nearly 1.5 million subscribers to NOVYY MIR, the rapidly growing readership of DRUZHBA NARODOV and ZNAMYA. Yet, to tell the truth, these and other figures, however important they are, do not interest me at present. For several reasons. The main one is this: it is not the figures themselves that have the greatest importance, but the way they are arrived at. The conclusions which should be drawn from an analysis of the error. The lesson that has been learned by everyone who had anything to do with the subscription season—both its organizers and the millions of subscribers.

Qui bono? Who benefits from this? the Romans asked when they wanted to understand the significance of some event. Who stands to gain from all this? we repeat this question, thinking about the course and the results of the past subscription season.

There is no doubt that its organizers were pursuing goals not confined to conserving scarce paper and covering newsstand sales of periodicals. Nor should we underestimate what they did achieve even though the limits they introduced were rescinded.

When they suspended unrestricted subscription for a considerable time, they planted a sense of uncertainty and distrust in people's minds. After that, who will say that something of the kind will not recur?

They tried—not without success—to deprive readers of the opportunity to subscribe to their own newspaper, to their own magazine, periodicals which represent their

interests, which are their voice, and which have been defending their civil rights. The bond between subscribers and editorial staffs, invisible, but withstanding many trials, created over the years, if not decades, has been seriously damaged. And let them not say that nothing was easier than to restore it by subscribing to the necessary periodical after the limits were removed. For many readers who are not all that well off—university students, pensioners, and others—this proved to be a financial problem. As one of my acquaintances said, eloquently slapping his pocket: "The money was already gone...."

By depriving readers of unrestricted subscription for a considerable time, they also deprived them of the possibility of choice and thereby of evaluating the particular periodical, of something we acquired only recently, only at the end of 1987, when the restrictions, which seemed eternal, were removed. How can one speak here of voting with the ruble for a particular newspaper or magazine, how can one speak of rivalry between them, when they offer such a limited assortment? And at this point, how is one to judge the true popularity of a newspaper on the basis of the number of people who subscribe to it? Inevitably, the figures turned out to be blurred. I cannot but be gratified to learn that the number of subscribers to OGONEK has more than doubled. But at the same time, I think how many readers of the magazine, especially in remote places, were unable to subscribe to it on time because the limits were put in place....

And what kind of an unwholesome hullabaloo the organizers of subscription caused! What Shakespearian passions boiled up over the only copy of NOVYY MIR or some other literary monthly "allocated" to a collective of 30 or 40 people! The "forbidden fruit" reflex was operative at 200 percent. So, when the limits were removed, many people once again rushed off to the post offices before there was another warning from above and they reinstated the restrictions that had vanished.... As a consequence, quite a few subscribers are now trying to figure out how to find the time to "assimilate" everything that the mail carriers, dead tired under the weight of their bags, have been delivering to them.

No, whatever you say, the organizers of that kind of subscription season were quite successful.

At the same time, we should not overestimate what they achieved. They still did not achieve the main thing they were aiming for. What is more, although they did gain a bit, in the final analysis they lost incomparably more.

They have not learned...Newton's third law. Remember what you learned in school, now half forgotten: every action generates an equal reaction in the opposite direction.... When he formulated one of the laws of classical mechanics, the great English scientist had no idea that it would be manifested elsewhere than in

physics. But it obviously operates with just as great force in human psychology as well. But with one very essential correction: the force of the reaction here quite often greatly exceeds the force of the original action. Whoever fails to take that into account will suffer failure. The best confirmation of this was the social reaction to adoption of the limits on newspapers and magazines.

This reaction is evidence that the last 3 years have not passed without a trace, that the process of changing social consciousness is speeding up, that many people have already become aware of the force of glasnost and their civic sentiments have been spilling over. The most favorable thing which the events related to the last subscription season have demonstrated is surely that in the course of it people realized what they could accomplish. They understood the force of public opinion and the need for its organized expression.

What we encountered during those months unexpectedly confirmed the full validity of the argument which M.S. Gorbachev advanced in his speech on 7 December 1988 in the session of the UN General Assembly. The argument about the freedom of choice being a universal principle which must not be subject to any exceptions at all. It would seem that this principle must operate at all levels. Even at the very highest—in world politics, in relations among nations. And at incomparably lower levels—in deciding concrete private matters. Including those, for example, that have to do with subscriptions. Every man must have the right to freely subscribe at any time to any newspaper or magazine published in our country, and to choose them freely according to his interests and affinities. And let that right be set down in the Law on the Press, the draft of which they are so reluctant to publish in our press.

Yes, adoption of the limits on glasnost turned out to be a boomerang that dealt a painful blow to the organizers of the subscription season. One cannot fail to experience a sense of satisfaction at that. But there is no basis here for anyone to exult. Because the mistake committed during the subscription campaign is not the last one. Because new mistakes await us in the future. And they are inevitable. After all, the road of restructuring is a difficult one and in many respects has not been scouted. Glasnost still has many opponents who do not want to reconcile themselves to the process of democratization, to the growing desire for true popular sovereignty. The number and size of these mistakes can be reduced only by drawing lessons from each one, by figuring out who and what stand behind it, whose interests collided to cause it. And by looking to history for advice—both history that is 1.5 centuries old as well as quite recent history that has occurred before our eyes. After all, what agitated us just yesterday is already history—"current history," as Marx would say. It always has a bearing on today and tomorrow—our future.

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Soviet Historian Calls for Greater Access to Archive Materials

18300279 Moscow *OGONEK* in Russian
No 2, Jan 89 pp 10-11

[Article by Boris Ilizarov, doctor of historical sciences, under the rubric "May I Speak": "On the Archives and the Secret Struggle to Keep Them 'Secret'"]

[Text] The years of stagnation were in fact years of respite which those who were in one way or another involved in the affairs of the Stalinist era secured for themselves after displacing Khrushchev. Not everyone understood that the respite would end sooner or later. But there are intelligent people in any camp. They are also found among the Stalinists. There should be a special discussion of how they used this respite in the most varied areas of our life. But concerning the area which in our times has become virtually paramount in public life, the area of archive work and the "secrets" which enshroud it, I have some ideas.

For those who do not know I will say that a broad network of "special storage facilities" existed and continues to exist; they were set up in the 1920s not only in libraries but in every major archive, and for decades enormous masses of documents were sent to them and continue to be sent there merely because a "big boss" or a minor clerk marks seemingly completely innocent documents with a stamp that dooms them to oblivion. And this is by no means done just because it was ordered so. The instructions published on this account spoke of keeping "state secrets." But as soon as one document in a fat file of several hundred of the most ordinary documents was found to be worth designating secret, all of it disappeared behind the steel doors of the archive storage facilities.

This mechanism created and, unfortunately, continues to create a special atmosphere of secrecy and access of chosen ones to certain high secrets of government and politics. But the main thing, of course, was that it allowed any information which could be material for criticism, even by future generations, to be put out of the sight of not only the broad public but also historians. Various "fathers of the fatherland" even when alive were concerned to shape their own "brilliant" images as builders of communism. It is therefore no accident that documents open to the researcher contained only that which strengthened this image.

They say that the East loves everything secret and irrational. I do not think that Stalin's love for secrets was a result of his Eastern origin. The atmosphere of secrecy was entirely conceived and rationally imposed by Stalin and his apparat in order to form a different but already "dark" image of the "enemy of the people" in the public mind. They were the ones, these enemies, who were supposed to be employ masses of foreign intelligence to make attempts on the lives of the "brilliant" leaders, to threaten the achievements of October, and so on. And

they were the ones, the spies and saboteurs, from whom the state secrets contained in the documents had to be kept. So the rational and the irrational merged in an almost Biblical story of "light" and "dark" angels.

One can immortalize oneself in the eyes of one's descendants in various ways, among them open propagation of misanthropic views and then actions as, for example, Hitler and his clique did. But Stalin and his circle acted in a much more foresighted and crafty way. Has anyone thought about why there was a need for such an enormous paper-generating machine which compiled and, most importantly, documented and placed in special storage facilities the falsified legal cases of the late 1920s-1950s? After all, no one dared to demand the truth on these cases during Stalin's lifetime and no "outsiders" could be given access to these documents even after the conviction and death of the people. All those endless "confessions" of guilt, protocols, decrees, and lists are not simply an account of the actions of the repressive apparat; they are above all the basis for justifying themselves in their descendants' eyes.

Before us is the plan which anticipated the events decades in advance. In some parts this plan almost succeeded, as the recent history with N. Andreyev and Shekhovtsov shows. It would have been a complete success if not for Khrushchev, who told the terrible truth about it too soon, in fact right after Stalin's death. It was too soon because the witnesses were still alive: camp inmates, eye-witnesses to the reprisal in Kurpaty and other places, and the wives, sons, and daughters of the repressed people. Those who had informed, imprisoned, tortured, and executed them were still prospering. If the Stalinist system had held on until the end of our century when there would no longer have been any living witnesses and the bones in the fraternal graves would have turned to dust, the secret documents of the OGPU [United State Political Administration at the Council of People's Commissars]—NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]—MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]—MGB [Ministry of State Security] and the judicial institutions of that time could have been a pedestal under the feet of the most persistent fighter against "enemies of the fatherland." But N.S. Khrushchev mixed up the cards and they began to fall like black gravestones not only on the image of Stalin but also on the system which he created.

After Khrushchev was removed, the process of rehabilitation of the victims of illegal repressions based on review of court archive files kept in the special storage facilities was in fact completely halted. Since Stalinist times every department has had the right to stamp "DSP" (for official use) on any of its documents and that immediately closes off access to the document, even when it ends up in the archives. And then, in addition to all this, in 1965 documents which reflected decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers were placed on the same footing as secret materials. In this way, the first thing the administrative-bureaucratic system which had taken its

revenge did was to additionally secure itself from any intervention in "its own" affairs and ensure full secrecy in its activity. But even that seemed to be too little.

A year later an enormous mass of documents which had been kept in state archives for a long time (about 20 million units of storage or approximately one-tenth of everything that was in state archives at that time) was transferred to so-called "limited access." That meant that no copies could be made or excerpts taken from documents to which, in principle, researchers had access. No matter how phenomenal a person's memory is, he cannot remember even one-thousandth of the information needed to write a historical work. And he must also know and remember all kinds of archive codes for references, which is the only way to make the assertions of a particular author conclusive and verifiable.

The motive for the decision on limited access was to ensure that it was impossible in the future to "follow the trail" (?) of this information. Do not shudder, dear reader, we are of course not speaking of the CIA, which as the initiators of these instructions well knew would hardly be hunting for Soviet historians who had information on the work of Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the Central Administration of the Statistical Survey of the National Economy, Narkompros [People's Commissariat of Education], the Central Statistical Administration, and others in the 1920's-1940's. It is clear that access was limited specifically for the Soviet researcher. And let us remember here that all this did not prevent Roy Medvedev and A. Anton-Ovseyenko from writing their books on the most important political figures of the Soviet era. Trying to find the personal work archives of these and other figures at that time was one of the favorite pursuits of the proper organs.

But, as life and historical practice, which everyone knows is the highest criterion of truth, demonstrated, neither the discovery of enormous sets of archive documents nor the confiscation of personal resources had the desired result. Even here the system proved to be inefficient.

The very fact of the appearance of instructions on documents of limited access was an illegal act. It directly violated the governmental decree on archives. Shortly before these events, in the late 1950s, the new "Decree on the USSR State Archive Fund" was ratified. It said that documents which were part of that fund would be offered to institutions, organizations, and citizens of the USSR for use in the interests of developing the economy, science, and culture. There was no mention at all of any limitations.

Any bureaucracy loves to preserve the secrecy of its activity, but that part of the bureaucracy which is actually involved with certain state secrets loves it three times as much. In a world where political tension exists, keeping diplomatic secrets cannot be avoided in certain stages. In this world intelligence and counterintelligence

cannot be avoided. But the question is how long will secrets remain secret—100, 200, 1,000 years? Recently the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA published an article which said that some people responsible for the exit of Soviet citizens abroad finally began to realize that access to military secrets that were 20 and more years old had no significance. If these citizens remember anything, it is at best the level of military equipment from the day of the electric tube radio receiver. But today even domestic appliances work on semiconductors.

But jokes aside, it should be added to everything said above that the most powerful departments, the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], the Ministry of Defense, the MVD, the KGB [State Security Committee], and others have their own, as they say, sectorial archives to which a very narrow circle of their own people are allowed access. From them they breed the dedicated apologists who extol and justify every action of "their own" department. But all this cannot even compare to the secrecy that surrounds the party archives. The well-known Soviet dramatist and CPSU member Mikhail Shatrov, whose works on the revolution and V.I. Lenin are so widely known, now states bitterly: "I was never allowed access to even one archive." But he was persecuted by the priests of party history science, and quite recently at that.

On the eve of the 19th Party Conference I published a note in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in which I reported that about 50 percent of all archive documents were concealed from the people, the public, and scientists behind all these numerous curtains. At the time this assertion was based mainly on intuition and some indirect data. Now these ideas have received additional basis. Thus, for example, it became clear that in the largest state archive, the USSR TsGAOR [Central State Archives of the October Revolution, High State Government Bodies, and State Administrative Bodies], before the "limited access" was removed more than 50 percent of all the funds were closed. In another very large archive, the USSR TsGANKh [Central State Archives of the National Economy], one third were secret. And that is by no means the most "secret" of all our "secret" archives.

Has anything changed for the better in all this area in the fourth year of restructuring? Some things have changed, of course. With creaking slowness, still in secret, and at the departmental level documents are being removed from "limited access." Some funds (but, unfortunately, a very small number) of the NKVD of the 1930s are open. The so-called "Prague Archive," created by White emigres before World War II and donated to our government by the Government of Czechoslovakia in 1948, is open. This archive never contained any political or state secrets, for foreign researchers in any case. There is talk of a partial opening of the acts of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Determination and Investigation of Crimes Committed by the German Fascist Aggressors and Their Accomplices. It is incomprehensible to the

mind why they were classified as secret. Perhaps for the reason that the publication of the information on the destruction of the Jewish, Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian population might play into the hands of international Zionism? A number of other funds are open. But a general movement toward more democratization of archive activity is not yet felt.

We still have storage facilities which are surrounded by such terrible secrecy that we must not even talk about them. There are castes of priests who are allowed into the holy of holies and are supposed to measure out doses of truth and rewrite and improve history.

Hitler was a pitiful imitator. A political pygmy, he borrowed his ideas of the state system and cultural institutions from his more talented predecessor Napoleon. And in creating a world empire Napoleon decided to concentrate the archives of all subjugated states in Paris. The fascists, who robbed not only museums in occupied territories but libraries and archives as well, tried to do the same thing. That is how the Smolensk Party Archive ended up in their hands. When the war spread to German territory, documents from the chancelleries of the Reich and documents rescued from the occupied territories began to fall into Allied hands. The Americans in particular took out some of the German archives. They got the Smolensk Party Archive too. They still have it, even though that violates international law on cultural treasures.

Returning to the problem of Soviet archives, let us note that despite the fact that special storage facilities have now almost been eliminated in most Soviet libraries, in the archives this work has not even begun in earnest. The same enormous number of documents is marked with the stamp "DSP." The most powerful departments still maintain all their rights to archive documents. Events show that the entire archive system headed by USSR Glavarkhiv [Main Administration of Archives] for some strange reason is hardly reacting at all to the demands of the Soviet people's changing historical self-consciousness. Not one substantial publication of documents which sheds light on the dark spots of history has appeared on its initiative. Everything that is now being done in this regard is done without the knowledge of the USSR Glavarkhiv, and sometimes even despite it.

Why is all this taking place? In my opinion for three main reasons: there are no laws regulating the full activity of the state archives, including in the area of the use of archive documents; the departmental right to archive documents is being greatly expanded; and the archives system and its management are now constructed so that archives are essentially appendages of the administrative-bureaucratic system and are intended to serve its interests and needs.

Let us make a small digression into the history of archive development in the USSR.

On 1 June 1918 V.I. Lenin signed the Decree "On Reorganizing and Centralizing Archive Work." This decree brought to an end the struggle which native archivists and historians had been waging before the revolution; they were trying to create a network of archives widely accessible to the scientific world and free from arbitrary departmental and governmental actions. Henceforward all archives in the Soviet State became part of a unified state archive fund and the departments lost their right to have archives. The same decree formed a special organ, the Main Administration of Archives, which was initially part of Narkompros but then existed as an independent administration under the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee (1917-1936)] from 1922. The well-known historian and Bolshevik of Lenin's group M.N. Pokrovskiy was made the head of it. In the 1920s all the prerequisites were created to turn the system of archives, libraries, and museums into the base for broad historical education of the peoples of our country. It was in these years that intensive publication work went on.

But as the administrative system gathered strength, the situation and character of archive activity changed. The year 1929 was a critical one for archives too. The make-up of the collegium of archive administration was changed and included, rather than scientists, representatives of people's commissariats for military and naval affairs, foreign affairs, railroads, and finance and the OGPU. Quite a deliberate and familiar group, don't you think? In this same year a unique interpretation of the concept "secret documents" was introduced; according to it not only secret documents of the given department but also any others which the new archive management chose to recognize as such were declared secret documents. Finally in that very same year 1929 a procedure for admittance to work on archive documents was introduced; according to it a special recommendation of state or social organs was needed.

For the next decade powerful departments whose representatives were not only on the collegium of the Central State Archives but also members of the Central Committee and VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Politburo violated the norms of the decree signed by V.I. Lenin and gradually seized the documents of their own departments from the unified state archive fund. For in that same year of 1929 they had been allowed to organize "special secret archives" in their own departments. It was in them that they put together their own systems. And by 1939 everything came to a logical conclusion. All the state archives, among them the scientific-historical archives, were handed over to the USSR NKVD. Beriia became the chief. We can judge the consequences of this step, if by nothing else, by the level of historical science which we see today. The archives were removed from this department only in 1961 and handed over to the USSR Council of Ministers with the authority of an independent administration.

Nothing happens without leaving a trace. The traditions of the past left their mark on the archive system too.

Perhaps that is why contemporary archives cannot be included in the restructuring of public consciousness on the proper level or break out of the usual stereotypes.

Thus, wishing to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the decree, the Central State Archives leadership, in customary quiet and secrecy, formulated a new law on the USSR state archive fund. The initial draft of the law gave the archives the right to decide themselves whom to allow access to archive materials and whom not to. Nor did the law have anything to say about a statute of limitation after which all secret materials should become available. But laws on this score exist in all developed countries. Some researchers criticized this draft in the press. And the 19th Party Conference resolution "On Glasnost" noted specially: "The use of archive materials should be legally regulated."

And again in the same secrecy not only from the broad public but even from people of science the Central State Archives is drawing up a new draft; it was recently presented for discussion at the USSR Council of Ministers Scientific Council on Social Development. From my point of view the new draft is much worse than the previous one, since the clause of Lenin's decree, especially the part which deals with the departmental right to archive materials, is abolished not de facto but de jure. The draft indicates that 12 departments keep documents outside the Central State Archives system permanently, and in our conditions that means their complete removal. But in the discussion process it became clear that the list of these departments was not a complete one, which was unambiguously stated by the representative of the Ministry of Defense. He demanded that his department not only be included in this list, but that the historical archives which now exist, such as TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army] and the Military History Archives, be transferred to its jurisdiction. The reason for all this was that any documents in this department are strictly secret for all time. I listened to this representative and thought sadly that the Soviet reader would not soon find out the truth not only about the war in Afghanistan but also about the Great Patriotic War, the Finnish war, or even the Civil War. A state which lays claim to being a rule-of-law state can hardly allow itself such a "move" in adoption of laws.

The new draft takes a seemingly progressive step—an article on a 50-year statute of limitation for documents containing state, military and official (?) secrets is introduced. But, since the draft says nothing of who has the right to declassify and lift restrictions on the use of documents, or how and when, this point practically loses its significance. It is also not understandable what an "official" secret is. Is it not the same as "DSP"? And why is a 50-year period established rather than a 20-, 30-, or perhaps even 100-year period?

It is time for the public to intervene in this matter. Archives are the common memory and that is the property of all the Soviet people rather than individual

departments. Archives in a rule-of-law state can and should be additional guarantees of the legality and openness of the activity of the state apparatus in all spheres. From my viewpoint, all archives, including party archives, should be subordinate to a unified center as they were in the early 1920s. This center should be under the country's highest legal organ, under the Soviet parliament—the USSR Supreme Soviet. The latter, in my view, is especially justified since the head of the party and the head of the state are one and the same person. But specifically historians, writers, and people of science, culture, and art who are members of the ruling Soviet should be the archive leaders rather than former party and state officials who have not managed to make careers and so are put out to "pasture." We must return to the basic ideas contained in the 1918 Decree and to the idea of the USSR Unified Archive Fund and completely abolish the departmental right to archives. In other words, we need a revolutionary Law on Organizing Archive Work in the USSR which will transfer all rights to form and use the documentary memory of our society to the peoples of our country.

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**Historian Details Stalin's Moves Against
Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy**

18300306 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by Geliy Shmelev, professor, under the rubric "Pages of History": "Before the Coup"]

[Text] A year ago PRAVDA began publication of "Pages of History." In essays and talks with scientists we discussed the key stages of our history and its blank spots which need to be studied, researched, and illuminated by the light of truth. A sober analysis of the path taken by our country and party, the successes and failures, and their causes and effects equips us with knowledge and helps indoctrinate political sophistication in ourselves and develop the correct course in economics and politics.

Inevitable in dealing with history and its lessons are sharp debates, confrontation of opinions, and abandonment of blinders and prejudice—everything that distinguishes a real scientific search and ascent to the truth on the basis of studying new documents and facts.

We present comments on certain problems of the history of the so-called "right deviation" in the late 1920's for the readers' attention.

The time of revolutionary restructuring has forced us to look anew to many pages of our history and to remove ideas of them from the rust of stereotypes and confusion. Taking into account contemporary knowledge we must also turn to the history of the so called "right deviation" in the party.

Today many archive documents have become available to researchers, and books and statements in the press by those whom at one time Stalin branded as leaders of the "right deviation" and who were later dealt with harshly as "enemies of the people" have reentered scientific circulation. It is necessary to deal with such a complex topic not only to remove the patina of slander from a number of prominent figures of our party and state—this has already been done now (see IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS, No 1, 1989, pp 113-131). We must deal with it in order to better understand the mechanism of the formation of the cult of personality and the methods of political manipulation and deception of the party and people by Stalin and his circle.

By 1928 the first group of party figures in which Stalin saw rivals in the struggle for leadership in the party was smashed and politically destroyed. The time of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy came; although they made up a minority in the Politburo (three out of nine members), at that time they occupied key posts in the party and government; Rykov was head of USSR Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissariats] and the Russian Federation and was chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense (the latter post came to him from Kameney). By tradition coming from Lenin, Rykov usually chaired meetings of the Party Central Committee Plenum. Bukharin, as general secretary of the Ispolkom of the Communist International, essentially headed the Comintern (the post of chairman, which Zinovyev held earlier, was abolished in 1928). But for many years he was the responsible editor of PRAVDA, who was supposed to be the theoretician of the party. For many years Tomskiy headed the country's trade unions. All of them were comrades in arms of Lenin who came to the party soon after it was founded or in the years of the first Russian revolution (Rykov—in 1898, Tomskiy—in 1904, and Bukharin—in 1906) and had by that time a great deal of prestige and influence in the party ranks.

There is no need now, six decades later, to correct or embellish their views or tone down the contradictions. They were people of their time and they sought, tested, made mistakes, and learned by experience, rejecting outdated ideas and formulating new ones on the basis of practice and analysis of reality. They learned from life, from Lenin. To the extent of their strength and potential they defended the path of socialist development outlined by Lenin and the Leninist principles of cooperation in agriculture and supported correct relations with the peasants. And it was completely natural that they refused to accept Stalin's ambitious policy of a "great leap" in the economy and his "theory" of the aggravation of the class struggle.

Today one can say with certainty that the accusation of right deviation against them was above all the result of Stalin's desire to get prominent figures in the party and state out of the way, to establish his own course, and to have a majority in the Central Committee obedient to his will on the eve of the steps which he had devised,

which as life showed, meant a retreat from Lenin's principles of socialist construction. This desire was multiplied by the no less strong desire of Stalin's circle to "help" their "boss" and themselves strengthen their positions. It is precisely for this reason that Bukharin's, Rykov's, and Tomskiy's attempts at the Party Central Committee Plenums in April and November 1929 to use convincing arguments to repudiate the unsubstantiated accusations remind us in many respects of talking with the deaf.

How were these charges created and how did they become cluttered with rigid political labels? Let us follow the mechanics, so to speak, of the actions of Stalin and his close comrades in arms. They were very characteristic of Stalin's methods.

The letters to the Politburo by the Deputy People's Commissar of Finances M. Frumkin served as one of the pretexts for undertaking the campaign against "right deviation." Stalin attached special significance to these letters (above all the first one). He prepared an answer to Frumkin and distributed it to the members of the Politburo (on 20 June 1928).

As one can judge from Stalin's answer, Frumkin had written about the danger of a break-up of the alliance with the main masses of peasants and of the difficult situation of the countryside and pointed to the need for measures to help the individual peasant farm. Stalin sharply attacked the author as an advocate of rejecting the party line. He was later presented as the ideologist of right deviation.

Even in July 1928, speaking at the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee Plenum, Stalin gave an uncustomarily broad interpretation of the opposition. He included in it both those who supported superindustrialization through low prices for agricultural output and those who proposed to increase prices, above all for grain, in the interests of supporting agriculture: "One should not forget that the demand for the immediate introduction of restoration prices for grain is the opposition's demand. That is a fact. It may seem improbable, but it is an undisputed fact. People may ask, how can the superindustrialization nonsense of the opposition be combined with the demand to introduce restoration prices for grain?"

"Yes, most likely they cannot be combined logically. But they were combined in the opposition platform. The point is that the opposition has two souls: one is blatant and left revolutionary, and it tries to denounce the Central Committee for an unwillingness to support industrialization; the other is demagogical and opportunistic in practice, and its goal is to jab the peasants about the need to introduce restoration prices. The first soul appeals to the so-called 'left' elements, and its goal is to rally them around the opposition. The second soul appeals to the 'right' elements and has the same goal of

rallying them around the opposition." (It is telling that this passage in Stalin's speech which really did contradict elementary logic was later removed from the text in his works.)

Such a broad interpretation of the opposition made it possible to rapidly switch over from the struggle against the opposition to the struggle against the "right threat" and as a result include the "rightist" in the "right Trotskiyite bloc."

So, the pattern was established and it remained only to fit it to the "troika" in the Politburo. But Stalin was not yet naming names.

On 19 October 1928 at the plenum of the MK [Moscow Oblast Committee] and the MGK [Moscow City Committee] of the VKP(b), he gave a speech entitled "On the Right Threat in the VKP(b)". After noting that the Central Committee included certain, it is true, very insignificant elements of a conciliatory attitude toward the right threat, Stalin alluded to the minutes of the July 1928 Central Committee Plenum which, in his opinion, were direct proof of this. But here he explained: "Are there any deviations in the Politburo? In the Politburo we have no rightists, no leftists, and no conciliators. That must be said categorically here."

Again not a single name of a Central Committee member was named. But on 19 November 1928 in the speech entitled "On the Country's Industrialization and the Right Deviation in the VKP(b)," given at the Central Committee Plenum, Stalin went further: "Are there people among our party members who voice right deviation? Undoubtedly there are." By awarding, as he said, "first place" to Frumkin in this, Stalin again sweeps aside the rumors being spread by all kinds of "ill-wishers, opponents, and enemies of our party, that we supposedly have in the Politburo right deviation, left deviation, and conciliators and the devil knows what." In dwelling in his speech on the point in Frumkin's second letter where he spoke of the stagnation in developing the grain economy and of the idea that the backwardness in agriculture is "tantamount to degradation," Stalin right there notes: "It is altogether possible that he (Frumkin—G. Sh.)... is trying to hang on to Bukharin's coattails in order to prove that Bukharin is saying 'the same thing' in his article 'Notes of an Economist.' But Bukharin is by no means saying 'the same thing.' In his article Bukharin posed the abstract theoretical question of the possibility or the threat of degradation. Speaking abstractly, such a formulation of the question is completely possible and natural. But what does Frumkin do? He turns an abstract question of the possibility of degradation into a fact, the degradation of agriculture."

Meanwhile the press and party organizations took up criticism of the right threat with references to the "troika." Stalin and his close associates seem to remain behind the scenes, but they were the main directors of the course of the campaign which was gathering force.

The method of spreading the criticism which was undirected but at the same time full of allusions was very convenient to discredit the "right deviationists." Beginning with seemingly very insignificant comments behind which it was easy to guess those persons whom the arrows of criticism were directed at, this method made it possible to come in conclusions and evaluations to the most serious and absurd accusations, figuring to encounter no objections. At the same time the appropriate organizational measures were being carried out. New employees from Stalin's circle were sent to PRAVDA as "emissaries." The Moscow Party Organization, whose secretaries Uglanov and Kotov supported Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy on a number of fundamental positions, was shaken up. Kaganovich was included in the trade union leadership, and he began to use apparat workers who had a clear sense of the situation to put pressure on Tomskiy.

Stalin also resorted to his favorite methods—playing people off against each other and intrigues. As early as the fall of 1927 in a private conversation he suggested to Uglanov that he replace Tomskiy in the post of AUCCTU Chairman. Uglanov firmly refused this proposal. Later Uglanov, a nonvoting member of the Politburo and secretary and member of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, Kotov, and other leaders of the Moscow Party Organization who were not under Stalin's thumb were removed from the posts they held. Even though not long before that on 18 October 1928 the Central Committee Address to the Moscow Party Organization asserted the following: "The Central Committee declares that the Moscow Oblast Committee as a whole and its leadership cell has followed and continues to follow the party line and unconditionally carries out the decisions of its organs. The Central Committee sweeps aside talk that the Moscow Oblast Committee is pitting itself against the Central Committee as untrue."

Stalin's letter to Kuybyshev of 31 August 1928 is also telling: "I heard that Tomskiy intends (?) to hurt you. He is a bad person and not always honest. It seems to me that he is wrong. What else is Tomskiy demanding from you?"

One cannot deny that Stalin and his supporters (Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, and others) were consistent in pumping up the charges. At first Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy were accused of a supposedly conciliatory attitude toward the rightists, then of hesitation and panic, and finally, they themselves "became" rightists and moreover leaders of the deviation itself, the struggle against which they had voted to intensify at one of the Central Committee party plenums.

In the environment of persecution which had developed, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy sent in their resignations from the posts they held and stated their views on the problems of economic development and internal party

life. Among other things they firmly opposed continuing the policy of "extraordinary measures" and Stalin's theory of "tribute" from the peasants for the needs of industrialization. At the same time they evaluated Stalin as a political figure, pointing out the serious deformations for which he was to blame when policy was replaced by intrigue and political labels.

In January-February 1929 at the combined session of the Central Committee Politburo and the Presidium of the TsKK VKP(b), Stalin sharply attacked Bukharin, Tomskiy, and Rykov, characterizing them as a special right deviationist capitulation group in the party which supported the free development of capitalist urban and rural elements. Then he gave an absolutely different, sharply negative evaluation to Bukharin's "Notes of an Economist," which two months earlier he had "defended" from Frumkin: "Notes of an Economist" is an antiparty eclectic article intended to slow down the development of industry and change our policy in the countryside in the spirit of Frumkin's well-known letter. If Bukharin has the right to write an absurd antiparty article like "Notes of an Economist," then party members certainly have the right to criticize this article.

The situation became more and more tense. Methods of pressure became more and more refined. Thus, at first people demanded that Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy disassociate themselves from Frumkin. But when ultimately they did this, their "disassociation" was turned against them. At the Central Committee Plenum in November 1929, regarding the "troika's" announcement Molotov said the following: "The authors of the announcement found it convenient to disassociate themselves from Frumkin but from whom are you comrades disassociating yourselves? You have gone ten times further than Frumkin. You have generalized and carried Frumkin's mistakes to the limit. You have become a real mouthpiece for those sentiments which Frumkin expressed in relatively weak form last year." Stalin's fervent stooge was already "protecting" Frumkin from Bukharin and his comrades.

Finally, the charges against them were formulated in concise form in Stalin's speech at the combined meeting of the Central Committee Politburo and Presidium of the TsKK VKP(b) in January-February 1929. In his words, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy demanded that the rate of development of industry be reduced, the construction of sovkhozes and kolkhozes be stopped, complete freedom of private trade be established and the regulatory role of the state in the field of trade be abolished, and the extraordinary measures against kulaks be abolished and taxes be raised for them. Stalin declared that the "main trouble with the Bukharinites" was that they supported facilitating—and freeing—the kulak as a means of resolving grain difficulties and that was incompatible "both theoretically and politically with the foundations of Leninist policy and Leninism." The Bukharinites want, Stalin said, "to be given the freedom of fractional groupings despite the Party By-Laws."

It is obvious today what the real price of these charges was and what the scope was of the political damage which the party suffered in the country because the warnings of Bukharin and his supporters were not heeded in time, and because Stalin managed to confuse many honest Communists.

I will remind the reader that Bukharin's views on the question of rate of development evolved to a certain extent and in 1928—1929 were distinguished by a very sober, balanced approach. In his "Notes of an Economist," Bukharin warned with good reason that attempting an extraordinarily high rate of development would leave us without reserves, and a policy regularly associated with lack of reserves smelled slightly of adventurism. He ridiculed the plans for superindustrialization and the Trotskyite "gardeners" who tugged at plants by their tops so they would grow faster. "Every Communist understands," he wrote, "that we must go forward as rapidly as possible." But not more rapidly than possible.

Bukharin supported a rational correlation between the development of industry and agriculture: "The point is not an extraordinarily rapid rate of industrialization, more is possible—but under certain conditions if we are going to have an upsurge in agriculture as the base and rapid economic turnover between the city and the countryside."

In taking issue with Stalin, who asserted that Bukharin was for the plan but against industrialization, he declared that that was an ignorant opposition, since the plan of the first five year period, which he voted for, was in fact a plan for industrialization.

In his turn Rykov in a report on the control figures for 1928-1929 said: "Making a fetish of rate of development is absolutely impossible." At the same time it was Rykov as head of the government who proposed accepting the plan of the first five year period after it was discussed and debated.

Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy did not oppose the construction of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, but only favored doing it at a moderate rate and favored a stable agrarian policy which took into account the interests of the broad masses of peasants.

The disagreements with Stalin were sharpest on the question of the so-called extraordinary measures.

In January 1928 in connection with the difficulties of grain procurements, the Politburo voted to use extraordinary measures against the kulak. Along with the other members of the Central Committee, the future "leaders of the right deviation" voted for the extraordinary measures at the April 1929 Plenum as well. But they considered them temporary measures which should be restricted to merely confiscating grain from the kulaks. But soon Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy saw that the extraordinary measures were becoming a system which

undermined the material incentive for producing grain and were being extended not only to the kulaks but also to ever wider strata of the peasants.

"We should eliminate the extraordinary measures," Bukharin noted, "because they have outgrown themselves, they have become outdated historically, economically they are giving us practically nothing more, and economically, if they have a result, the result will be intensifying those tendencies which lead toward war communism." The extraordinary measures, he noted, reduced commodity turnover and were a form of direct administrative pressure. "What will come next?" asked Bukharin. "Well all right, today we will purchase grain for one day using all means of pressure, but tomorrow and the day after tomorrow what will happen? Policy must certainly not be determined for one day!"

In summarizing results of imposing extraordinary measures and noting their initial effect, Rykov self-critically acknowledged that he had not foreseen all the negative consequences. "... A great many of what we call distortions entered the system of these measures. I personally was convinced that administrative measures would lead to the elimination of the grain crisis. That, unfortunately, did not happen," but, as Rykov noted, relations with the middle income and poor peasants were spoiled. "I am one of the main people to blame for the events that occurred. The political result of the extraordinary measures was such that the party should do everything possible to avoid them," he declared at the July Party Central Committee Plenum in 1928, with an approving remark by Stalin incidentally.

I will note that at the July 1928 Central Committee Plenum, not only Bukharin, Tomskiy, and Rykov but also many other members of the Central Committee, Stetskiy, Khatayevich, Sokolnikov, Klimenko, Medvedev, Eykhe, and Kalinin among others, favored abolishing the extraordinary measures and talked about the excesses linked with them. And these measures were abolished at the July Plenum, but soon Stalin and his circle turned to them again. Moreover, the forms of force on the peasants became even harsher, essentially becoming the large-scale tyranny about which a great deal has been written today, including in the pages of PRAVDA.

At the April 1929 Central Committee Plenum, Bukharin directly opposed the sinister theory of the aggravation of the class struggle as successes increased in the construction of socialism. He correctly evaluated this theory formulated by Stalin at the July 1928 Central Committee Plenum and developed later, in September 1928, by Kuybyshev as the theoretical basis of the "time of extraordinary measures."

At the November 1928 Plenum, the Central Committee supported Stalin's line on the extraordinary measures, and that proved to be a tragic mistake.

As later events showed, the restrictions on commodity monetary relations imposed by Stalin and his policy of dismantling the NEP [New Economic Policy] cost the country a great deal. And he misrepresented the position of his opponents by charging the "Bukharinites" with supporting complete freedom of private trade and rejecting the regulatory role of the state. In fact Bukharin was for increasing the regulatory role of prices in developing the economy and opposed disruption of market ties as the basic form of the linkage between industry and agriculture, and opposed turning the peasants from the sellers of grain to deliverers of grain. He proposed maneuvering with grain prices by season and regulating them by regions of the country, favored flexibility in prices and their connection with market food reserves, with prices for the means of production, with the taxation system, and the like. At the same time Bukharin justifiably noted that speaking of free market relations meant speaking of "dry water," for even under capitalism in its monopoly stage there is no free market. He asked, "With the ever greater concentration of our production in our country and with the enormous concentration of factories and plants, can there really be a 'single market'? For it to exist, a 'little bit more' is needed: nationalization of land must be eliminated, nationalization of factories and plants must be eliminated, the dictatorship of the proletariat must be eliminated—no more, no less! So this 'interpretation' rests on a slightly primitive understanding, to put it mildly, of what is called the 'free market.'"

The assertion that Bukharin was for "freeing the kulaks" was also based on manipulation of facts. In 1929 quotations were taken from his articles and statements of 1925, for which the Trotskiyites had attacked him sharply and regarding which Stalin himself and the party Central Committee Politburo at that time had repeatedly rebuked them. For example, at the 14th Party Congress Stalin, defending Bukharin from the Trotskiyites' attacks on the slogan "Enrich yourselves", said: "... Comrade Bukharin made an insignificant mistake compared with these comrades. And he did not violate one decree of the Central Committee. How do you explain that despite that the unbridled persecution of Comrade Bukharin still continues? What specifically do they want from Bukharin? They demand the blood of Comrade Bukharin. That is precisely what Comrade Zinoviev demands. Do you demand Bukharin's blood? We will not give you his blood, you must know that." But then those who yesterday defended him opened fire on Bukharin, and with "ammunition" which appeared to be taken from the Trotskiyite arsenal. The 180-degree turn in the evaluation of Bukharin and his notorious slogan, the error of which he himself had acknowledged several years before, above all determined the change in Stalin's personal attitude toward Bukharin.

Here one must say that the slogan "Enrich yourselves!" which the left opposition and then the General Secretary too considered so negative, was addressed not to the kulaks but to all the peasants. Here is what Bukharin had

to say in his report at the meeting of the Aktiv of the Moscow Party Organization in April 1925: "In general one must say to all the peasants and all strata of the peasants: Enrich yourselves, save up, develop your farms. Only idiots may say that we should always be poor; we must now follow a policy which will make poverty disappear in our country. We prefer to allow the bourgeois peasants to develop their farms, but we will take much more from them than we take from the middle-income peasant. The capital we receive from them we will give to organizations of middle-income peasants in the form of credit or in some other form to the poor and farm laborers.

It is worth mentioning that back in 1921 in the pamphlet "On the Food Tax" V. I. Lenin wrote: "Everything should be put in motion to revive industrial turnover and farm turnover at all costs. Whoever achieves the greatest results in this area, even through private management capitalism and even without cooperatives and without directly turning this capitalism into state capitalism, will bring more benefit to the cause of all-Russian socialist construction than whoever 'thinks' about the purity of Communism and writes regulations, rules, and instructions on state capitalism and cooperation but in practice does not advance turnover. This may seem like a paradox: private management capitalism in the role of the accomplice of socialism? It is by no means a paradox but economically and altogether an indisputable fact. There should be fewer disputes about words. Even now we are excessively guilty in this area. There should be a little more diversity in practical experience and a little more study of it."

In rehabilitating the slogan "Enrich yourselves!" during the charges against Bukharin at the plenums in 1929, his later proposals for an aggressive economic attack on the kulaks, given by Bukharin in October 1927 at the Moscow Guberniya Congress of Trade Unions, were intentionally ignored.

It is something else again to what degree Bukharin's proposals in that period were justified. Even then the weight of taxation was causing large-scale elimination and break-up of the farms of kulaks and well-to-do average peasants in many rayons of the country. As Delegate Ivanov noted at the 15th Congress, up to half of the kulak farms were transferred to lower groups in the Northern Caucasus. It is also well known that Rykov did not share Bukharin's opinion about aggressive measures against the kulaks. It should be emphasized that Bukharin proposed only economic measures to restrict the kulaks but not at all the direct forcible expropriation which the Stalinist leadership soon relied upon. Expropriation of the kulaks in the period of complete collectivization hit the average peasant as well, as PRAVDA has already written, while the extraordinary measures were used even against kolkhoz members as repression for not fulfilling assignments of procurements and the like.

The charge that Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy were working to create fractions and were fighting against party decisions was also unfounded. This is what Rykov had to say on this score: "There is no contradiction between the unity of the party, collective leadership, and a struggle of opinions in the Politburo and the Central Committee if all members of the leadership organs carry out the decisions adopted, regardless of whether they are in the majority or the minority. Moreover, the more complicated the situation, the higher the cultural level and the more intensive the economic and political growth of the country, and the more complex the questions which arise before us (and more and more questions are arising), the more disputes there are. The essence of the matter is that we acted as one once the decision was adopted, but each of us argued and voted the way he thought when the decision was being formulated."

At the April 1929 Central Committee Plenum Tomskiy asked those who accused him of factionalism the following: "Where did we speak out, at what meeting did we speak out against the line of the Politburo majority?" No one could name such statements.

Stalin's tactics in relationship to Bukharin's, Rykov's, and Tomskiy's statements or resignations from their posts in 1928 also illustrate the nature of the methods used by Stalin. At that time those resignations were not accepted. Obviously Stalin needed a little more time to prepare for open assault on the "troika" at the Central Committee Plenum and to unite his supporters in the higher party organ and further discredit the "right deviationists" in party circles. In exposing Stalin's tactics, Bukharin said: "First it was absolutely necessary to sully, to stain, to discredit, and to trample, and then it would not be a matter of satisfying requests for resignations, but of 'removal' for sabotage. The game here is absolutely clear." Their offers to resign were later considered betrayal of the party.

One should remember that other prominent party members also resorted to such means when there were disagreements, the threat of resigning. Even V. I. Lenin made such a statement during the bitter arguments about the Brest Peace. Even Stalin put in his resignation from the post of general secretary. Rykov brought Stalin's note of 27 December 1926 to one of the plenums: "I ask to be released from the post of general secretary of the Central Committee. I declare that I can no longer work in this post. I do not have the strength to work in this post any longer." "They ask me," Rykov commented right there on the note, "whether he acquiesces to the Central Committee or not (this means the Central Committee decision on Stalin continuing to work in this post—G. Sh.) Well, I think that was the reason he put in his resignation, in order to acquiesce."

The main reason for the reprisal against them was, of course, criticism of Stalin's desire for one man rule and opposition to the style he had created which contrasted with Leninist principles of internal party democracy.

At the combined Plenum of the Central Committee and the TsKK VKP(b) in April 1929, Rykov warned: "I am not at all concerned about myself: neither I, nor Bukharin, nor Tomskiy have any elements of any kind of self defense. The regulation being used against us can do a great deal of harm to us and the party may kill us politically and has the right to do so. I am afraid, however, that this regulation may do extreme harm to the entire party by becoming the starting point for an altogether new stage in the organization and life of the entire party."

These words proved to be prophetic. It was precisely that style of party life which was alien to the Leninist norms that was established in the decades of the age of the cult of personality, and the tragic pages in the history of our party and country began.

Stalin turned the 10th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress resolution "On Party Unity," which was directed against the split in the party, into a truncheon for dealing with people who dared to support their own opinion which differed from Stalin's and a means to assert his totalitarian power.

Lenin warned that it was unacceptable to abuse the resolution "On Party Unity." He emphasized that the struggle against factionalism should not mean curtailing criticism of the party's shortcomings and that the party should be set up in such a way "so that any practical suggestion... was set immediately, without any red tape, for discussion and decision by executive, local and central, party organs." In the resolution Lenin included a proviso on regular publication of the party's DISKUSIONNYY LISTOK and special collections with critical materials. When K. I. Marchenko, one of the delegates of the 10th Party Congress, proposed to introduce an amendment to the resolution on the anarchist and syndicalist deviation, saying that debate anthologies should be published only by the RKP(b) Central Committee or the Oblast Central Committee Buro, Lenin objected: "Saying that in the name of the congress is extremely prohibitive." At his suggestion the congress voted down the amendment to prohibit publication of collections locally at the initiative of local communists. And Lenin proposed rejection of D. B. Ryazanov's amendment to the resolution "On Party Unity" in which Ryazanov proposed to decisively oppose the possibility of elections to the congress on the basis of platforms. "We cannot deprive the party and the Central Committee members of the right to appeal to the party if a question arouses fundamental disagreement... and if there is such a question as, let us say, concluding the Brest Peace? Do you guarantee that there cannot be such questions? That is impossible to guarantee. But if circumstances cause fundamental disagreements, can you prohibit submitting them to the court of the whole party? Never! That is an excessive desire which cannot be fulfilled and which I suggest that you reject."

Lenin indicated that the resolution did not mean stirring up party members against the opposition, but was an appeal for unity. He noted that in addition to criticism, the resolution on unity contained recognition of the merits of the "workers' opposition" in formulating a number of fundamental questions (Point 5). It is telling that by decision of the 10th Congress, Point 7 of the resolution on unity, which envisioned expulsion from the party as an extreme measure against factionalists, was not published; that also was no accident.

V. I. Lenin was against excessive spread of the concept "deviation" and turning it into a bugbear for the struggle against unconventional thinkers. Thus, in September 1921 in a letter to G. Ye. Zinovyev he wrote: "There were serious fundamental disagreements in Moscow, and at the 10th RKP Congress they were the most reliable ones, and the same at the congress of metalworkers. These comrades could not so suddenly fall into deviation. We do not see a shadow of facts which prove this.

"In St. Petersburg there are no fundamental disagreements and there is not even a deviation toward deviation. Neither Komarov nor Uglov has this inclination, and at the 10th RKP Congress they were the most reliable ones, and the same at the congress of metalworkers. These comrades could not so suddenly fall into deviation. We do not see a shadow of facts which prove this.

"There is the legitimate desire of the majority to be the majority and replace that group through which you 'governed' the other group. People have grown up, and thus their desire is certainly a legitimate one.

"It is not necessary to urge them toward deviation by speaking of 'fundamental disagreements.' It is necessary to cautiously carry out 'ideological' leadership."

In the pamphlet "Once Again on Trade Unions, on the Present Moment, and on the Mistakes of Comrades Trotsky and Bukharin," Lenin wrote "the party is learning not to exaggerate disagreements." And right there he repeated Trotsky's true words that the ideological struggle in the party did not mean sweeping each other aside but meant mutual influence. Lenin called for comradely tolerance of others' opinions.

The decisions of the 10th All-Russian RKP(b) Conference expressed the principle according to which "no repressions whatsoever are acceptable against comrades for thinking differently on certain questions decided by the party."

In December 1923 the Central Committee Politburo and TsKK Presidium at a joint session unanimously adopted the resolution which also confirmed the principles of the freedom of internal party criticism. The resolution contained the demand that the party leadership organs "not consider any criticism a manifestation of factionalism and in doing so push conscientious and disciplined party

members onto the path of close-mindedness and factionalism." But later this provision was violated. It started when under Stalin's pressure a proposal was introduced to the resolution of the 13th Party Conference, which was held in January 1924 a few days before Lenin's death; this proposal was addressed to the party's central committee and proposed that the "secret seventh point of the resolution of the 10th Congress be published before then. This later played a role in the struggle against heresy, which included even reprisals against those who tried to support their own viewpoint when party policy was being worked out.

In reconstructing the truth of history today, of course, we should not place all the blame for the crimes and mistakes on Stalin alone. Many of his circle intentionally or unintentionally helped create Stalin's cult, even though later they became his victims themselves. You can't have a song without words, as they say.

It is bitter to realize that, for example, Kirov, a well-known party figure who had done quite a bit for the country, demanded that Rykov and Tomskiy (Bukharin was not at the meetings) not only acknowledge their mistakes and reject the platform but also "acknowledge its kulak program which ultimately leads to the ruin of socialist construction. It must be said directly that every added percentage point of rate of our industrialization and every added kolkhoz were achieved not only in the struggle against the kulak and other counterrevolutionary elements in our country; they were also achieved in the struggle against comrades Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy, and Uglanov." Rudzutak, who later in the 1930's was repressed, also demanded more and more self-reproach from the "leaders of the right opposition": "You confessed at the November plenum and you confessed yesterday, but beyond that nothing more has been done with you."

In this situation Tomskiy acknowledged his real and nonexistent mistakes and declared with bitterness: "It is somewhat difficult to be constantly confessing. Some comrades have these sentiments: confess, confess, confess endlessly. But let me do a little work."

In passing let us say something about acknowledging the "mistakes." Frequently one hears that Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy gradually moved to the majority's positions and themselves condemned their previous views. But can one speak of a really voluntary "move" in a situation when their views were equated by the Stalinist leadership to apostasy against Leninism and to rejecting the construction of socialism and the like and direct threats were made against them? It is enough to cite, for example, a fragment from Zhdanov's speech at the April Central Committee Plenum in 1929: "Dear Comrade Tomskiy... we settled accounts with the Trotskyites, and the party as a whole will settle accounts with you if you do not acquiesce and acknowledge your mistakes." At the same plenum Bukharin and Tomskiy were discharged from their posts at PRAVDA, the Comintern,

and the All-Union Komsomol. In November of the same year Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo, while Rykov, Tomskiy, and Ugarov (a member of the party's Central Committee) were warned that if "they make the smallest attempt to continue the struggle against the line and decisions of the IKKI [Executive Committee of the Communist International] and the VKP(b) Central Committee, the party will not hesitate to use the appropriate organizational measures against them." It was in these conditions that the "convergence" of the viewpoints and then the self-reproaches of Bukharin, Tomskiy, and Rykov at various party forums took place. The "bringing to confession" was also part of the ritual worked out by Stalin.

As a result of such methods, pluralism of opinions disappeared from practice and from party life for decades and voting in the party central committee became unanimous.

As was already noted, this situation did not come about all at once. The minutes of the congresses of the second half of the 1920's show an increase in intolerance of other opinions, even erroneous ones, and a situation of filibustering against heretics, which was essentially the tactic of "shutting their mouths." Here are just a few of the cries from the audience and the retorts during speeches at the 15th Congress of Muralov, Rakovskiy, and other now-rehabilitated party figures: "Throw away Trotsky's cheat sheet," "You'll be done for!" "A naked lie!" "Stop, that's enough!" "You wretched traitors!" "Get out of the party and that's the end of it!" "Let him go over to the Mensheviks, they'll give him something to talk about there! The congress demands that he be removed!" and so on. So the environment of hostility and abuse of the individual, which was later evolved into hanging the label "enemy of the people" on dissenters, became more and more tense.

To be fair it should be recognized that in the years which preceded their being expelled from the Politburo, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskiy themselves to a certain extent helped elevate Stalin and create the conditions which led to replacing opinions with repressions against dissent (Rykov, for example, approved the arrest of opposition members). Such is the truth of history.

But it was precisely the defeat of the "right deviation" which opened up a direct road to confirming Stalin's totalitarian power in the party and the state. Collective leadership in the Politburo was completely replaced by one man leadership. This allowed Stalin to develop and complete the actual deviation from Leninist principles and norms of party life. In economic and political spheres the departure from Leninism appeared above all in the undermining of the alliance of the working class with the peasants, in the imposition of forced collectivization, and in mass repressions.

Rejection of the collective principle in formulating party policy, the actual ban on free discussion of the prospects of social development and alternative approaches in the field of economics, and one-sided information afforded the Stalinist leadership an opportunity to appear unanimous in supporting any, including voluntaristic, political and economic decisions. This interrupted the process of the formation of a rule-of-law state which had just begun and of the democratization of social and economic life and led to deformation of the theory and practice of socialist construction.

Overcoming these deformations and returning to Leninist principles and norms of management of society is one of the key tasks of our revolutionary restructuring.

'Memorial' Constituent Conference Discussed
18000644 Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Feb 89 p 3

[Article by A. Goldobin, member of the USSR journalists' union: "The Path to the Truth"]

[Text] Moscow-Leningrad—At the end of January in Moscow a constituent conference was held for "Memorial," an all-union voluntary historico-educational society. There were 505 delegates from 198 cities of our country, guests and journalists who gathered at this first, long-awaited forum of the new mass social organization.

The conference adopted a charter and elected a board for the society. From our city it included the social coordinators of the Leningrad chapter of "Memorial," Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof G. S. Lebedev and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent M. Ye. Proshina. In the near future two more Leningraders will be elected to the board from members of section of former political prisoners.

Finally! After long and difficult changes, arguments and "coordinations," the forum was finally held. Why was everything so difficult? In general it is difficult for anything new to make its way into our lives. But this was so unusual, so "nonformal," not handed down "from above" but generated "from below" in the thick of the people inspired by the noble idea of raising a monument to the deceased. Deceased not in war but in the bloody slaughter of Stalinist tyranny...

More than 50,000 citizens of the country signed a petition to the CPSU CC containing the appeal: a party resolution to immortalize the victims of the persecutions must be accelerated and put into the hands of enthusiasts of the mass movement.

Who are these no-longer-young fellow Leningraders who filled an entire railroad car of compartments on the way to Moscow? They are gray, wrinkled, and forever marked by the memory of what they have experienced. The fate

of each of them is marked by Stalinism, which tyrannized the homeland for almost half of its socialist history and left scars on the souls of the people.

An associate of the Institute of Linguistics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philological Sciences, Prof L. A. Pokrovskaya came to the meeting. Her father, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Pokrovskiy, during the thirties was an eminent specialist in the history of religion, one of the founders of the museum in the Kazan cathedral. They came for him in 1935. They sent his family to the remote parts of the Bashkir ASSR. They had neither housing nor work. Every 5 days they had to "sign in." If you did not show up it meant that you had fled... How could the family of the "enemy of the people" live, what could they hope for?... The earth is not without good people—they helped the Leningraders not to perish. Now Lyudmila Aleksandrovna is an activist in "Memorial."

The biology teacher Aleksandr Albertovich Snovskiy after the war studied in the second course at the Leningrad Veterinary Institute. When Vera Panova's new book, "Kruzhilikh," was published the students organized a discussion of it. Snovskiy said a few words about it: it was weak... And he substantiated his opinion as a reader. For this he was exiled beyond the Yenisey. The student was accused of "slander against Soviet literature."

Spread out before me is the house newspaper of the Plastpolimer scientific production association, ZNAMYA TRUDA, for 15 November of last year. The headline "Story of 16 Executed" strikes the eye. It contains 16 names, biographies, and destinies of former engineering and technical personnel of the Okhtinskiy chemical combine. The year was 1937. All 16 engineers were shot for participating in the "counterrevolutionary Trotsky-Bukharin organization." What happened to their families? They were scattered over the earth, in camps and in exile.

It is impossible to tell about all of them now. But each of these destinies is an automatic reproach to us, who appear to be innocent but are still guilty: the people have a common destiny. You cannot raise millions from the dead. Those few who survived after going through the circles of hell will wait for justice until the end. It has passed many by, and even today they are frequently slow in making decisions to improve living conditions for those who have been rehabilitated. I was told of our duty to these people by those who through their activity have prepared for the creation of the society.

Academician A. D. Sakharov: "Our country has lost many millions of its citizens because of illegal persecutions, organized famine, lawlessness, and terror. These are individual human destinies, and only such a social organization as 'Memorial' can reach each destiny. Only a social, democratic organization is capable of doing this."

The poet A. A. Voznesenskiy: "Thousands upon thousands of fighters against Stalinism in our country have now joined forces for the first time. There have been no analogs in history to such a large nationwide movement. Behind the hundreds of thousands of people stand 30 million victims, 30 million shadows, and the best monument to them will be not monuments made of stone and not monuments made of bronze, but complete democratization of the country, the impossibility of a repetition of the disgrace, the appearance of another Stalinism."

The writer A. M. Adamovich: "I think that following our 'Memorial' restructuring will make its way to the god-forsaken corners of the country, where it has not yet reached... 'Memorial' is a coming together of people through a feeling of revulsion for executioners and the institution of execution, through a feeling of compassion and guilt before the victims. This idea of 'Memorial' which brings people together, brings nations together, brings cultures together, brings republics together—is especially important."

The writer G. Ya. Baklanov: "We must win the battle for the present generation and for the future generation so

that in their souls there will no longer be any readiness to accept Stalinism. The fact is that the country's economic situation is difficult now, and this is the last hope of the Stalinists and everyone else who is standing in the way of perestroika...."

And so 'Memorial' has received its right to citizenship. Of course, as the historian Yu. N. Afanasyev said at the conference, the circumstance that General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev in a personal conversation with him and the writer A. M. Adamovich in December of last year, regarding the ideas and goals of the future society with interest and approval, even recalled that such a movement was mentioned at the 22d Party Congress in 1961 contributed to this.

"Memorial" is not only and not even so much the building of monuments in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities and regions. "Memorial" is primarily a work of the spirit, historical research. It is memory of the dead and concern for the living; it is the path to the truth.

Failings of Authorities, Society Blamed for Increase in Believers

18000397 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
6 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by V. Shulgin, SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent, Vologodskaya Oblast: "A Frank Conversation. Refuge for An Aggrieved Soul. Why Quite Modern People Go to Church"]

[Text] In Ust-Pechengsk I was a witness to an event which the local newspapers did not report the next day or later: the rayispolkom transferred the Troitsa-na-Zeleni temple to the orthodox community.

Old timers recall dozens of churches that were closed at one time or another, but they have no recollection of a new one being opened. And for us, of course, it is much more customary to report on the construction of hospitals and schools, cultural centers, and children's training centers. But, you see, for believers, the temple serves a similar innermost desire and need.

Together with archbishop Mikhail Nikolayevich Muduyugin, the father superior of Troitskaya church, archpriest Vasily Vasilevich Chugunov, and several women, who were participants in a parish meeting that was just held, we set out for Troitsa. From the building of the rayispolkom, the church against a background of a very wide, in these parts, Sukhona [river], looks like a fantastic sail. I was emotionally prepared for the meeting by S. M. Zaytsev, the guide at the Totma Regional Museum. Stanislav Mikhaylovich told me an amazing story about how he came to discover the secret of a special Totma architecture cult that had no counterparts in the Russian North. A chronicle found in Troitsa-na-Zeleni itself served the researcher as an original source. The church, by the way, is officially listed as a relic of ancient Russian architecture and is protected by the state.

And then V. Spazhev, rayispolkom deputy chairman, opened the lock, and we squeezed our way inside one by one. Not paying any attention (at least, it seemed that way to me) to the piles of rusted iron, bottles, tin cans, and even to the less attractive evidence of human presence, my companions patiently examined the remains of the past temple property. Incredible shame burned my very face. It seems that over many years the eyes should have gotten accustomed to the destruction of churches, but, no, each time the heart sinks again at the sight of such ragged walls and windows that are nailed up with boards.

The clerics explain to K. Ye. Shishkina, chairman of the parish council, what has to be done. I was interested as a human being in how this 67-year-old woman, thin and weighing little, literally like an autumn leaf, intends to restore all of this.

"And we, my dear, will not be in a hurry," Klavdia Yegorovna reassured me. "Now there is no reason to hurry—the temple is ours now. First of all, we have to dress up the room for father Vasilii; we will remove the rubbish and the iron, install windows, and consecrate some little corner in order, not provoking god, to pray.

It is strange to me, an atheist, to pray because of such a trifle and to take on such toil! And what do they really find in this? The rather modern old women watch television, they know about space satellites, and lecturers have been explaining to them for some decades that there is no god . . .

But it is not just little old ladies! You will also see quite a few young faces at church services. They say that the flock has even gotten younger in recent years. Statistics confirm that 20 percent of the population of our country are believers (of course, their share varies in different regions). The number of baptized children of preschool age for the 20 years 1966 to 1986 increased fourfold, the number of funeral services has reached a million a year, and 20,000 wedding ceremonies have been added. Just in the last two 2 years in this very same Vologodskaya Oblast, the number of performances of church rites increased five to six times.

Of course, it is possible not to notice this returning wave. Or to continue to pretend that religion is the refuge of old women impoverished of reason. But one can notice it, accept it as fact and reflect on it. Why are people drawn to church, what do they find there that neither a club, nor a library, nor a glib lecturer gives? I do not think that absolutely everyone who goes into a temple believes in a biblical god. But for some reason, they go!

Recently I thought it worthwhile to inquire of this Vasily Vasilevich Chugunov, the archpriest, why the church confession was so dear to the believing soul.

"But ask the believers," father Vasilii unexpectedly advised.

"Oh, they all answer the same way: we speak our piece to the father, and it immediately becomes easier. An expressed joy is a double joy, and an expressed grief is half grief. This truth is prosaic, arrived at through the science of psychology, but the church also agrees with it. Ninety persons out of 100 go to a confessor with one worldly sin—disorder in one's personal life. The thirst for confession is a search for help.

In our world this is given the technical term "to unburden oneself," or "to get rid of stress." But, in general, life is such that we continue to "burden ourselves," and we "stress." Sometimes fate pushes us into such a corner that you cannot see the light of day.

A parishioner called Anna, about 40 years old, was pointed out to me in the Pokrovskaya church in Gryazovets. A beautiful woman, with blond hair flowing to

the shoulders, she was standing almost right in front of the lectern, and she looked intently at the flickering flames of the numerous candles. Her lips were firmly pressed, and because of this their corners turned into mournful wrinkles and dimples that gave the whole face an expression of sad estrangement. It seemed that everything that was happening around Anna did not interest her. One can look an extremely long time like this at a bonfire in a forest, at a brook murmuring and flowing over pebbles, and at clouds while lying in grass that has been worn out by the sun.

After the service, and after obtaining a promise that her name would remain between us, Anna talked about herself. It is a long and sad story.

She was the seventh and last one in the family, a postwar child. The father soon died, and the mother also did not live long. While Anna was attending elementary school, the older one's looked after her, and in the eight grade they set her up in a boarding school, and they left her by herself: swim as best you can.

She became friendly with girls who were older, and in the tenth grade she became pregnant. She left school. She gave birth. The brothers and sisters refused to give the "libertine" shelter—she knocked about for a year in hospitals and with other people until the baby died. She went to another rayon, got married, and gave birth to twins. There was no peace in the family; the husband could never forgive her maidenly "sin." "It was such torment that I wanted to put my head in a noose." But it did not get to this. In the next fit of drinking, Grigoriy drove on a tractor into the forest, he fell asleep clumsily on the seat and was killed.

She had to refuse work on the farm. The sovkhos moved her out of the apartment as "one who has lost a connection with production." She turned to the court, but "they did not accept the production case," and they read-dressed it to the trade union. It seems that the chairman of the trade union committee would have accepted Anna, but the sovkhos director, after reading the decision, said: "I do not care for your protocols; I need apartments for milkmaids, and not for a drifter without kith or kin!"

Anna left the village, and she made arrangements in the rayon center as a school technician. There they also found her a tiny apartment. The young charwoman was liked by the teachers, and Anna, feeling that she was on solid ground, enrolled in evening school and finished the eleventh grade with a "5". She was accepted as a candidate for membership in the party, and they gave her a recommendation for enrollment in the institute.

"I should have stopped at this point, but, no, women's luck got me once again," Anna bitterly sighs, pausing for breath. Some young fellow gave me a lift in a dump truck. He turned out to be a widower, but he was so cheerful and free-and-easy . . ."

Vitaliy took Anna to his home, especially since there were no children by his first wife. And in a year and a half, when Anna gave birth, he got caught stealing kolkhoz grain. The court gave him 6 years. The mother-in-law blamed the daughter-in-law for everything, and she chased the "newcomer" out of the house; however, she kept the grandson with her.

Afterwards there were a lot of other things. She left work and moved to another oblast, and she ran into the callousness of people more than once. True, she also met with kindness. Grandma Agrafena, who rented part of a regular room to her, was a good soul, and tender. It was at her instructions that Anna came to church.

"The first time I did not feel like myself. I went to the Ramenskaya church—it is about 50 kilometers from Gryazovets, and I stayed at the entrance for the entire service until all of the others departed. Father was also getting ready to go home, and it was then that I told him about everything. The father heard me out, and he did not interrupt even once, and then he asked if I was christened. 'I do not know,' I admitted. 'It is a big sin [grekh-to-kakoy],' the father said. 'You are not allowed to appear in church, if you have not been christened.' 'Then, christen me, father,' came out of me somehow by itself. . . Since then, I go. I stand before the candles, and each time I recall my awkward life, and I think that since I began to go to church my life has been put right. My work, as previously, is with cattle; the pay is decent, and my friends will soon be returning from the army. Both are tankers. I worry now only about my little daughter, and I entreat the Lord that everything goes better for her than it did for me. . ."

I listened and surmised: where could this woman still have taken the burden of her uncomfortable fate, in whom could she have found support, or, if the worst came to the worst, in whom could she have found an obliging listener who would at least hear her out, not interrupting and not saying mischievously: "Well, the woman gives!" ["Nu, daet baba!"] She would come, let us say, to a sovkhos trade union committee. They would stop her at the third sentence: "Be brief. What do you need, an apartment, a pass to a rest home, financial aid [matpomoshch]?" If she knocked on the door of the party committee, the party secretary, befuddled over the accounts of membership dues, the drop in milk yield, and the renewal of the graphic propaganda and fight for the timely preparation of the inventory of tractor-drawn implements, would be frozen to the spot with amazement: "What am I to you, the pope, or what, give you absolution?"

Actually, to what department does a soul go in our country? In whose books is it included? Which of our secular organizations, up to their necks, undoubtedly, in the most important work, can "hear" a confession? Keeping it a secret, naturally.

And can many of our "worldly" confessors say several sincere, informal words over a grave without a crib sheet? And a church sexton would say that the marriage ceremony performed in our registry offices [zags] is hackwork. So, it should not be surprising that the church "opium" continues to cloud even present-day brains that are enlightened by the sciences. The soul is drawn there where refuge is given.

I had a remarkable dialogue with A. Volokitina, chairman of the Ust-Pechengsk rural soviet. Anna Anfinogenovna, with knowledge of the matter, talked about how her countrymen and women live, what they buy in the store, what they subscribe to and read, and how much money they have on their bankbooks. She guiltily became silent only when I asked whether she knew for what reasons Komsomol member Sidorova recently baptized her firstborn, and deputy Petrova, her two sons, who are senior pupils.

"I visit the church only on a patron saint's day," Volokitina admitted frankly. "In order to hear whether there is anything anti-Soviet in the sermons. I once tried to establish contact with the father, and he then and there took the opportunity to ask permission. . . at times to sit in at sessions and meetings of the ispolkom."

"You did not allow it?"

"What else!"

Brief, but very eloquent indeed. But I liked that seditious initiative of the Ust-Pechengsk father superior very much (true, he is now in another parish). Well, he will not miss his chance, and we? Are we always seeking, finding and seizing any opportunity to look into the human heart—into another soul. Which, maybe, is drawn to us more strongly than to the temple?

. . . I finished my notes in the Gryazovetskiy Rayon. Three of the 17 parishes functioning now in Vologodskaya Oblast (not counting the newly opened church in Totma) are in villages in the nearby area. Apparently, it is for this very reason that the visiting (vyezdnoye) conference of the department of propaganda and agitation of the Vologodskiy CPSU obkom was held here. The conference examined the question "on the individual approach to the atheistic education of the population." Not bothering the reader with an exposition "of individual shortcomings in the system of party management of atheistic education of the population," I will say, however, that this system is in deep stagnation, if not worse.

There is this kind of a line in the resolution document: "The ideological activ obtains information on the activity of religious organizations in the rayon. . ." I strongly doubt the truth of this assertion. The rayispolkom showed me such information on the condition: "Not for publication." N. Voronin, a representative of the council on religious matters in Vologodskaya Oblast, when

requested to acquaint the correspondent with the activity of the Vologodskaya eparchy [diocese], turned the key in a safe and, excusing himself, said: "All information of this kind goes to Moscow under a "secret" stamp, so I do not have the right."

Secret—just like in a confession. Only it is not known what is being concealed. It looks like it is the fact of their capitulation to the father.

Results of Youth Poll on Religious Issues Reported

18000552a Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian
6 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Ye. Grishina, under the rubric "Sociological Laboratory": "Are We Religious?"]

[Text] The process of renewing society has made the problem of the human being, his spirituality and morality, paramount. In this connection a great deal of attention is being given to questions of the attitude toward religion, the level of acceptance of religious culture, and its place and role in spiritual culture and in the life of contemporary society.

The Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School of the All-Union Leninist Komsomol Central Committee conducted a sociological study on this subject. They questioned 420 representatives of the youth intelligentsia and college students in Moscow and Leningrad, including doctors, teachers, engineers, and representatives of the creative professions. In addition, young believers in the non-traditional religious grouping of Hare Krishna were questioned by the identical methodology.

On the basis of the data received we can say that the interest in religion, above all in religious culture and the ethical side of religious teachings, is quite high among the youth intelligentsia: about 40 percent of all the young people surveyed were familiar with religious literature (mainly the Bible, less commonly the Koran and the Talmud), and the interest shows most markedly among the creative intelligentsia.

Young people are attracted first of all by the historical and literary value of these works. In their answers they often speak of the humanism and wisdom expressed in these monuments of religious teaching. It is interesting that some respondents consider the Bible's prophecies timely for the present day; they consider them a kind of "futurology." This is found most commonly among students.

Responding to a question about the reasons for the preservation of religious feelings, almost half of the respondents agreed with the statement that in ordinary ideas there is a mixture of national and religious concepts and that it is often impossible to separate national from religious traditions. Perhaps this is why the growth

in national self-awareness which has been manifested more and more vigorously in recent years carries in itself somewhat idealized ideas of the role of religion in national culture. Thus, 23 percent of the creative youth feel that national culture cannot exist without religion, and overall 16.4 percent of the respondents hold this point of view.

A fact that draws attention is that four percent think that religion under contemporary conditions is a "form of defense of national interests" and express the opinion that religious fundamentals should be taught in school. About 10 percent of the young people surveyed think that in the process of religious organizations' more active interaction with society they must be represented in state organs, and 14 percent propose organizing broad access to the mass information media for religious organizations.

It appears that such a "radical" position in part of the intelligentsia may be caused by a reaction of rejection of that "atheistic" stereotype that has been artificially imposed for many years. At the same time it is direct evidence of an inadequately mature civic position in some young people, a result of equating the concepts of religion and morality, religion and culture, and so in the ideas of these young people.

A significant number of respondents (about 30 percent) expressed the opinion that one of the primary reasons for the preservation of religious feeling is shortcomings in the system of education and indoctrination, which does not adequately mold a scientific materialist worldview. Thus, to the question, "Did the knowledge received in these classes help you in realizing and formulating principles and goals in life and in searching for answers to the questions that are important to you?" 38 percent answered, "No," and 30 percent were unable to give any answer at all. But this is just one aspect of the general problem of dehumanization of the system of education and indoctrination.

Along with the youth intelligentsia these same questions were answered by a group of young believers, followers of the Hare Krishna cult. The answers to questions about the level of teaching of history and literature are practically the same for both groups. But 70 percent of the believers gave a negative assessment to the role of the humanitarian knowledge received in school. If we consider that the ranks of the believers are filled most often by emotional, suggestible types who are easily wounded psychologically, then the damage to their spiritual world that is caused by the mechanical, stereotyped approach to humanitarian culture could have been the initial impetus to withdraw into religious mysticism. It is not surprising that an absolute majority (95 percent) of them think that religion fosters an awakening of the higher spiritual principle in people.

While traditional, canonical religious culture attracts the attention of about half of the respondents, a majority (80 percent) are interested in questions linked to mysterious phenomena of nature and the human mind (UFO's, telepathy, telekinesis, the biofield, and the like). There is a notable infatuation with dream books, horoscopes, fortune telling, and the like. Although 36 percent consider all of these things a kind of "game" and something to do "from boredom," 32 percent of the young people surveyed link fortune telling with a hope to avoid dangers and unpleasantness and a desire to know one's future, and almost as many say that they have encountered cases which verified certain signs, predictions, and so on.

I would like to point out one other aspect of the problem of non-traditional religion. This is that because of a certain eclecticism and primitivism the so-called "neocults" are unable to perform the religious compensatory function and cannot serve as a adequate means of individual social adaptation. Therefore, politization of the activity of non-traditional religious groups is almost inevitable. This is confirmed by foreign experience, and by our own domestic experience. Most of the existing associations which to one degree or another have a religious (or pseudoreligious) orientation are drawn to consolidation. Steps are being taken to work out common ideas and programs whose purpose is to form a political organization of believers, persons united by "space religion," and so on.

Many Soviet social scientists are now speaking of the "need to refine the existing practices in classifying believers with religious organizations considering the real processes in the ideology and activity of our country's religious organizations." But while rejecting vulgar atheism which has been imposed on mass consciousness for many years, we must understand that idealized ideas of religion and religious organizations are also unwise and usually result from inadequate theoretical literacy and humanitarian culture.

Under conditions of continued democratization of public life in the country the activity of religious organizations, including the non-traditional ones, will grow. Overall this is natural, and given all the diversity of the situation there must be broader interaction with religious organizations and groups of believers in the social, cultural, and sociopolitical spheres. Joint activity by religious, public, and state organizations offers an opportunity for believers to achieve social self-realization not only in the religious sphere, but also in solving socially significant problems. Such interaction can help reorient the individual and mold a scientific materialist worldview through concrete activity, through solving joint problems that are equally important to believers and non-believers.

Life in Catholic Seminary in LaSSR Described
18000552B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian
6 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by O. Grekov, under the rubric "Frank Talk":
"Seminarists"]

[Text] On Kiyevs Street not far from the center of Riga is St. Frantsisk Catholic Church, one of the most beautiful monuments of European Gothic architecture. Its spires rise above the red roofs of surrounding buildings. There are Catholic churches in Riga that are older, and more beautiful, but this one is remarkable because it is on the grounds of the Catholic Metropolitan Spiritual Seminary, one of two in the country. Separated from secular temptations by a high iron fence, it is always open to believers. But the place where outsiders are forbidden is the seminarists dormitory.

They follow their own life here; their own laws operate, and the primary one is the divine law. This monastery for future priests, which appeared 3 years ago, jealously keeps away from secular eyes. The youth of the seminarists passes by behind the thick walls and narrow windows; their contacts with the world are limited. They are not allowed off the grounds without permission for the whole semester, so that their young souls will not be tempted on the thorny path to God. It is true that on Thursdays after class they are "released" for a few hours. The future priests change into "civilian" clothes and walk about town in pairs or groups. It is not recommended to enter into debates about God on the street, especially during their early time at the seminary while there may possibly still be a place for doubt in their souls.

During the day there is no time left for "dangerous" reflections which the Devil might implant in their minds if they were idle. All of the time except for the monastery dinner table and sleeping goes for study and self-perfection. They get up at 0600 and have morning prayers and service. After a scanty breakfast at the long table they have classes in the auditorium, 40 minutes apiece. Dinner does not leave the priest too full either. Then there is independent training until supper, with a 15 minute break. Evening prayer, reading the Holy Book before bed, and "taps" at 2200.

The schedule there is almost like in a military school. But in school the cadets are allowed to "relax" in the last year and many things, in particular self-training, become formalities (each person does what he wants to). In the seminary the disciplinary requirements only increase throughout the entire period of study and become an inner discipline. In their opinion, a sincere belief in God helps the seminarists keep themselves in hand. It brought them here and it will accompany them through all life, and afterward too. Bishop Wilhelm Nyuksh, rector of the seminary and highly respected in the Vatican, serves as an example to follow.

They live by the good principle that to mark time means to go backwards. If you do not give yourself entirely to your studies you will not absorb the program. The seminarists essentially go through two curricula, the VUZ humanities curriculum and their own, broader one. They devote special attention to history, and it must be admitted that they are better educated in history than students at state VUZes. They study philosophy and psychology thoroughly. Just a list of the special subjects included in their curriculum would take several pages. On top of everything else they have to master five languages perfectly, in addition to Russian which is the teaching language. The five are Latvian, Polish, German, Latin, and Greek. It is not acceptable to do poorly in studies here.

The seminarists spend their free time, 2 hours a day, on reading, television, and sports. The library's rich collection includes both clerical and secular literature for any taste. Erudition is not unimportant in their later activity. There is no shortage of video equipment but, of course, they watch church programs.

While waiting for the prefect of the seminary I observed a funny scene out the window. Seminarists were playing soccer on an excellent field. They ran with purely boyish enthusiasm. If you looked at their excited faces and flashing eyes they were ordinary fellows. Except that their long black smocks slowed down the pace of the game, and made them hot. But they could not take them off. So they ran, holding them down with their hands. I looked at the clock: in 5 minutes the rest hour after dinner would be over and they would again be taken prisoner by thoughts of God. The expressions of their faces would again become as impenetrable as masks, their eyes passionless, and their movements solemn.

Our seminarists call this field "Little Luzhniki." In winter they flood it and play hockey. "Our people love games of motion," Prefect Yazep Trubovich began the conversation as he entered the room. The prefect introduced me to the history of the seminary and the life of its inhabitants.

The Riga seminary was founded in 1920. For the next two decades it graduated several dozen priests each year. After the annexation of Latvia to the Soviet Union the seminary was closed as a result of the erroneous policy of the leaders of the state toward religion. During the German occupation it threw open its doors once more, and then in the early 1950's it was closed down again. The leadership of the country changed and teaching was permitted. But the status of the Catholic VUZ remained hopeless. Only in the second half of the 1980's did they begin breathing freely again. Relations between the state and the church improved significantly and promise to develop further. Admissions have increased and permission has been given to admit Catholics from other republics. At the present time the 88 students at the seminary represent nine nationalities.

"This time we admitted 30 students for study," Yazep Trubovich continued the story. "By no means is every applicant admitted. We require a recommendation from the senior priest of a parish who knows the person being recommended to be a good Catholic. Enrolment is done on the basis of results of a detailed conversation on general religious subjects. Upon the completion of five years of study the seminarists take a rigorous examination. And the diploma is awarded only after a year of practical work as a vicar. We do not produce dilettantes. After all, a poor priest is more dangerous for the faith than a poor doctor is to the health."

That is true. The quality of training the priests receive is enviable. And they often have a better understanding of the processes taking place in our society than do the graduates of secular humanities VUZes. Graduates of Soviet universities and institutes often study in the spiritual seminary.

In the library I met a graduate of MGU [Moscow State University], a psychologist who is now a second year student in the seminary.

"While I was still studying psychology I decided definitely to enter the seminary," Genrikh recalled unwillingly. It seemed painful for him to talk about his secular past. "My parents are believers, but I was drawn to science. I became disillusioned, however. Your doctrine is not convincing. It is paradoxical, but there were quite a few believers in my department. I don't know how their lives have turned out; it is 5 years since graduation now. I was strengthened in my choice by an unpleasant incident. I saw the hand of God, which helped prevent me from committing a serious spiritual crime. I did not ponder the future. The main thing for me is to serve people and be a spokesman for the teachings of Christ."

And not wishing to continue a conversation about himself, he bowed modestly and retreated, moving in a fluid and proud way—they also teach that—as if just outside the door there were lost sheep who needed to be brought back to the bosom of the holy church.

A short time ago the Riga seminary was a fortress that was closed to guests from the "world." And even today it is not easy to visit there, and even more difficult to draw its occupants into frank conversation. The seminary is broadening its contacts today, but strange as it seems, mostly with foreign guests. People from abroad come as individuals and in delegations to satisfy their interest in the life of Catholics in the USSR and the role of priests in Soviet society.

But meetings between atheists and monks, between VUZ students and seminarists, are rare. Who is afraid of such debates? Is it us, the hardened atheists who passed our classes in this subject at the university?

LiSSR Official on Improving Church, State Relations

18000475 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
13 Jan 89 p 3

[Interview with Kazimeras-Lyudvikas Valanchyus, new Lithuanian SSR representative of the USSR Council of Ministers' Council on Religious Affairs, with ELTA correspondent Rolandas Barisas: "From Confrontation to Dialogue"]

[Text] Kazimeras-Lyudvikas Valanchyus has been appointed the Lithuanian SSR representative of the USSR Council of Ministers' Council on Religious Affairs. Previously he worked at the Lithuanian SSR Communist Party's Central Committee as deputy head of the propaganda and agitation department. K. Valanchyus is 52 years of age, he holds a candidate's degree in law and is a doctor. He is married and has a son and a daughter. His wife Valeriya teaches at the Vilnius general school No. 21.

ELTA correspondent Rolandas Barisas asked Kazimeras Valanchyus to describe the current state of state-church relations.

[Valanchyus] During the tragic years of stalinism and stagnation, certain deviations occurred in, among other things, the area of implementation of Lenin's decree on separation of church from state and school, which was meant to safeguard the freedom of conscience for both believers and nonbelievers. Unfortunately, the Council on Religious Affairs and its local offices did not fully carry out their main responsibilities, which were to monitor adherence to the constitutional principle of freedom of consciousness, to oversee laws regulating the activities of religious communities and to effect contact between church and the government. Mistakes of the past are being corrected today. Currently, relations between state and church are characterized by a constructive dialogue, not confrontation. The new law on the freedom of conscience, the drafting of which is nearly complete, will help improve those relations as well. The law will be published for popular discussion. I want to use this opportunity to call upon all, both believers and nonbelievers, to actively express their opinions and proposals regarding that document.

Another proof of changing church-state relations is the fact that all legitimate demands of believers are being satisfied, whereas some of them used to be rejected in recent past. For instance, the Vilnius Cathedral, which has been returned to the church, is undergoing repairs which should be completed by February 1 (it will be consecrated on February 5); repairs at the Church of St. Kazimeras will be completed by March 4. It is well-known that a permission has been granted to build a church in the Lithuanian SSR capital's Pashilaychyay residential district, where a new religious community has been registered. The time when construction will start now depends on believers themselves. I could cite other, similar examples detailed in the republic's press.

The law banning priests from teaching religion to children and preparing them for first communion, Eucharist and confirmation has drawn much criticism. We are seeking ways to resolve this protracted dispute in ways that would provide maximum safeguards for the freedom of conscience. This issue should be reflected in the draft law on the freedom of conscience.

Many people have expressed concern for the fate of Yulionas Cardinal Steponavichyus. It is well-known that his state licence as an apostolic administrator of the Vilnius Archdiocese was revoked in 1961. He still lives in Zhagara. Recently, Cardinal Steponavichyus has been allowed to carry out his responsibilities: once again, he has a clergy licence and works at his diocese. His return to Vilnius is up to the leadership of the Lithuanian Catholic Church.

Reasons for Tensions Between Authorities, Believers Detailed

*18000526 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Jan 89 p 3*

[Article by G. Luparev, docent of the Alma-Ata Higher Party School, candidate of law: "From Conflict to Understanding"]

[Text] Several years ago, when working in the Alma-Ata Party Obkom, I checked up on the complaint of an inhabitant of one of the rural rayons. This person, we shall call him F., a believer, wrote that the local authorities oppress him and grossly violate his civil rights. The district plenipotentiary, for example, comes to his house every night, without the permission and sanction of the procurator, examines the rooms, removes spiritual literature under the pretext of needing it for study, and, as a rule, does not return it...

During the check-up, these facts were fully confirmed, and the illegality was stopped. However, in passing something else, too, was ascertained. Violations of Soviet legislation were permitted more than once and by F. himself. Being one of the leaders of the local Baptists—the followers of the so-called Council of Churches of the Evangelical Christians-Baptists, he headed up illegal meetings of an unregistered religious commune, organized underground "Sunday schools" for the instruction of children in religion, etc. In response, the rural soviet, with the aid of the militia, had recourse, to express it in sports language, to the tactic of power pressing.

Practice shows that such situations are not a rarity. Many conflicts between believers and the representatives of the organs of power are created through mutual efforts of the parties and grow like a snow ball from illegal counter-actions. Let us say, zealous administrators prevent the registration of a religious community. Having despaired, the believers begin joint cult activity without registration. In response, the administrative commission of the rayispolkom fines all of them in succession. Or

another variant—a religious community received permission to rebuild its prayer-house, but enjoying lack of control, it permitted serious deviations from the plan. And the organs of power did not find anything better than to set the bulldozer into motion.

In all such cases, an atmosphere of mutual lack of distrust, suspicion and resentment arises.

The study of the feeling for law and order of believers shows that for many of them legal views, concepts and aims deformed by religion and religious ideology are characteristic, as well as a low level of knowledge of law, including with respect to freedom of conscience, organization, and religious communities. All of this has a negative effect on their relations with the organs of the state and on their conduct in public life.

Unfortunately, things are no better with the legal training of officials representing the state. This was confirmed by the questionnaire survey conducted recently of 118 students of the faculty for the improvement of qualifications of the Alma-Ata Higher Party School, those working in the position of deputy chairman of the ispolkom of the rayon Soviet of People's Deputies of Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, those who take care of culture, public education, and public health.

It cannot be said that the general level of their training gives rise to doubt—all of them have a higher education, in the main—pedagogical. Half of them have been working in this post for more than 5 years, the overwhelming majority of those surveyed head up at the local level public commissions for assistance in the control of the observance of legislation on religious cults.

And nevertheless, the answers to the questions of the questionnaire showed that only one-fourth of them has a sufficiently correct understanding of the constitutional principle of freedom of conscience.

Only one-tenth of the students has a more or less correct concept of the difference in the policy of the CPSU and the policy of the Soviet state in matters of religion. ("The policy of the CPSU is aimed at the struggle against religion, but the work of the Soviet organs consists in the preservation of the rights of citizens and associations to the performance of religious rites.").

The questionnaire survey also showed that many deputy chairmen of the raispolkoms have a poor knowledge of the registration procedures for religious associations and erroneously interpret the corresponding legal norms. Thus, for example, to the question of "What does Soviet legislation prohibit religious associations from doing?"—only one-fifth of those surveyed gave a more or less correct answer. ("To operate, without having registered, to involve children in the rites, to carry out their instruction, and to organize meetings for children and young people."). The rest answered this question inaccurately or did not answer it at all. A part of the

students erroneously treats the limitations in the activity of religious associations: "They cannot conduct agitational work, or publish religious literature, without the consent of the commission they cannot perform religious rites." Or: "The propagation of religious rites, the conduct of various religious measures, and the involvement of the population and young people in religion is prohibited," or "it is prohibited to involve school children under the age of 18 in religion." These answers are not correct, but it is precisely the incorrect and arbitrary treatment, by officials and members of the commissions for assistance, of some limitations of the activity of religious communes and groups established by Soviet legislation, which calls forth the sharp reaction of religious associations and the dissatisfaction and resentment of the believers. In general, the instruction of children in religion is one of the most complex problems in the provinces, calling forth great disputes and differences, although this question has been sufficiently clearly solved by the legislation that is in effect. It only prohibits the organized instruction of children in religion, but it does not prevent parents from bringing up their children in the spirit of their own ideological convictions, including bringing them to worship services and prayer meetings. However, the survey showed that less than half of the deputy chairmen of the rayispolkom taking care of public education know about this. The rest are convinced that believers do not have the right to bring their children to religious measures.

It is clear that with such a level of legal training of Soviet officials, who in terms of their official duties are called upon to control the execution of the laws on religion and the church, it is difficult to count on a serious improvement of the relations of the organs of state authority and religious associations, and all the more so to attain the elimination of violations of law on the part of the believers. In practice, such legal semi-literacy and weak knowledge of the methods of work with religious associations turns into an aspiration to rely on administrative methods, to solve all problems that arise from a position of strength. Although present-day conditions demand another approach from the representatives of the Soviet of People's Deputies—the precise observance of legality and the strengthening of legal education work with the believers.

To increase the legal training of Soviet officials and people actively engaged in social life, who take part in controlling the activity of religious associations, seminars have been held in the provinces during the past years and other forms of their studies have been organized, and this is producing some results. But the studies usually have an unsystematic character and for this reason they cannot fundamentally solve the problem. One can attain a significant increase in the level of legal knowledge and the legal culture of the leaders and members of the commissions for assistance to the ispolkoms of the local Soviets, and, consequently, significantly improve state-church relations only having put it on a professional basis, as this is demanded by the resolution of the 19th Party Conference "On Legal Reform." It seems, it has become necessary to introduce in the instruction programs of the existing network for the training of Soviet officials and of the departments for Soviet construction of the law faculties of universities, a small (6-10 hours) special courses for the study of questions of the legal regulation of the external activity of religious associations and the provision of political and legal guarantees of the freedom of conscience of citizens. It is impossible not to take into account the fact that these questions directly touch on the vital interests of a considerable part of our population, they are directly related to the party line aimed at the deepening of democratization and the renewal of socialism, as well as the involvement, in the process of restructuring, of all Soviet people, regardless of their ideological convictions.

Cooperative Offers Bibles For Sale 18000612

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 21 February 1989 carries on page 6 a 100-word advertisement for the "Ostrog Bible." The bible is being offered for sale by the "Slovo-Art Cooperative." The bible is a replica of the first "fully published" bible in Church Slavonic which was printed in 1580 to 1581. The advertisement notes that two previous attempts to publish the bible in this century were unsuccessful. This is the third attempt and was accomplished with assistance from the Soviet Cultural Fund and Russian churches. Ten thousand copies of the bible have been published. The price is 150 rubles, a portion of which will be donated to museums and churches. The bible was printed by the Finnish publishing house "Yukheystyuo".

Culture Ministry Streamlining Measures Described

18000378 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Dec 88 p 2

[Interview with P. Shabanov, deputy minister of culture, by N. Kishchik: "From Authoritative Sources. Culture Without Officials"]

[Text] A new general plan for administering the field of culture has been approved. Our correspondent talks with P. Shabanov, deputy minister, about what is changing in the system of management in this sphere.

[Kishchik] Pyotr Ilyich, are only certain elements in the administrative apparatus being curtailed or are we in for great changes in the administrative structure itself that has come into conflict with the new conditions?

[Shabanov] The one does not exclude the other. Before restructuring or creating a new plan of administration, it is necessary to get rid of that which hobbles, binds and does not make it possible to work creatively, practically, and with full responsibility for making decisions.

Today, instructions are our main impediment. We are all their captives, and we describe in detail what is permissible and what is not permissible. Over the years an enormous amount of long since outdated orders and regulations have piled up. . .

And now 927 standard documents have been rescinded. We have been given a job by the USSR Council of Ministers to develop "New Conditions of Administration" for each of the branches of culture, taking their special features into account. Together with the Union of Theatrical Workers of the USSR, we have just prepared the first such document. We hope that it will be adopted in the near future. We are attempting to create the kind of commercial mechanism that will stimulate work efficiency to the maximum and that will make it possible to evaluate, and depending on the overall success, to encourage, everyone's specific contributions. We are giving a lot of attention to expanding the rights of organizations.

The activity of the ministry itself was tied to instructions. We receive significant resources from the state budget. But each little request required coordination with the Ministry of Finance and in the Council of Ministers. . . Now this situation will be changed. Resources are allocated to us for the maintenance of cultural establishments, the development of cultural communications, the acquisition of equipment, and the conduct of centralized measures—festivals, competitions and reviews. . . And, today, we can operate them freely, to "move" from one item to another, not checking with any higher department. And, what is very important, moneys not spent in a previous year will not be written off.

Changes will also take place in the structure of the central apparatus of our ministry. The number of employees will be reduced by 25 percent. Ten departments are being eliminated; there will not be 21 of them but 11. Four central administrative boards are being created in principal avenues of activity: musical art, the fine arts, cultural work among the masses, and library and museum affairs (historical, local lore and memorial museums are under this jurisdiction).

We will transfer a significant part of the organizations of a union subordination to the jurisdiction of the republics and to the local soviets of people's deputies, which will make it possible to eliminate duplication in the activities of central and local organs and to expand the rights of local organs of culture. I want to emphasize: we have proposed a new structure of a basic, rayon, link, where there is a chronic shortage of cultural services. It is especially difficult with this in the villages: the territories are large, and they lack their own base and their own professional collectives. Everyone tries to service rural inhabitants "culturally": cinema facilities services, mass sports and trade union establishments and rayon departments of culture. . . They all have their own budgets. And the forces and resources are being scattered, and they are not achieving their goal. . . We have proposed the creation of a single rayon center of culture and leisure.

Commission on Repressed Writers Begins Work

18000486 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 52, 28 Dec 88 p 5

[Interview with V. Shentalinskiy, deputy chairman of the All-Union Commission on the Literary Heritage of Repressed and Perished Writers, by T. Arkhangel'skaya: "They Will Return from Oblivion"]

[Excerpt] I have read in the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No.49, dated December 7, about the creation of the All-Union Commission on the Literary Heritage of Repressed and Perished Writers. I see this as another proof of our perestroika: only a few years ago everything would have been sustained by the enthusiasm of individuals.

I would like to know whether the new commission's work has produced any results, and what it will do in the future.

[Signed] D. Konstantinov, engineer, Perm.

[Shentalinskiy] From the 1920s to the 1950s some 2,000 literary figures were illegally repressed in this country, and some 1,500 of them died in prisons and labor camps before they could be freed. Naturally, these numbers are incomplete, but it is impossible to check them. It is one of the most abused groups, which is understandable: those who thought it up wanted above all to get rid of the thinking and creative intelligentsia, who are nothing less than the self-consciousness of the people.

Shaken by the abyss of evil that has opened up before our eyes (forget Shakespeare!), we have been as yet unable to fully evaluate those times or to draw a historical lesson from them.

[Arkhangelskaya] At a writer's arrest, his manuscripts and archives were usually confiscated. Is there any hope that at least a part of them survived?

[Shentalinskiy] Indeed, 90 percent of the Writers' Union members who joined it in 1934 were repressed.

We can not bring back the people themselves; at least, we will try to save their labor, their oeuvre, and to give it back to the people. The chance to do so has appeared only now, under the conditions of developing democracy and glasnost. This is the least we can do for our innocently killed comrades. We will find out at last whether or not manuscripts can be burned!

The fate of a manuscript can be utterly unpredictable. Sometimes, awaiting arrest, writers transferred their papers into safe hands or hid them. Sometimes it was done for them by their relatives or friends. For instance, Ye.F.Nikitina, the founder of the museum and publishing house "Nikitinskiye Subbotniki", saved the archive of poet Antala Gidash. Or, for instance, a member of the prosecution team saved Yu.Dombrovskiy's novel "The Monkey Comes for Its Skull"; he simply pulled it out of the file and hid it in his home. There is also a legend that the prosecutor in charge of Pavel Vasilyev's case knew very well that he was a talented poet and not an enemy of the people, and purposefully stretched out the investigation. He would call the prisoner, give him food and paper and leave him for long periods of time so that he could write whatever he wished. They say that Vasilyev wrote a entire bag full of poems there. Is it only a legend?

A world-renowned figure who perished during that period, priest Pavel Florenskiy, philosopher, scientist and writer, wrote when he found out that his entire library, archive and manuscripts had been seized by the OGPU: "The destruction of the results of my life's work are much worse for me than physical death." "Worse than physical death..."

[Arkhangelskaya] By saving and gathering book manuscripts, documents and letters that were hidden or stolen from the people, you will do a great deed: it is akin to raising from the dead, since what we are talking about is the preservation of the Word, the best of what those gifted people produced in their short martyred lives.

[Shentalinskiy] We were driven by similar thoughts when we created our commission. In the process, the entire range of opinions and contradictory situations in the writers' world came to the fore. "We must shout about it!" exclaimed some. "We should do it quietly," whispered others. "I don't believe it," said still others. No one denied that it was a necessary task, but some were ready to help and did indeed help, whereas others

waited to see how it would turn out. I can not say that everything went on quickly or smoothly, but it went on nonetheless. A founding group was formed, if it could be called that. It included such writers as A.Zhigulin, B.Okudzhava, Yu.Davydov, O.Volkov, E.Beltov and V.Leonovich. The Moscow Writers' Organization and the USSR Writers' Union management lent us their support. The idea to form the commission met with understanding in the party's Central Committee as well.

The employees of the USSR Prosecutor's Office readily responded to our inquiries. At our request, they have begun searching for manuscripts and other papers. Some papers from M.Ye.Koltsov's archive seized upon his arrest have been located, including his correspondence with I.G.Erenburg. The search in the archives goes on. By the way, recently, on the protest of the USSR Prosecutor General, A.Chayanov has been rehabilitated, as has been O.Mandelshtam (the rehabilitation concerned his second case, as he had already been rehabilitated in connection with his first case.)

Gradually, the commission's program has been broadening: it has become clear that we must be concerned not only with the work of those writers who perished, as was thought earlier, but of all those who were repressed, and that while the preservation and publication of manuscripts may be the most important aspect of this work, it is not the only one. We must find out the facts about every repressed writer, rehabilitate all those who have not yet been rehabilitated and do everything to preserve their memory. In the bloody civil war that Stalinism waged on our people there were missing in action, too: we know that in the wilderness of the Gulag at least 150 writers disappeared without a trace, of whom 75 were members of the Writers' Union. We must learn their fate. Reference books are being published with distorted data: the dates of death for many writers, including I.Babel, A.Vesoly and B.Pilnyak, are incorrect.

In many republics and oblasts, writers' groups concerned with the same problem have been formed spontaneously, or unofficially. It is not an accident, of course, since the idea of Resurrection seems to be in the air: it is consonant with these times, with their prevailing themes of Repentance and Memory. Our task is to save and identify socially important and artistically significant heritage and to reveal as much as possible of the factual background of events and biographies. It is not a handful of dust or funeral wreaths, but a living task, to bring writers back from oblivion. In effect, the commission has only recently been formed and its work has only begun. Our task is to unite and to create. From the start we have tried to avoid any kind of factional struggle and to attract writers known only for their talent and civic conscience. We have representatives from every republic: all ethnic groups suffered from the arbitrary rule; we should organize and coordinate activities all over the country. Here is an excellent opportunity to show internationalism in practice. We need a large number of active members and a climate of active goodwill around the commission.

[Arkhangelskaya] Could you give us an example of a concrete action?

[Shentalinskiy] I have recently been to Leningrad. The city's House of the Writer organized an evening "The Poetry of Prisons and Camps". How many wonderful, high-quality poems were heard! Practically none of them has yet been published or is known to the reader. What lives! Nikolay Oleynikov, Anatoliy Kleshchenko, Yelena Tager and Yelena Vladimirova. One hundred and 60, those are eloquent figures. At least 100 Leningrad writers were repressed and 60 perished. Later, we met with members of the commission: O.Volkov and Leningraders Z.Dicharov and V.Bakhtin. We heard many proposals: to compile a biographical and bibliographical reference book, to publish a book series or a volume in the "Literary Heritage" series, to organize literary evenings, to assist writers who survived prisons and camps and to improve their living standards. Almost everywhere, from the Baltic to the Pacific, there are enthusiasts who painstakingly collect and preserve the memory of the most tragic period in the history of our literature.

[Arkhangelskaya] What will happen next?

[Shentalinskiy] We have been heard. Literally immediately after the report on the creation of our commission was published in the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA we began to get letters, packages and telephone calls. All documents will be studied professionally and if they have any value they will be recommended for publication and then passed for safekeeping to literary archives and museums.

Let me use this opportunity to once again call upon the public and everyone here in our Motherland and abroad to help up. The restoration of historical truth and justice concerns the society as a whole and everyone of us in particular. Send us manuscripts, letters, memoirs, documents and photographs—everything related to the lives and work of writers who suffered innocently. Our address is 121825 Moscow, Vorovskiy Street, No.52, USSR Writers' Union, All-Union Commission on the Literary Heritage of Repressed Writers.

The LITERATURNAYA GAZETA will continue to inform its readers about the work of the commission.

Weekly Chief Editor Blasts Writers Union Secretary Bondarev

18000405 Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 1,
31 Dec 88-7 Jan 89 p 8

[Editorial by Mikhail Kolosov, chief editor of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA: "Open Letter to Yuriy Bondarev"]

[Text] Believe me, it is not easy to write this. For a long time, I considered you to be a kindred spirit. What is more, you were my idol, and I worshiped you.

The front-line fraternity drew us together, first of all; your books about war were also my books—about me, about us—truthful and honest, graphic and courageous. My admiration for you began to wane when I saw you on the job, at work, in your treatment of people, when I had to work under your leadership at the weekly LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, when you became the leader of the Russian Writers Union, when you "burdened" yourself with a lot of other positions, titles, awards, prizes and many publications. You withstood the trial by fire at the front, you withstood the test of glory to some degree, but you did not withstand the test of power and excessive prosperity that was heaped on you.

Understand, the point is not my grudges. The point is what goals you are pursuing with this, how you want to see the newspaper, but, more precisely, what you want it to be. And this is far from just my personal affair, this affects society in general and writers in particular.

But your goals are clear, if one just traces your "stewardship" of the weekly over the last 5 years.

Having assumed a high post on the board of the RSFSR Writers Union, you laid your hands on absolute power over all of the writers and press organs of the RSFSR—publishing houses, journals and newspapers.

I do not know how you manage other publications, but on the other hand, I know for certain how you tend the weekly LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA—as they say, I know what it felt like. Essentially, you victimized the newspaper through your pressure on it; your pretensions, your open ill-will towards the newspaper constantly hang over it.

In recent years, you created unbearable working conditions for the editorial staff through petty and serious faultfinding and instructions.

Here are just a few examples of your "stewardship," just individual landmarks of your "leadership" of the newspaper.

During my second month as editor, you screamed and raged regarding the report of the plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union in which the journal NASH SOVREMENNİK was criticized: "Why was this criticism left in the report? With whom was this coordinated?" Incidentally, this report was approved by the chairman of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union; you were on vacation at the time and did not attend the plenum. Nevertheless, you demanded that, henceforth, "such things" be approved by you, no matter where you were.

You were indignant whenever the names of critics A. Bocharov, I. Dedkov and certain others appeared in the newspaper, you reprimanded them and forced them not to publish. And, on the contrary, you demanded that V.

Bondarenko, V. Korobov, A. Lanshchikov, N. Fed, A. Larionov and others, who sing your praises and attack your personal enemies, be published.

During your meetings with constituents, which were arranged like some sort of royal outings—with a great retinue of writers and correspondents, you demanded special zeal from LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA. Besides coverage of these trips, a correspondent had to form your muddled speeches into a well-composed structure and rewrite them. And you yourself were only being capricious.

Two years ago, you organized a discussion of the newspaper at the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers Union, the purpose of which was to run off the current editorial staff which was unacceptable to you. According to your scenario and at your instigation, all of these very same critics of yours, V. Bondarenko, V. Korobov, A. Salutskiy and others inveighed against the newspaper at this discussion: gossip and invective were the main "arguments." At the same time, they even slandered Ch. Aytmatov. Only the intervention of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Writers Union saved the newspaper from defeat at that time.

What served to exasperate you was that the editorial staff of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA rejected N. Fed's article, in which he gave an unconvincing rebuke to I. Dedkov for criticizing you. Was that not the story which later appeared in NASH SOVREMENNİK (No 11, 1986), published with your blessing?

In order to give visibility to the system of discussion, you conducted two more after this. But what discussion! The "Sovremennik" publishing house was somewhat gently taken to task for certain derelictions of duty, and without a twinge of conscience you simply staged a real benefit performance for the journal NASH SOVREMENNİK. How much balm and how much syrup was spilled that day in the conference hall on the Komsomolskiy Prospekt! What darling, obedient and readily sympathetic children!

Now, when critical articles directed at "untouchable writers," including yours, are appearing more and more frequently in the press, you are trying with special zeal to crush down the newspaper. You need it like a mouthpiece to propagandize your, to put it mildly, not very progressive ideas, as an organ which would protect you and your group from criticism, denounce and sling mud at your enemies. You want to turn the newspaper into an organ which quickly responds to criticism directed at you in other publications. The editorial staff tries to resist, and this makes you especially angry.

The positions you take are no longer a secret to anyone.

At the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union, you compared the current situation in literature with the situation which arose "in July 1941, when the

progressive forces, rendering unorganized resistance, retreated under the onslaught of the battering ram blows of the civilized barbarians," and if "a Stalingrad doesn't soon ensue, the matter will end with national values being toppled into the abyss."

At the secretariat of the board of the USSR Writers Union in January of last year, you stated that you sense the smoke of the burning Reichstag and that only 200 meters remained to the Volga. This "smoke" is N. Ilina's article in OGONEK, in which she reproached N. Fed because he raised you up on high in NASH SOVREMENNİK, placing you on the same level with Horace and Schiller. You were offended by Ilina: How did she dare dispute such an obvious truth! And later you demanded the publication of N. Kavelashvili's poor and quarrelsome article in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA. Finally, you agreed, with great difficulty, to the editorial staff's refusal, but you demanded that an article condemning Ilina be prepared anyway. Such an article was prepared, but it did not satisfy you: It was too moderate. Incidentally, was not N. Kavelashvili's article published in MOLODAYA GVARDIYA journal (No 8, 1988) through your efforts?

At the 19th Party Conference, you compared the situation in the country to an airplane which had taken off but could not see the runway or where to land, foretelling a catastrophe.

There is no need to recall other similar "prophecies" of yours.

We really should dwell on the latest action. I have the December Plenum of the RSFSR Writers Union in mind, where your stage manager's hand, as at the Ryazan secretariat, was felt in everything. At the plenum, these very same extremist speeches, gross attacks against your enemies and invective rang out against KOMMUNIST, ZNAMYA, OGONEK, and other publications, to which your "hit men" added LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA.

How they beat up on the weekly! Especially because it reprinted the editorial commentary "Old Myths, New Fears" from KOMMUNIST, the theoretical journal of the CPSU Central Committee! What invective was floating from the rostrum; what strange, dare I say, frightening arguments were set forth! They even called the newspaper "anti-Russian." "The newspaper does not reflect the interests of Russian writers," asserted V. Belov. But V. Sidorov went completely beyond the bounds of the conceivable, stating that the Russian word generally "is still under a heavy press and, in a number of instances, even under a total ban (?)." The most frank of all was V. Lichutin, who directly advised me "...to call the chairman of the Union and say: 'I am leaving your lousy newspaper because all of your ideas, all of your pro-fascist, chauvinistic, and so forth ideas disgust me.'" What would you say here? These ideas are indeed repulsive. But the fact is that, in protecting the "newspaper" from such ideas, we on the editorial staff do not

consider it to be lousy at all and do not want it to become anyone's—"yours" or "ours"—it must follow the ideas of the party, serve perestroika, and facilitate consolidation of writers forces.

It is also significant that A. Salutskiy, V. Lichutin and A. Larionov became secretaries of the board of the RSFSR Writers Union. Are you gathering them under your wing?

You are directly and indirectly fettering the work of the editorial staff. On the one hand, you recommend the unacceptable, and, on the other, you weave constant intrigues, convincing people in various instances of the need to disperse the editorial staff of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, demagogically putting this forth as your concern for perestroika.

Meanwhile, it must be pointed out that throughout your "stewardship," you have not once met with the collective of the editorial staff, you were arrogantly silent to all of our invitations to come to our meetings and did not come, and continued to command by telephone or by summoning people to your office.

Following your example, other chief writers are constantly attempting to command the newspaper! And what is curious, these peremptory shouts occur, as a rule, throughout those publications which the editorial office prides itself on and which were noticed and approved of by the readers. They are G. Kunitsin's article "Has the Time Arrived?," Yu. Goncharov's story "Our Daily Bread," D. Feldman's article "Before and After Arrest," and the article "Old Myths, New Fears" from KOMMUNIST.

For the good of the cause and in the spirit of the time, the newspaper must be freed from petty tugging so that it can freely and opportunely breathe in a time of glasnost and democracy. It would be logical to free the editorial staff from such "stewardship," from such administrative and bureaucratic methods of managing the press, which have now clearly grown hopelessly obsolete and serve only as an obstacle on the paths of perestroika.

It is hard for the collective of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA to live in such a situation, and it is hard for a newspaper to find its identity, when it "grazes" on censorship such as yours, which is a bit worse than that which spread by the state in the most stagnant periods. Whereas censorship in recent times has become more moderate and preserved only that which it has been instructed to preserve, your Bondarev-style censorship, on the contrary, has become tougher, became more vigilant, more zealous and more intolerant than it was even earlier. Is it not time to free the editorial staff from your manacles and from your heavy, cliquish fetters?

Fulfillment of your recommendations contradicts that which society is living for now and that which the Soviet reader expects.

It is not a matter of mutiny of the editor or the editorial staff as a whole against your staff—the collective understands whose organ the weekly is. It is ready to follow rational leadership from the secretariat and from the board of the RSFSR Writers Union, but it is fed up with the diktat of one of the secretaries who has usurped power in the Russian Writers Union, since your diktat is directed exclusively at asserting narrow-group interests.

Is it possible that you really cannot see that the forces which you lead and inspire, and which inspire you, are leading to anarchy and, in the literary world, to a division of writers and to irreconcilability.

Weed through the crowd of sycophants and have a look around. Have a look around and think: Are you fighting there for those ideals which are for the good of the people? Are you, the advocate of good in words, in fact sowing the seeds of evil and the seeds of suspicion and enmity?

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Treatment of Stalin Era, Writers' Factionalism Viewed

*18000532a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 89 pp 4, 6*

[Article by Col Yu. Belichenko, member of the USSR Writers' Union and editor of the Literature and Art Section of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Why Don't the Disputes Stop?"]

[Text] An active interest on the part of the readers in the literary process, in public affairs and all that is appearing presently on the pages of the central periodicals is a true sign of the times. The source of this interest lies in the concern of our fellow citizens in the fate of restructuring and in everything that impedes it and a desire not only to personally understand what is going on but also to take part in the social life of the nation. In the readers' mail to the newspaper, there are numerous letters which are a direct response to the literary articles in the central publications. The readers have urged us periodically to review the most significant and characteristic publications, voicing our viewpoint on them.

1.

Literary criticism in recent months somewhat unexpectedly has shifted the vector of its polemics from socially significant problems to questions which are more specifically literary or even simply of a group or personal nature. In many instances this outwardly appears thus. Particularly if the current publications are supplemented by the oral comments of writers at various sorts of plenums, forums and meetings. Advances and debts, authentic and austensible realities of the economy, the dramatic truth of "stagnation" prosperity which until recently were at the center of the readers' attention have seemingly given way to an unrestrained intensity of

polemical passions where it is rather difficult to distinguish a position from an ambition. One is busy reading such publications. However, this interest, let us put it this way, is not of an intellectual order. This is constantly being interrupted by a feeling of the awkwardness of the authors who, in endeavoring to make the opponent "feel it" more, in their ardor forget the very subject of the discussion and the concepts of measure and dignity which are obligatory for any literary critic. Examples of this are legion. Let me refer to just two of them which, it seems to me, are most obvious.

The December issue of OGONEK (No 52) published over the signature "Section of Literature" an article (and possibly an extensive reply) entitled "Provincial Anecdotes" on a traveling session held in Ryazan of the secretariat of the board of the Russian Writers' Union. Even the very tone of the article, beginning with the title and continuing with all sorts of humiliations sprinkled liberally through the text ("Ryazan Orators," "Ryazan Sit-Around Gatherings" and so forth), to put it mildly, overstep the bounds of literary decency. But it is not even a matter of tone. From this article it turns out that the Russian writers assembled in Ryazan merely to condemn OGONEK and its authors to their heart's content. But, if you please, we would like to note that the subjects for discussion by the Russian writers in Ryazan were the state of the spiritual culture of the people, moral aspects of the restructuring processes, ecology, the indoctrination of the younger generation, the unjustified attacks on the army and, finally, but in no way OGONEK or its authors. It is easy to become convinced of this as a detailed report was published. Why does the criticism addressed to OGONEK and which, incidentally, at times both sharply and categorically resounded in the discussion of the Russian writers, been taken by OGONEK out of the context of the discussion itself?

Or another example. The December issue of the magazine MOSKVA published an article by A. Baygushev entitled "On Sadduceism and Philistinism." The biblical terms should obviously alert the attuned reader to the corresponding subtext as the Sadducees and the Philistines, as is known, before being baptized had to repent. The article is devoted to the journal OGONEK and to its literary critical practices. Well and good but why not talk about the essence of the publications in OGONEK. But, having cursorily and not persuasively debated OGONEK about its attitude toward the vanguard in the 1920s, the author places the main critical accent of the article on the biography and creativity of the editor-in-chief of OGONEK, V. Korotich. He accuses him of the sins of time-serving and transparently calls for public repentance before—let us continue the biblical parallel—accepting baptism by restructuring. But was it worth, in truth, involving the reader in such moral nonsense and replace a principle discussion of the journal by a discussion of the personality of its editor-in-chief? Peace-making appeals—and there are not enough of these—do not bring respite in quarrels. In infecting one another with a new potential of negative energy, the

opponents, while assuring their peaceableness in words, with the first convenient opportunity throw themselves into new battles on the pages of the journals and newspapers. The literary "battles" continue, diverting both the forces and attention of the readers and the writers from problems which seemingly are much more important, acute and pertinent.

What is the problem?

2.

In my view, there are several reasons for this, and I will take up those which seem as the most important to me.

In the first place, with a general approbation by the writers of the restructuring of society as a nationwide task for today and tomorrow, they have already clearly ascertained and continue to ascertain the discrepancy in positions over the past day. Vasilii Bykov, in a recent interview with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, even feels that this confrontation has an ideological and political nature and the demarcation lines runs along Stalinism. I feel, however, that it is in no way a question of the Stalinism of some and the rejection of it by others, as he assumes, but rather in a differing attitude to what has come to be called our common historical, social and spiritual heritage. To put it even more accurately, everything comes down to the question: do we presently need those historical, social and moral values of socialism which were established in life and society not due to but rather in contrast to the distortions and illegality of the cult of personality or are they unnecessary? And it is precisely here, in my view, that the true line of confrontation runs. And it runs not only through the literary and public affairs disputes—this is apparent—but it also runs through the fates of entire generations.

Each person has one life and one fate and this in its own way is linked to the fate of the fatherland. For many people and their relatives who blamelessly suffered from the Stalinist crimes, precisely these transgressions which flaunt both the law, morality and the idea itself have remained the only "visiting card" of socialism. It is possible to understand them, these people, just as it is possible to understand their desire to shatter all of the stereotypes which became reinforced in those years in social conscience. Whose mind is not made indignant, whose heart does not contract with pain, agony and sympathy over the pages of the stories by Varlam Shalamov from his much-suffering "Kolyma Notebooks" (these have been published in NOVYY MIR, YUNOST and other periodicals last year). And seemingly no arguments are possible against the view that a social system which doomed an innocent man to such suffering is unjust in its very essence.

But here are the words Boris Pasternak in 1952 addressed to Shalamov who had just been released from the camps (their correspondence was published in No. 10

of YUNOST): "Do not seek consolation in the wrongfulness of the times. Its moral wrong does not make you right and its inhumanity is not enough that, without agreeing with it, you can still remain a man. But its violence against the aesthetic whims of a dissolute generation is beneficent, even if it is accidental and is the consequence of several, individually falsely directed blows...."

The age was harsh, this requires no proof. But it also was complicated, unsimple, both great and we must not identify the over 4 decades lived by the people—and what years they were!—with only the executions without a court and evidence, the elimination of the Kulaks, the hunger, the camps and the lauding of the leader. This was an enormous injustice done against those, possibly, less educated and more trusting persons than one would find today, those who honestly and with conviction laid down their sole life on the alter of the socialist renewal of society.

Secondly, we would like to point out that many writers do not take a direct part in the current group disputes. And this is not because they are indifferent to the arguments of the sides but more probably because they understand that no longer does a successful critical passage but a substantial artistic work becomes a real argument in such a principled dispute. Publications last year including "Chevengur" by A. Platonov, "Zhizn i sudba" [Life and Fate] by V. Grossman and "Fakultet nenuzhnykh veshchey" [Faculty of Unnecessary Things] by Yu. Dombrovskiy, showed the reality of the Bulgakov thesis that manuscripts are not burned. An again there came to mind the height of the aesthetic, moral and artistic criteria inherent to domestic literature. And those who today are working on prose, embodying their most cherished thoughts, cannot help but consider this. It is hard to guess ahead of time what these ideas will become but that they in the nearest future will lie heavily on the pages of periodical journals, I wager, is indisputable.

3.

But our own history, in throwing open the windows of the secret rooms ever-wider, in supplementing the showy magnificence of the halls with the contrasts of the behind-the-scenes, continues to remain not only an object of close reader attention but also an unique moral field which constantly influences both the positions of the quarreling sides as well as the movements of the barometer of public awareness. Facts are being re-analyzed, uniformly interpreted events are being given a new subtext and monumental figures who were on the peaks of the state and party hierarchy are not presented before us in their true form, just as the naked emperor appeared to the boy in Anderson's tale.

However, one cannot help but notice that in this cleansing process of social enlightenment, one can see those same opposing trends which we mentioned above. Here

the central figure as before remains Stalin, his immediate circle and those previously closed documents and facts which make it possible evermore clearly to elucidate the mechanism of the rise, development and functioning of the cult of personality in its interaction with the entire administrative-bureaucratic system which initially gave rise to this cult and then became its support. Historians, current affairs writers, the participants of the events, publishers and writers are actively joining in this process. Here I would mention the works of A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, D. Volkogonov and R. Medvedev who were published or continue to be published in periodicals. But it must be recognized that with each passing month it seems to me more and more that the avalanche of disclosures about Stalinism and the period of "stagnation" is no longer clarifying but evermore obscuring the real historical picture. So long as the researchers in an evermore arbitrary and selective way group the historical facts to favor their own viewpoint.

Understandably, complete impartiality is impossible here as the past is still hot for minds and hearts just as the covered ashes of a just extinguished fire are hot for the fingers. But it is possible to investigate Stalinism, I propose, only having eliminated from oneself the methodology of Stalinism and this is difficult as it has been inculcated in us since childhood. It seems to me that the freest of such errors is the fundamental historical work by D. Volkogonov "Triumf i tragediya" [Triumph and Tragedy] which is a full-scale political portrait of I.V. Stalin (its first part was published in the last three issues of the journal OKTYABR in 1988). I would point out that in it the author for the first time widely draws on archival materials which were previously closed to researchers.

D. Volkogonov examines the evolution of Stalin not in isolation from all the vagaries of the sociopolitical and economic situation in the nation but rather precisely through its dynamics and in a grid of the social coordinates caused by it. Certainly, the author emphasizes, the figure of Stalin at the head of the party and state was not inevitable but historical reality was precisely that and to enumerate the alternatives following the principle "what would have happened if it had not been for" means to retreat from reality into Utopia. "The false gods must be denied," he quotes the words of Herzen, "but that is not all: beneath their masks we must search for the reasons of their existence."

In thoroughly investigating these factors, D. Volkogonov, in my view, voices the important notion of the guilt and responsibility of the entire party for the distortions of the cult of personality. "Stalin usurped power and committed crimes also because he was permitted to do this," he emphasizes.

In stating his viewpoint, Volkogonov almost never enters into direct polemics with other judgments but many of his conclusions are in a way internally polemical. I would put among these the reflections over the "chance of conscience," the "secrets" of Stalin's popularity in the people and so forth.

The author acts both as an historian and as a public affairs writer simultaneously because he constantly shifts his view from the past to the present, drawing conclusions, asking questions and using lessons which could serve today. "At present," he comments, "many people under conditions when positive changes, albeit with difficulty, are occurring in our nation, feel that the cult of personality, after all that we know about Stalin, is simply impossible. I feel that this is not the case as the cult of personality can assume the most diverse forms and manifestations. And in no way should we fear only the Caesarian dictatorial form. It, this form, in my opinion, can appear completely differently, possibly even in 'humanistic' wrapping, if we do not create a clear system of legal, political and moral guarantees."

I am far from considering the work by D. Volkogonov irreproachable and exhausting the subject once and for all. The reader will certainly find in it both long-windedness and individual contradictions and may not agree with all. But it is both painful and interesting to read it, for all of it is a disturbing discussion of people and times who have substantially influenced our own times, lives and fate.

4.

And now, we might say, for a contrast I would like to relate several subjects taken from periodicals. I will let the reader judge their merits.

For example, take this one. The war had started. In the kolkhoz market of a town in the rear, the workers from that very institution which "sees everything, hears everything, and knows everything" apprehends and takes to the "office" a suspicious subject, an old Jewish cobbler. At first in order to get things started properly, they break his jaw, which, as it turns out, has false teeth. But suddenly the captain conducting the interrogation begins to feel a chill: the apprehended person is called...Moise Solomonovich Stalin. What should they do? And suddenly you have a relative, the captain reflects, as Stalin's father was also supposedly a cobbler. What should they keep in the records? Certainly in it you will have to record that you arrested and interrogated...Stalin. What a mess.

Or this. An independent agricultural amateur plant breeder who, using Lysenko's method, is raising a hybrid tomato and potato, having given it the resounding name PUKS (path to socialism), is approached in his sleep by the kolkhoz gelding named Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction]. By hard work in the kolkhoz yard, he [the gelding], according to the theory of evolution has become "humanized." But he does not want to leave for the front, arguing that he cannot pull the trigger with his hoof. And he wants, like all "normal" people, to go to Moscow to get in contact with scientists.

Or this. About those who will soon be on the front. A soldier jealous of his beloved Nyurka for...her boar Vorka, in a dream happens upon the wedding of his Nyurka to this boar dressed for the ceremonial occasion in a velvet jacket with the insignia "Voroshilov Marksman." Initially the soldier is confused, ending up in unfamiliar company but his neighbors behave happily and, having learned that he is called Ivan Vasilyevich, immediately remind him that there was a tsar by the same name. Soon the soldier realizes that sitting at the table are not humans but pigs. In order not to spoil the mood, he begins to eat like everyone else, without fork and knife. And then upon instigation of the neighbors to the right reticently and then with growing excitement and rapture he begins to grunt like all the rest and things turn out well. And he is served on a tray...personally of Comrade Stalin who holds a pipe in his withered hand and slyly laughs to himself. It is almost a Hoffman phantasmagoria.

Funny?

For me personally, not very.

The author clearly will recognize that the briefly retold vignettes have been taken from the anecdotal novel (as the author himself has defined the genre "Zhizn i neobychnyye priklyucheniya soldata Ivana Chonkina" [The Life and Unusual Adventures of the Soldier Ivan Chonkin] belonging to the pen of Vladimir Voynovich who now lives abroad. A fragment from this novel was published at the end of last year by OGONEK and it continues to be published in its completion in YUNOST.

It must be pointed out that even after the first publication in OGONEK which acquainted us with the life and manners of the prewar army, where the unit duty officer walks about in an unbuttoned tunic and long, uncleaned, dust-covered boots and the sergeant major before his eyes forces the clumsy Chonkin to lie down and stand up ad infinitum to supposedly teach him the regulations—and the readers became indignant. They began to phone and write to the editors saying that all of this was slandered. The proposed game of referring to an anecdotal novel or stipulating that, supposedly, if this story seems uninteresting and boring or even stupid, then so be it and consider that I have not related anything—was not accepted by them. Numerous complaints and arguments were unleashed against the author accusing him of having slandered and compromised the army of prewar years. But even from the above-given "anecdotes" one can see that this is not the case. More accurately, not completely so. The army in the given instance is only a particular, one of the vital veins falling into the view of the novel. Incidentally, a novel written, in my view, in plastic prose in which, in truth, an overabundance of commonplaces and speculative attitudes when it is a question of rural or military life and which are certainly unknown to the author.

Just what is it, this anecdotal novel? This, I think, is a sort of attempt to shatter in social conscience all the ideals and stereotypes of "Stalin" socialism which we have described above, but undertaken not with a public affairs pen but rather in the genre of social satire. It is not Chonkin per se, but rather the times and Stalin who are the true heroes of this novel.

All of that may be so if it were not for one fundamental circumstance. The moral effect turns out not the one the author was counting on but rather the opposite. Because the artistic method of solving the set problem was immoral. And immorality, as is known from the Russian classics, takes a work beyond the brink of artistickness.

In what do I see the immorality of this thing? In scoffing at Stalin and those abnormalities which were created in society by fear and blind obedience to the leader, Voinovich was unable to completely abstract himself from life, from everyday existence, from the real social and economic situation in which the nation found itself by the start of the war. And these in a way internally cancel out the very possibility of sarcasm and irony. Because like it or not the mocking and scoffing at Stalin in the novel become mocking and scoffing at the people who had just entered a most severe war, at their grief and misfortune, at their naiveness and belief, at their morality. And the soul becomes indignant, having spotted oneself and one's fathers behind the flight of the author's fantasy—both those who will soon fall on the battlefield and those who will make it to Berlin—all depicted as a herd of pigs which is presented to Stalin on a tray.

The novel will certainly find its defenders who will immediately mention pluralism, who will accuse us of bias and a reticence or inability to properly assess satirical metaphors and will say that we must cure ourselves of the stereotypes and ulcers of the past using strong medicine. They will also remind us of the difficult fate of Voinovich and his novel during the years of "stagnation." Let them! These are different things. There are good intentions and there is a text. And what the author has written has been written. As for all the rest, do what you wish.

I would also like to point out that I truly fail to understand that ecstatic hurry with which the editors without any analysis turned to the works of our recent compatriots who have come to be known as the "writers of the Russian emigration." There is no doubt about it, there are many talented things among them. But it would be naive to assume that everything that had been rejected for publication during the years of "stagnation" is precisely what would help society along the difficult path of restructuring. It would be a good thing to recall here the well-known notion of A.S. Pushkin: "Respect for the past—this is the trait which distinguishes the educated from the wild: nomadic tribes do not have either a history or aristocracy." Certainly all that we have said is

far from exhausting all the complexity of the rapidly-flowing literary process but to some degree, I feel, does define the trends which have become most established in it recently.

Writer Bykov on Stalinism, Informal Groups in Belorussia

18000507 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 18 Jan 89 p 4

[Vasil Bykov replies to letters, under the "The LG Audience: Notes from the Hall" rubric: "Vasil Bykov: Guided by the Changes"]

[Text] In opening the new rubric, "The LG Audience: Notes from the Hall," late last year with the article by B. Mozhayev, "Let Truth be our Only Point of Reference," we were basing our arguments on the fact that today not a single literary soiree and not a single meeting between authors and their readers takes place without questions from the audience. The authors' presentations have ceased to be monologues: now they always turn into a debate on problems—and extremely critical, topical-polemical debates—touching upon the fundamental, essential questions of life and literature, and on the writer's craft. We have asked our readers:

WHICH OF THE AUTHORS DO YOU WISH TO SEE UNDER THIS RUBRIC? WHAT QUESTIONS WOULD YOU ASK OF THEM?

We bring this up today because, since the New Year we have had nearly three million new subscribers, and we want to honor their wishes.

A few words about the mail which we have already received. The writers vary widely: the famous and not-so-famous; the masters and the young. Not all, but many names appear again and again in the letters. Out of fairness, we would like to offer the first word to those who have received the greatest number of votes from the readers. Politicized thinking has, naturally, spread to modern literary life as well. This was also characteristic of those notes which Vasil Bykov received during his recent meeting at MGU. Today we are publishing his replies to them, as well as his responses to questions addressed to him in letters from our readers. It goes without saying that both the questions and the answers are of a personal, subjective nature. But the right to have one's own opinion and the right to express it—are essential features of a democratic society.

The Literature and Commentary Department of LG

[Question] When did you first realize that Stalinism is a terrible phenomenon in our history? How was the transition made in your creativity and from your personal experience as a lieutenant, to the fate of the nation, and the fate of the countryside in the pre-war years and during the war?

[Bykov] Perhaps it is immodest of me, but I would like to say that I began to comprehend Stalinism as a phenomenon at the same time, and in parallel with, my comprehension of life as a whole. I do not count myself among those people of my generation (whether a little older or younger than I) who found out about Stalin's crimes from the resolutions of the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses, or later. In Belorussia the people came to comprehend Stalinism early, while they were still of Pioneer age. For those things which in the 1930's passed before our childish eyes were completely synonymous. One could still believe, that—let's say, Marshal Tukhachevskiy was a German spy, or that other high-ranking officers were spies. But we were certainly unable to agree with the grounds for the mass repressions which took place before our eyes with respect to ordinary people—peasants, teachers, or workers. There was no way we could believe that some poorly-educated kolkhoznik or other, a laborer, who knew nothing apart from the land and working on the land, could be a sophisticated agent for three foreign intelligence agencies. And no one else believed it either. And we had no need to delve into the secret actions of far-off "enemies of the people," or "saboteurs"—we saw these "enemies" right under our noses, by example of our neighbors. And, of course, like many others, we were unable to ask ourselves: Who is to blame? Undoubtedly, there were also illusions, such as—Stalin did not know everything; or that a lot took place on the initiative of local authorities. But after all, such things took place not only in one rayon, but throughout the land—the newspapers were writing about them. Inevitably a figure emerged who was the architect of all our victories and our happiness. As it turned out, he was the architect of our unhappiness too. Unquestionably, at that time too there were people whose minds were poisoned, who were unable to—or, owing to their privileged position did not want to—properly evaluate what was going on in the country. Personally, I formed a certain attitude very early on toward Stalin and Stalinism, which flourished during the war years under the stamp of our victories over Fascism. But in the post-war years my attitude took its final shape, with regard to the relentless dictatorship of Stalin.

Here the question might arise: Why were we silent? Well, it happened that certain people did lose their restraint and could not remain silent; but all these ended up the same way: as enemies of the people, spies and saboteurs, undercover gestapo agents, or Vlasovites. And these were combat officers, who went through war, the recipients of many medals! The entire country existed in an atmosphere of suspicion; it was pierced through with systematic shadowing and betrayal. One could feel a certain reassurance that words spoken in confidence would have no consequences if they passed between two close people. But if a third person took part in the conversation, then there was no guarantee that the third person might turn out to be a stool-pigeon, and then "unpleasantness" would follow without delay.

For a long time, in my own literary activities, I got along on my own experiences at the front: a self-styled kind of

inquest, so to speak, manifested in objective reality at the front; and it took me years to realize the necessity of causality. As far as the war materials are concerned, causality of many of its aspects lay in the prewar years; but a certain amount of decisiveness was needed to begin to stir up the 1930's, a subject all but forbidden for the arts. It goes without saying, the decisiveness did not come right away; and in the preceding decades hardly anyone in our society was able to properly perceive the truth about the 30's.

[Question] Does it not seem to you, that the present-day row about Stalin and his accomplices, just like the past mass glorification of the "achievements" of socialism, is distracting us from more important problems of the day, and is taking social activeness in the wrong direction?

[Bykov] In this case I would like to ask, just who is this "we" that is always somehow distracted and led in the in the wrong direction? Where does such spinelessness and easy manageability come from? If you have in mind experimental laboratory mice, then of course they should be manipulated, for that is why they exist. Or if they are dark and ignorant crowds who are controlled by the will of the leader, then it goes without saying that their will is distracted and directed in accordance with the will of the leader. But you see, we are an educated society and we are developing in the direction of a democratic renaissance, where every man must consciously determine his own choice, as well as his own attitude toward one phenomenon or another. Who is capable of leading him astray? Here the opponents of rock music are endlessly holding forth about its pernicious power, which allegedly is leading the young people to a precipice, or the devil knows where. But I suggest that the young people are not just an accumulation of sightless things which can be led in the wrong direction. Young people today are strong-willed and go where they want to go. Just try to force them to go where they don't want to. You haven't tried? Well, it's high time we understood that in a democratic society some things must also depend on the will of the citizens, and not only on the intentions of the powers-that-be.

[Question] How do you feel about the social organizations and groups which have been established in your republic, such as "Talaka," "The Martyrologists of Belorussia," and "Tuteyshyya"?

[Bykov] It is well-known that the party, which is the initiator of perestroyka, has energized the initiative of the broad popular masses. The fact of the matter is, that after a long period of hibernation and political nihilism, the masses have awakened and want to be a part of this vital, creative cause. Young people were the first to respond to perestroyka, by creating the so-called "informal" associations. We have several of those. "Talaka," comprised on the whole of student youth, is perhaps the most popular and most active. What does the word "talaka" mean? This is the form of rural mutual assistance and cooperative work, known from ancient

times. The association has the characteristics of an educational, cultural-historical society and, one must say, has done a great deal for the republic. Naturally, through its activeness, Talaka very quickly came into conflict with the bureaucracy. This conflict became acute after Talaka had held several meetings in defense of the historical center of Minsk, which was under threat of demolition. Then Talaka was subjected to press exposure of all obvious and imaginary shortcomings. The intelligentsia lined up behind Talaka; but the discussion soon turned into a one-sided exposure of nearly all informal associations in the republic. The "informals" at the same time were deprived of any opportunity whatsoever to speak out in the press, to explain their goals, or to make an attempt to justify themselves. When "Tuteyshyya" applied for a permit to hold a meeting in memory of their forebears, the city authorities replied with a ban. This, it goes without saying, heated up the situation in the city and created an atmosphere of confrontation between the youth, the "informals" and the city authorities. A conflict sprang up, for which there were no convincing reasons at all, with the exception of the desire of the authorities to "flex their muscles" in the form of militia formations in helmets and bullet-proof vests.

The bureaucracy is attempting to present the events of 30 October as a national incident, ascribing it to the category of international relations. But that is not so. What took place on 30 October in Minsk had virtually nothing to do with international relations; it was an attempt of the first water to suppress the budding democracy and perestroika in the republic. Sooner or later the republic leadership will have to acknowledge this.

[Question] Do you mean to say that Minsk is opposed to perestroika?

[Bykov] Minsk is not opposed to perestroika. Moreover, I can declare with confidence that Minsk has accepted its ideals not only intellectually but also in its heart. But the fact of the matter is that there is still very strong inertia among us from the stagnation years, when any movement whatsoever in society took place only with the permission and upon the initiative of the higher-ups. Yet presently these higher-ups in many instances have not progressed farther than talking about perestroika, and have decisively opposed any sort of grass-roots initiative.

For example, the Martyrologists of Belorussia had no sooner declared their goals, than the BSSR Ministry of Justice declared the society illegal. It turns out that its founders (three creative societies and the editors of the newspaper LITARATURA I MASTATSTVA) failed to observe the requirements of two decrees of 1932 and 1935 by the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee, 1924-1937] and SNK [Council of People's Commissars, 1917-1946]; that is, an anti-Stalin society was created in violation of Stalinist legal decrees, and therefore is subject to liquidation.

Why do such things happen?

There are many reasons. But the chief of them, in my view, is the fact that we have not matured enough to realize the necessity for democratization of society or to understand the political activation of the people as an indispensable condition for the emancipation of economic development. The lengthy struggle of the national intelligentsia with the disappearance of the Belorussian language ended with a verbose palliative decree—a typical example of the bureaucratic paper shuffling of years gone by. The ecological situation in the republic cries out for taking urgent measures; but instead of that, once again we get wordy, murky decrees. Long-term projects—for the period up to the year 2000 and beyond—have become fashionable among the leading bureaucrats, the completion of which, it goes without saying, is beyond the realm of possibility of their creators; and, with all due respect to them, it is difficult to see any chances whatsoever for their completion. Meanwhile, no effective measures are being taken and are not anticipated. Instead of measures, considerable efforts are exerted in struggling with its critics—with the "informals," the organizational committee of the Popular Front, and the writers.

We have been stubbornly struggling "for" and "against" for a long time. And now, when confronted with the lurching "image of the enemy," we have been taken aback. The need to see a treacherous enemy before us has already become almost an inborn need. This applies especially to our bureaucracy, which in such cases, for want of actual enemies, is prepared to pounce on imaginary enemies at the slightest suggestion. In times past such enemies were actively created by the appropriate authorities; now they are given birth by the inflamed defensive consciousness of certain sector of officialdom.

[Question] What is your reaction to the "Notes" of Konstantin Simonov, "Through the Eyes of a Man of My Generation"?

[Bykov] I know that there are various reactions to this work. The fact of the matter is that a great deal written in previous years might be inadequate for the present-day moral and social atmosphere. We know that policies and situations change. But if what one has written is an honest testimony of a man on the events in which he took part or with which he was involved, then the significance of the writing does not die with the time. Obviously, one must proceed from the conditions in which "Notes" were created. After all, many works of the times of "stagnation" or Stalin, which we are now re-reading seem insipid to us, lacking depth in comprehending the truth; whereas, in their time they were extremely radical works. Therefore, I think one must take a concrete, historical approach to them. I find no harmful tendencies whatsoever in Simonov's "Notes." Just as we all are, Simonov was a man of his times; he was situated at a certain level of power or writer's hierarchy and bore witness to his experiences honestly.

and with talent. Honesty in the arts, in my opinion, is always worthy of approval. There are certainly aspects of conformism there, although this conformism is also a sign of the times, a kind of testimony to history. But an honest tale of past delusions cannot be an act of immorality.

[Question] We read in LG about a soiree dedicated to the memory of Viktor Nekrasov at the Central House of Literary Figures imeni A.A. Fadeyev, where you spoke. At last, and it's a great pity that Viktor Platonovich did not live to see it, his talent and his contribution to national literature have been officially recognized.

[Bykov] This is a sign of the changes in the country—the return of Nekrasov, who until quite recently had not been memorialized anywhere at all. I was unable to publish even a few lines with respect to his decease. But now it has become possible to talk about him. It is sad, of course, that all this is taking place after the man has departed forever from this earthly life. Here, apparently, we are under the power of tradition: Not only he, but a great many have become tolerable for society, and have even been recognized by it—after they departed for another world. That's the way it was, for example, with Bunin, Nabokov and Akhmatova. Quite often public opinion does not accept an artist during his lifetime; and it is only when he departs this life that we begin to re-examine our views and establish a different attitude toward him.

The fact that Viktor Nekrasov turned up in the West is not so much his fault, as his misfortune; for here conditions were created for him in which a person with an ounce of self-respect simply could not exist. At the soiree, people from Kiev and Moscow who knew him well spoke about this. When at the instigation of the authorities they lie in wait for a writer on the street and give him a terrible beating; when they carry out a search of his apartment lasting for almost 48 hours; when they confiscate his library, his writings, his thoughts—then it becomes physically impossible for him to exist in this society, and he goes away, if only to be somewhere else... Nekrasov's example is not the only one, unfortunately. The magazine TEATR printed a truly remarkable verbatim record of two sessions, of Lyubimov's dramatic history and the Theater at Taganka. I think that it would immediately become clear to a person who had read this verbatim account of the materials of the case against Brodskiy (in OGONEK), what sort of conditions the director and his theater had worked in, and the conditions in which the poet lived. In such a case, can one lightheartedly accuse the artist of anything, as was done here? It seems to me that if he did not consent to become a submissive nonentity, then he had to react in a manner worthy of himself. At the same time one must keep in mind that the general public knows little of this. The true mechanism of what took place was, of course, carefully concealed; the victimizing was done in secret; and the press spitefully gave out only the sad consequences, carefully concealing their cause.

Would it not be fine if that which unfortunately took place, had not taken place; if our literature had developed in the way in which it should have developed under conditions of a civilized, truly democratic society, on the basis of the only possible values for it—the individual and his talent. Alas; talent, as it is known among us, is no guarantee of recognition: it is more often a reason and a pretext for abuse, for casting stones. Until only recently the guarantee of recognition was different, and had nothing in common with the quality of literature. One can show that even now one should not talk about all this; but we cannot forget that even in the days of perestroika, a member of the Writers' Society expressed the desire to the party leadership to produce a document similar to the resolution about the magazines ZVEZDA and LENINGRAD.

For me, as a reader, Viktor Nekrasov's prose is above all an honest, untroubled, humane view on the war; on our accursed and great war with German Fascism. I don't know how he managed, in a situation so poorly suited for humanity, to imbibe and preserve for decades that view and that humanity. How he realized and defended it in literature we know; we were witnesses and we saw that he managed to do this at the cost of unbelievable stubbornness and opposition to pressure of equally unbelievable strength from his surroundings—the domestic, literary, party and state milieu. Further: for me it was exceptionally important that Viktor Nekrasov (perhaps for the first time in our literature) displayed the world of innocence and the lofty essence of individuality in war, and the significance of the individual—if not in counterpoint, then at least along with the innocence and essential nature of class, of the collective, and society... Even if the presence of individuality was in an environment least suitable for it: the milieu that is war and the army, with their absolute subordination of one to all, and the strict prohibition of any kind of diversity.

Viktor Nekrasov spotted an intellectual at war, and unlike the prevalent view of one such in our literature as a milksop or a useless person and a man not of this world, he established his innocence and his significance as a bearer of spiritual values in conditions so poorly suited for any kind of spirituality at all. However, this is rightful and understandable: being himself at the highest level of the phenomenon of spirituality, he also expressed that which should have been expressed in literature. No doubt this was not easy: in a country where the peasantry had been annihilated and the initiative of the working masses suppressed, the intelligentsia turned out to be the only possible factor for spiritual progress, and therefore it is precisely the intelligentsia that experiences for itself everything which fate has prepared to test the historical vanguard of society.

Of course, to a significant degree Nekrasov defined his own time, and as quite often happens in the arts (and not only in the arts), as a result he paid dearly for it. For, "No prophet is acceptable in his own country" [Luke 4:24]. No words belonging to this earthly age are better suited

for engraving on his tombstone. And perhaps we can take comfort in the thought, that they will be not only on his tombstone. What happened to Viktor Nekrasov was until quite recently our national way of life, our fate, the main essence of the policy of the state with respect to honesty and worthiness in general. Quite recently it still seemed that things could be no other way, because things have never been different. And the obelisks, crosses, and the carvings on the tombstones of the finest sons of the Fatherland have spread out across the unbounded expanse of the country and beyond—from the population of Kolyma in their unmarked graves, to the no-less-populated Sainte-Genevieve-du-Bois. And what of it? We're used to it: that is our fate and our history; which, up to now, unfortunately, has not yet become a part of our objective historiography.

[Question] How do you, a writer on war, rate Vasilii Grossman's novel, "Life and Fate"?

[Bykov] The significance of this novel, in my view, goes far beyond the framework of understanding of the war theme. In a large sense, "Life and Fate" is an act of discovery in our literature. It is namely from this novel that we learned of the astounding things pertaining to the amazing similarity of two—it would seem—completely opposite systems of rule in the largest powers of Europe. It is made clear that the imperial movement in Germany was nominally socialist as well, having set the goal of building a harmonious popular state, albeit on a racial basis: Hitler's party officially bore the title of "German National-Socialist Workers' Party"; and the actual basis of power both here and there was openly expressed autocracy: the same phenomena were characteristic of both states, although perhaps to different degrees—such as cultural nihilism, an all-powerful secret police, a ramified system of concentration camps without precedent in all earthly history, and the complete trampling of elementary human rights.

The author of "Life and Fate" was perhaps the first of our literary figures to recognize this similarity, and he depicted it with wit and brilliance in his book; and this of itself raised the novel to the level of the highest achievement of contemporary literature.

Of course, the arrest [sic] of "Life and Fate," even in the conditions of those years—was an extraordinary event; but one can recall a great many sad stories from the creative and publishing world of those days. For example, for many long years I was unable to publish a single thing that would not be corrupted by the editors. The degree of this corruption depended on many things, including the degree of pliability of the author. Because in the final analysis, the author might not publish his work and might cease to be in print. But it often happened that at the moment of publication the author was completely torn apart, and drained of energy and hope; he was depressed, and everything was bad—just let it be over with, soon...

Now the times have changed, and censorship has been lifted from works of fiction: and this may be our greatest achievement, just as glasnost and those things that proceed from it. But as recent events indicate, all this cannot be done without significant losses; after all, glasnost is being used with great success by the bureaucracy too, which is fiercely resisting perestroika. There is a real danger that if there are a few more turns in a certain direction—glasnost may perish and may be turned into a pseudo-glasnost, accessible only to the bureaucracy. I don't know what will come in the future and how it will come; however, I am convinced that the lessons of perestroika—even if it is not realized in the form in which it was conceived—these lessons are already extremely important for the future. Most likely in the coming century glasnost itself will become the most significant landmark of our times. "Everything changes, but the truth will win out," wrote A.T. Tvardovskiy at an evil time for me. And he was right.

[Question] Were your things subject to editorial execution at NOVYY MIR as well?

[Bykov] It was understandable that there too, the editors tried to remove many of the more piquant elements in order not to upset the censors, to avoid calling down more fault-finding, in order not to attract the notice of the authorities. Nevertheless, three of my novels, "Mertvym ne bolno" [The Dead Feel No Pain], "Ataka s khodu" [Attack from the March], and "Kruglyanskiy most" [Kruglyanskiy Bridge] were published in Tvardovskiy's NOVYY MIR with a minimum of deletions. "Kruglyanskiy Bridge" was published with no cuts whatsoever; but "Attack from the March" was not published under the author's title: in the Belorussian language, the novel is known as "Proklyataya vysota" [The Accursed Heights]; you see, "accursed" is a kind of negative word, and the editors decided to give it a neutral title—which in my opinion is simply poor.

[Question] Is there an organization in Belorussia similar to Pamyat?

[Bykov] Probably there is a Pamyat in Belorussia as well; there are certain signs that point to it. One of its official ideologues lives in Minsk, Candidate of Physical Sciences Begun, who is famous not only in Belorussia. At one time he seemed to have been quieted by the pressure of denunciations in the national press; but then in the November issue of NASH SOVREMENNİK his voice was raised once again. And so he is becoming active, and apparently with the support of certain press organs will try to remain active—for Pamyat is not a Talaka; Pamyat is an organization looking for a rostrum. In this connection, of course, various questions arise, which today seem to me to be not only strange, but wild—especially after the Ryazan secretariat and also after the latest plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Society and a number of scandalous statements made there.

It is too well-known, how much unhappiness extremist national feelings have brought to mankind—chauvinism and nationalism—to put up with their reappearance at the end of the 20th century. Their reappearance is on the whole understandable, just as the nature of the age-old enmities in the Trans Caucasus, and in other places as well, is understandable. The sad thing, however, is the fact that mankind has to this day not yet learned to subordinate their ancient instincts to democratic principles of coexistence, and to resolve their old conflicts on the basis of contemporary laws. This is yet another problem for social thought, for literature, and for all the contemporary arts.

[Question] What do you think of the fact that in our time, in Gori, the homeland of Iosif Dzhugashvili, people are standing guard duty day and night at a monument to the "Father of the Nations"? Can they really still be enthralled captives of their delusions with respect to Stalin?

[Bykov] Do you think they are aware of their delusions? Perhaps they will never be aware of them. But let them be; let a whole crowd stand guard duty if they want to. A crowd is not the people [narod]. The real question is, why is such a thing permitted and another strictly forbidden? After all, the law is uniform, and the law is the law. But at the Youth Palace in Moscow, a lot of people assembled under the guise of attending a soiree in honor of A. Kosaryev actually held a Pamyat meeting—at which, incidentally, a former Kharkov prosecutor who achieved notoriety by virtue of his legal suits in defense of Stalin, was also present. But in Minsk, a group of seven Talaka activists, who gathered at a private apartment, were summoned to the police station, where they were subjected to a humiliating interrogation. The admirers of Stalin in Gori were openly photographed by correspondents from many publications; but in Minsk, on 30 October, the police smashed the press and motion picture cameras, and they blinded the correspondents of republic and central newspapers and television with tear gas, thus preventing them from carrying out their professional duties. How can this be compatible with the law and the ideals of democratization?

I mentioned the former Kharkov prosecutor. The judicial process under his prosecution is highly instructive, and it is very important that film be shot on this and that this film be shown on Central Television, so that many people can see it. For those who are up-to-date on current events, it would hardly add anything new; but for others, I think, the phenomenon would become clear—a type of "classic" Stalinist: in spite of history; regardless of the experience of the people, and even in defiance of one's own fate. Unfortunately, this type is more widespread than we may think, and not only among people of the older generation. The ideas of Stalin's era are also alive among those who are somewhat younger, especially among the bureaucratic cadres and proponents of the "firm hand," whose yearnings for which are increasingly

distinct. I can say very definitely, that Stalin is dead; but the mentality of the Stalin era is alive—and perhaps because of our often clumsy and inconsistent attempts at democratization.

[Question] Today there is an obvious confrontation between two groups of magazines. In your opinion, what is the essential difference between their positions?

[Bykov] The confrontation which has been noted in literature would be inevitable and difficult to eliminate even if it were understood as merely a difference of views, a clash of opinions; or in certain areas, incompatibility of moral positions. But if, as in the given situation, the confrontation is of a political and ideological nature (and I understand it to be precisely thus), and the delineation follows the line of Stalinism—then on the whole nothing can be done about it, except to fight. At the same time, of course, to an outsider not everything is visible and not everything is sufficiently clear. We merely sense something between the lines; there is a certain estrangement, like some kind of tiny spring, the cause of action; that which is expressed verbally is already the consequence. The fact of the matter is, that their attitude toward Stalin and Stalinism on the whole defines the delineation of these two groups. Presently it seems to be becoming more obvious and when we encounter in certain articles equivocation on the part of the authors to the effect that Stalin was, they say, thus-and-such—partly "yes" and at the same time "no;" here is where one begins to see that the people are separated by a chasm and they find themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. Here the differences are matters of principle, and it is extremely difficult to pacify the two sides. [Question] Please answer some questions concerning your professional work. What in your opinion has literature not yet said about the war, and what can you say further about it?

[Bykov] I believe that literature can still say a great deal about the war. I have already written that over the decades literature and the arts in general have completely developed at least one theme, and that is the heroic aspect. Nature and the manifestation of heroism in war has, in my opinion, already been developed to the limit. But other features, including the moral, psychological and certain others still possess some untapped reserves. It seems to me that the greatest possibilities in this sense can be found in the civil war itself. But not at the Front, not in the war of our army, but in the exceptionally complex and confused situations on the occupied territories.

[Question] Currently many people are writing and speaking about the creative societies. In your opinion, is the Writers' Society necessary in its present form?

[Bykov] In its present form the Writers' Society has justified itself only in the capacity of a commanding, administrative or punitive organ. Indeed, just remember how many odious campaigns have been conducted

against individual writers—and not by the hands of the NKVD or the KGB, and not even at the hands of the party or bureaucratic organs, but by the writers themselves. Is this not a wonder, that we do ourselves in! And the top leadership can at the same time step aside; they were not the ones who administered the punishment—it was the colleagues themselves who made the effort. Was it not the literary community itself that condemned Pasternak, for example, and many others? This was the style of the attitude of the higher-ups toward literature, and it was implemented within the framework and by means of the Writers' Society—by the self-service method so to speak. Therefore, if we truly want to strive to put an end to what we endured, and become a democratic society, then the Writers' Society in the form in which it exists today, is of no use to the writers. And I suppose that in the future it will probably be replaced by voluntary associations of writers on the basis of communality of artistic views; or as an ethical community; or simply because of purely human attractions: just as it was for a time here in the 1920's, or as it happens right now in Western literature. And it would make a great deal of sense for such associations to have their own press organs, not necessarily with wide circulation—say, 15-20,000. A society will always note something of principal importance, and the publishers can reproduce them in the required numbers.

[Question] You were in the USA when Gorbachev spoke at the UN session. What were your impressions of that trip?

[Bykov] I do not want to resort to banalities by saying that New York is striking in its grandiosity and its contrasts, but that is indeed so, as all school-children know. I, like others who attended the UN session and heard Gorbachev's speech, was staggered by many of the propositions in this truly epochal speech (unilateral reduction of armed forces, a summons to reduce the financial burden of the developing countries, and others). But perhaps our country's President touched the hearts of the people and the humanitarian intelligentsia of the world most of all by acknowledging the clear priority of common human values, without which the existence of the human race is not only unthinkable, but impossible as well.

The words which fell from the lips of our country's leader within those walls for the first time were such, that the assembled community of nations could not but be amazed. This is a genuine achievement, the path to which was not easy, and came at the cost of enormous sacrifice.

POSTSCRIPT

This material had already been prepared for publication when a meeting with scientific and cultural figures was held at the CPSU Central Committee. The discussion at the meeting included the fact that the interrelations

between certain writers' groups and organizations, especially in Russian literature, were grounds for considerable concern. Gorbachev called upon the adversary magazines to restrain their passions and to begin with "unilateral disarmament." Today his words must not go unheeded; for I am confident that they will summon both the understanding and the support of the broad literary community. Indeed, the publications of certain literary organs in the heated atmosphere of group struggle have increasingly begun to overstep the elementary bounds of propriety, and to an equal extent surpassing the sensible bounds of polemical self-defense, such that they have quite often been transformed into a medium for foolish political accusations. One must hope, however, that the writers' forces of the Russian Federation will find it possible to correct the situation on strictly democratic principles, the only means worthy of the great cause of perestroika.

Georgian Writer Appeals for Unified National Strategy

18130034 Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO
in Georgian 11 Nov 88 p 2

[Article by Apolon Silagadze: "Then They Quarreled Among Themselves"]

[Text] This writer makes no claim to bringing anything new to the national and social movement which is underway today at an astonishing pace. He wishes to state at the outset that he is filled with the deepest respect toward those persons—whether official politicians or public figures, wise and experienced personages or school and college students—who are now actively and vigorously engaged in restorative, in particular national-restorative, processes. The main thing this writer wishes to say, to declare out loud and hold up to judgment, is briefly this: The movement which has today spread over virtually the entire republic or, more accurately, the one expressed in the form frequently encountered today, has been followed by a strange and, from the standpoint of the future, undesirable consequence: The idea of national consolidation is breaking down.

The general course of perestroika and democratization, and its accompanying freedom, has naturally given rise to an awakening of consciousness and the activation of unutilized energies. It appears, however, that we in Georgia are not utilizing all this in a way that would be correct nor in the direction that would yield the desired results. First, we are evidently forgetting that democratization and freedom (in a certain dosage so far) have been granted to us from above; we did not gain them ourselves and, therefore, we do not have the moral right to pose as heroes, to reject tolerance absolutely and take an exclusively maximalist position at all times and on every issue. Second, that position has brought it about that heroes have proliferated and issues have proliferated, yet the real thing, the common cause somehow gradually gets shunted aside. The most unfortunate result, the consequence which appears clearly and not

vaguely on our horizon, is that we are headed toward a disunity of views and a fragmentation of society rather than toward unity and wholeness.

What do unity and wholeness mean, after all? Essentially the following. First, there are constituent elements of a nation, of society, which are materially differentiated by a definite sign: male and female, elder and junior, producer and consumer, pupil and mentor, and so on. Second, there is the nation's society's structure, which is built upon the relations between elements, and each one of them not only has its own material representation but also its own place, its own connections and function. Third and finally (since we are not talking about inanimate and nonliving structure) there is an idea, which is absolute, common to everyone, and unifying.

This time we need not speak on the first two points, but the third is certainly basic today: There is no common idea which would unite the nation, society. Moreover: Today, wittingly or unwittingly, everything is being done (perhaps this assertion is not categorical but relative) to ensure that such an idea does not exist; everything is being done to ensure that the nation's unity breaks down. Today we have—unfortunately—a Georgia of Abkhazians, a Georgia of Mingrelians, a Georgia of Kakhetians, a Georgia of Tatars...a Georgia of the government and a Georgia of informal associations, a Georgia of fronts and assemblies, a Georgia of personalities (worthy and unworthy) and a Georgia of inert masses, a metropolitan Georgia and a Georgia of students, a Georgia of busy people and a Georgia of the idle....

We can definitely conclude, then, that we lack a unified, general, all-encompassing idea in which different specific positions go into the numerator while the denominator is common. Today we do not have a distinctively single cause, a shared sacred cause. The great Dante imagined it this way: During the building of the Tower of Babel, when the first confusion took place and men who had until then communicated in a single language no longer understood one another, the only ones who retained a common language were those who were doing the same thing. Today we may be speaking the same language (although even that is questionable), but we do not understand one another because we do not have a common cause.

Pluralism in this context is a completely inappropriate concept (despite the word's natural popularity). The fact is that pluralism means not only an allowable and acceptable difference of opinions but also listening to them; it means that different ideas exist naturally which must clash with each other—but in a good way, in order to deal with a task better (in this case, a national task). Among us, however, quite the opposite obtains: each group having its own position, far from listening to those holding different positions, actually boos and curses them. Accordingly, each group is anti-pluralist—unfortunately—in regard to raising and resolving the most urgent, the boldest and most national goals.

Moreover: Under conditions of democratization, on the one hand, and under circumstances where the most complicated and difficult thing to be solved is the hierarchically highest problem—relations and equality among nations—on the other, we are surrounded by many phenomena today which are difficult but essential to sort out, which must be reacted to appropriately, in which the formulation of the right position is essential and delicate. We are dealing with extremely serious phenomena which will determine the nation's future, which cannot be resolved without comparing, weighing, and choosing our society's internal positions and formulating a concerted strategy.

It is not hard to see the consequences of the opposite kind of strategy. There was a time, for example, when some of us insisted on bringing back the Meskhetians. When the subject was first brought up, we forgot to check the choice, to study the matter not only within our own capabilities but also in collaboration with specialists; we forgot to listen to different opinions and take time to get clear about something that is clear today: It seems that the problem is not subject to an easy and unequivocal solution, nor is the Meskhetian exactly who we thought. Suddenly the word "Turk" and the idea of Turkish autonomy and so forth cropped up, and today the movement which we in fact inspired ourselves is coming to haunt us and we are frantically seeking an optimal solution (except that we still don't have a unified position).

The formulation of a common idea and unified strategy is primarily based on judicious action. We cannot afford to act otherwise. If we flit nervously around and make decisions on impulse, we might hang out more than just one Georgian flag; it is quite likely we might say that it is acceptable for there to be two flags (we chanced to hear that something like that has already happened somewhere)—a Georgian flag and a republic flag, and only then, when it is too late, will we see that we are agreeing to something startling and unprecedented: namely, that the existence of two symbols means the existence of two Georgias. The situation should be entirely different. There should be nothing in Georgia that is not Georgian. Even the non-Georgian is a Georgian in Georgia. He should be able to speak, read, and write Georgian; he should be nurtured on Georgian literature; he should care about the spirit of Georgia; and, finally, he should not be considered a citizen of Georgia unless all this obtains.

Just one thing is necessary to settle these and similar concerns, to build Georgia's future: the existence of a common, unifying idea by which society unites its forces for action. What is important is the idea, not the person who supports it. What is important is the flag, not the person who hoists it. We must love the cause, not ourselves in the cause. Not long ago, our fine young people achieved brilliant success in regard to the Davit Garejsha Monument. But that act was followed by an entirely unattractive development of events. For some

reason, like after an extended party, the inebriation, the savoring of victory, lasted a long time. This was reflected in the fact that the exact addresses of the authors of the victory were given while the weakness of the older generation was emphasized; it was also reflected in all the interviews and didactic articles that were published. What was forgotten, meanwhile, was the idea of consolidation, which suffered a blow—a mild one, to be sure. According to one current position, Georgian society divided into fathers and sons—and unworthy fathers and worthy sons, at that. This is not merely tantamount to rejecting the productive principle of heredity, it is tantamount to forgetting the nation's unity, its historically spiritual and cultural wholeness. Davit Garedzha, like Georgia itself, was built by our forefathers; Davit Garedzha, like Georgia itself, was brought this far, well or poorly, by our forefathers. We do not have the right (perhaps I am exaggerating the situation somewhat, but it is not too much to say) to shape the line of development such that we stand powerless before our past, powerless to master the policies of our national and human unity. Nor is it necessary for us to take the trouble to erect a monument to victories which we have not yet won, for that would be a monument to our own inferiority complex.

In 1978 we did have a unitary, unified Georgian idea, and that was the key to our success. In 1956 we did not have that kind of unified idea, and that was the key to the tragedy. The idea was unified and concerted in the case of Davit Gadedzha, and in tallying the results we do not have the right to say or do anything against that unity. Today we can only say Thanks, and Well Done to the young people who, by refusing to compromise, managed to do what their fathers in their time could not even think about. We must also note, however, that savoring this success to the disparagement of the older generation, pushing everyone out of the way, and taking care only to seize the initiative, do not constitute the natural path of our society's development. For it has been said: "When thou doest thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and the streets, that they may have glory of men."

Incidentally, those who commit antisocial, anti-Georgian acts do not appear anywhere—neither in the newspapers, in interviews, photographs, names or surnames. They do their business, and we suddenly find that our seashore, for example, can no longer be called ours, and, secondly, that it has been settled by people coming in from other territories. We find that a new, non-Georgian settlement has sprung up overnight in the geographically opposite district. We find that many children in Mingrelia are going to non-Georgian schools. And so on and so forth. (Neither, incidentally, do we see those Georgians without whose crucial participation or tacit acquiescence these acts could not be carried out.) What are we doing to oppose all this? What we are doing is that, after our small victories (the kind of victories, incidentally, which in effect only serve to patch the facade) we refuse to share the laurels. There's more: In the premature celebration

of the future national victories that are naturally to be expected under conditions of democratization, we try to get ahead of each other and be the first to take credit. This means that we are not becoming united, we are falling apart.

It also means that we are not acting skillfully. It appears that we have become quite used to unskillfulness and unprofessionalism. We live in the worst-built houses in the Soviet Union (and therefore in the world), we freeze more than anyone else, we move about on the worst asphalt, we have the worst telephone system, and we endure treatment in the worst and most inhumane hospitals... Such is the result of our unskillful and unprofessional attitudes, and are we ever going to correct them? How and to what extent can we correct our unskillfulness and impulsiveness in running our national policies, when the expected result appears to be a disunity rather than a unity of our forces? The answer to this question should not make us optimistic. Our emigres, former members of the Georgian Democratic Republic's government and parliament, died in Paris and its suburbs without even speaking to one another, but they couldn't do anything right, as we know.

The task facing us today is a single, fundamental one: We must act united and to do this we must find an idea that is unified and acceptable to all (which entails compromises on everyone's part), an idea on which to build a unified strategy. Moreover, we must proceed from the specific nature of our nation and state and take absolutely everything into account (as Ilia Chavchavadze brilliantly perceived as he was mapping out Georgia's specific program of statehood): We must take account of our place in geography and our place in religion, the lessons of our history and the realities of today, the rate of our population growth and that of others, and we must also keep in mind how we have escaped disasters on a geological scale and how we have survived physically, what forces have objectively helped us and what forces have gnawed away at us... Let us also map out an appropriate program of action. We must know exactly to whom we must concede nothing and with whom we may speak of compromise, with whom we must be angry or affectionate, which future is realistic for us and which future—however desirable—is unrealistic. In all cases, we must remember what our capabilities are, because unfortunately they are not so unlimited as to permit us unlimited desires. "Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?"

We must also bear in mind that when mapping out our position it will not do either to copy or to mechanically adopt the models of others. Every nation has its own concerns, which are established on their own specific nature and give birth to their own unified idea. Everyone who creates something creates only his own (the pyramids and the Colosseum have already been built, by others; any new, improved, bigger pyramid or Colosseum will always be worse and smaller than its prototype). And if there is no doubt that the only culture

which survives and becomes part of the world's cultural treasury is that which is original, there should also be no doubt that any realistic and promising national policy must also be original. Today even the most advanced and fortunate countries of Europe have their own problems and complexes, which have to do chiefly with the necessity of defining their own character in the face of all-powerful American models (Great Britain is a striking example in this regard).

Hence and consequently, it is essential today that we map out a national strategy and in order to do so we ought not to scatter our forces but rather unite them around an idea acceptable to all. If people ask, Just what is this common idea?, I can only give a general answer. The ideal option, of course, would be to be guided by the kind of idea that has the largest scope, but in principle the scale of the idea is not of crucial importance. What is fundamental and decisive is another attribute: The idea must be acceptable to all. If that is the case, the overall idea can be hierarchically lower as long as it is unifying. The prime task today is to unite our forces and our energy, and to do this we must find a idea which is both agreed on and creates agreement, which does not give rise to sectarian sentiments. "First be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift. Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art in the way with him."

Georgian Stereotypes in Russian Films Deplored 18130039

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO in Georgian No 42, 14 October 1988 carries on page 9 a 2200-word article by Paata Iakashvili, titled "Cinematic Life and National Relations." In it the author examines typical depictions of Georgians (and other Caucasians) in Russian films down through the years, as well as Russian critics' attitudes toward Georgian film making, which he does not feel foster better inter-ethnic understanding and respect. The article also

discusses the hampering effect of excessively centralized control over Georgian film making and distribution, and the author urges that this be lifted.

In examining recent and past Russian film stereotypes of Georgians, Iakashvili discusses the duty of the artist to rise above the tendency of "the masses" to evaluate other peoples, their traditions, customs, etc., from their own restricted and biased standpoint. He also places special emphasis, in this context, on the damaging legacy of the "Stalinist" nationality policy of the 1920s and 1930s, when the "big and little brother" theory took shape, as reflected in movies. For example, he notes all historical movies obligatorily falsified particular episodes in this or that small nation's past by inserting a wise, mentor-like, fictitious Russian into the plot—this in the name of "internationalism" versus "nationalism." The author cites two films by Georgian director Chiaureli as examples of this, but the same distortion was typical of the films of other non-Russian peoples as well.

Cited examples of stereotypes go back to the 1930s. Typical ones have Georgians/Caucasians dressing and talking loudly and flamboyantly, Georgian "biznesmeny" looking like American gangsters of the 1930s, functioning as parodies. Nikita Mikhalkov's films, the author claims, always take a "condescending" air toward Georgians.

In conclusion, Iakashvili notes that "functionaries" in the Moscow film establishment cannot really grasp and understand what the Georgian movie-going public or the Georgian film industry need, and should not be allowed to retain its grip on all aspects of the national film studios' efforts—screenplays, repertoire, distribution, and the like. Approval of all such matters must rest with local film makers. In this connection, Iakashvili is disturbed by the fact that last summer, a "constituent conference" of the All-Union Youth Cinematographers Association was held in Moscow, an omen that the excessive centralization of the years of stagnation still persists.

Due Process Urged Despite 'Shocking' Crime Wave

18120061 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 9, 5-12 Mar 89 p 3

[Text] Soviet crime statistics for the last two years were recently published. The first time such statistics have ever been made public, they are shocking indeed. Crime has somewhat dropped in only 2 of the 12 categories listed. Strange as it may seem, these two are fraud and mercenary crimes like embezzlement and misappropriation of state and public property. At the same time robbery and armed robbery increased almost 50 percent in 1988; the number of thefts grew almost 25 percent; assault and battery rose almost 30 percent; and the incidence of premeditated murder grew 14.1 percent.

To call this statistics alarming would be an understatement. They arouse indignation, confusion and distress. "Who's to blame?" and "what is to be done?" One can't help thinking about our prospects for the future. What if the current trend continues unabated? The entire population will be done in by the year 2000. Please forgive my irony in discussing such grave statistics. I resort to it only because I'm sure that panic is the worst reaction to any serious situation.

God forbid we should use the word "emergency" in discussing and analyzing these statistics. No matter how steep the rise in armed robberies and burglaries may be. Then the natural answer to the question "what is to be done?" would be "take emergency measures." In my view, that would be the most frightening answer of all. It would cancel out whatever small and tentative steps we have taken towards establishing a law-governed state and protecting our citizens from arbitrary rule.

Even now, as we analyze the rise in crime, some people are saying that our courts have grown too demanding of investigators and prosecutors, too lenient with criminals, postponing cases for further examination and generally being too liberal. The conclusion is usually this: enough of standing on ceremony and finding fault with the evidence, "the courts must intensify their struggle against crime."

But I am deeply convinced that the courts must not struggle against crime because this is not their business. No matter how sharply the crime may increase or how indignant the public may get in reaction, the judges' sole and vital function is to painstakingly weigh the evidence and to decide whether or not the charge is justified. If it isn't, it must be thrown out. If it is justified, the appropriate sentence must be passed. A single verdict delivered by the court in the interest of "struggling against crime" rather than on the strength of the evidence would mean the end of our efforts to build a state committed to the rule of law, and the end of perestroika.

I have heard people say that amnesties, lighter sentences, calls for mercy and so on are to blame for the increase in crime. Shall we renounce mercy then? Shall we incite an already embittered and merciless society to further cruelty? Shall we institute public hangings and torture?

There's no arguing the fact that under democratic rule and legal procedure it is harder to put a criminal behind bars than under a totalitarian regime. (No doubt, Comrade Stalin would have eliminated this mafia in no time. He would simply have jailed half the nation, the mafia along with the others.) But does it follow that democracy and legality should be curtailed?

This country is under repair. I would call it an overhaul, which necessarily involves inconveniences and outlay. But we can't stop work in the middle, or leave the dark corners unpainted. Before condemning democracy, mercy and legal procedure, we must examine and analyze the situation, calmly and thoroughly.

These statistics are alarming but incomplete. They say a lot to the heart, but little to the mind.

Why do the statistics cover only two years? To understand the dynamics of crime, a more extensive period ought to have been analyzed. It would be good, too, to compare them with relevant statistics from the United States and Europe. It would also be useful to know how many crimes went unregistered and how many innocent people were convicted before. And what does the expression "registered crimes" mean? Registered by the militia? Confirmed by public prosecutors? Or acknowledged as criminal by the court? Only in the last case can we really speak of crime.

In any event, the publication of criminal statistics is a positive sign of perestroika. We must know everything about ourselves to be able to draw rational conclusions and answer the questions: what is to be done and how should we proceed?

UkSSR MVD Official on Domestic Crime

18110046d Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 7 Jan 89 p 4

[Article by Lt Col Militia V. O. Zhuk, deputy chief, Maintenance of Public Order Administration, UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs: "Crime and Punishment: UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Crime Report"]

[Text] One evening E. Palchak, 45 years of age, residing in the village of Novo-Pavlovka, Bliznyukovskiy Rayon, Kharkov Oblast, killed her husband with a kitchen knife. Shortly prior to this the spouses had shared a bottle of vodka and had gotten into a domestic dispute.

That same day a report was received from Vinnitsa Oblast that a kolkhoz farm wife by the name of V. Shevchenko, 48 years of age, had been found dead in her home in the village of Tsybulovka, Trostyanetskiy

Rayon. The medical examiner determined that death had been caused by trauma to the skull and brain. Neighbors testified that on the previous day there had been a violent argument at the Shevchenkos. They had seen the decedent's husband, S. Shevchenko, savagely beating his wife with a cane or stick.

Eight-year-old twin sistems Yulya and Inna Solomiyenko were found dead in their home in Krivoy Rog. Their bodies were covered with stab wounds. The little girls' father, V. Solomiyenko, born 1957, employed at the Krivorozhstalstroy Trust, with a past conviction for vagrancy, was arrested for this crime.

D. Kefer, an eighth-grade student at Secondary School No 71 in Odessa, in the course of a violent argument strangled his father, N. Kefer, born 1951, employed at a grain products combine, who was in an inebriated state.

Commentary by Lt Col Militia V. O. Zhuk, deputy chief, Maintenance of Public Order Administration, UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs

The above represent only a fraction of the crime reports we receive every day. We have grouped these crimes on the basis of similarity of motive, for they all were committed in the home. Crimes of this category comprise 38 percent of the total number of murders reported in this republic. And this percentage is even higher in some areas. In Transcarpathian, Rovno, Ternopol, and Kharkov oblasts, for example, one out of every two murders falls in the domestic category. The predominant cause of these crimes is alcohol and animosity arising in family relations connected with the consumption of alcohol. A tense atmosphere develops in these families, and the children suffer emotional trauma.

The critical nature of the problem of domestic disputes proceeds from the fact that conflict situations, if not promptly resolved, lead to various crimes against the person. Hooliganism, intentional infliction of serious bodily injury, and murder comprise a substantial percentage of these crimes.

Failure to recognize the gravity of this problem, and sometimes ignoring the problem altogether, callousness and indifference toward the victims on the part of the community in general, management and administration of enterprises and organizations, and workforces lead to tragedy, such as in the case of the Kucherenko family in Aleksandriya, Kirovograd Oblast.

In October 1984 this young married couple and their two children moved to Aleksandriya. The newly-arrived family was given a warm welcome by their new neighbors. But soon their friendly curiosity was replaced by disappointment: the Kucherenkos engaged in domestic quarreling, would disappear from home for long periods of time, entertained drunken friends, and themselves drank to excess.

It was not long before the Kucherenkos were registered as chronic alcoholics by the substance abuse specialist at the Aleksandriya Psychoneurological Hospital. The people's court considered a motion to take away their parental rights. But the court's decision was to grant the parents a period of probation to demonstrate their parental fitness. But should a period of probation have been granted, without eradicating the cause of the moral disintegration of these young parents? The Kucherenkos refused to take treatment for their alcoholism, and it was not possible to compel at least the "head" of the family to undergo treatment. He was the family's only gainfully-employed member, that is, he was the sole support of his wife and children.

The workforce at the Aleksandriyagol Production Association's truck terminal, where Kucherenko was employed as a welder, also could have exerted influence on him. Members of the community and enterprise management also could have given assistance to and kept an eye on the family. But they paid no attention to what was going on. All this hastened the denouement. Ultimately a drunken quarrel between husband and wife ended in tragedy. Losing all control, Kucherenko killed his wife.

A tragedy almost identical to the Kucherenko affair occurred on the Novyy Donbass Sovkhoz in Starobelskiy Rayon, Voroshilovgrad Oblast, where farm machinery operator M. Serhiyenko killed his wife.

Analyzing the circumstances of crimes, we have time and again noted that a substantial portion of the public tolerates immoral actions by those around them and that in many cities, towns and villages there is a lack of firm reaction by the community against specific wrongdoers. But there are ways to combat antisocial manifestations. These include consolidation of the forces of society, cooperation between the police and workforces, enterprise management and administration of establishments, as well as public organizations in the locality of residence. Maintenance of public order station councils can greatly influence the state of affairs in the microrayons, as well as their numerous commissions, women's councils, block and building committees. Deputies, Soviet executive committees, and party agencies seldom get involved in these matters.

Police precinct inspectors are also insufficiently reliable and consistent in these activities. If they showed greater firmness in performing their duties, and if they showed greater initiative in bringing up these matters with local party and Soviet bodies as well as with the community at large, the outcome of the described situations could have been different.

An important party document was adopted in October of this year: "On Progress in Implementing the CPSU Central Committee Decree on Stepping up the Campaign Against Drunkenness and Alcoholism." A critical

appraisal of efforts in this country to eradicate drunkenness and alcoholism once again emphasizes a simple truth: there cannot be a campaign against an evil merely on a general basis; there can be a campaign only against specific bearers of the evil. Only under this condition can we achieve results.

The considerable work which has been done in society to combat drunkenness and alcoholism has had a positive effect on public order on the streets of our cities, towns and villages. But this success was not pushed further. This evil has found "refuge" in the home.

The importance of preventing law violations in the domain of domestic relations, rooting out negative phenomena in our society, and creating a healthy atmosphere in the community would seem to be obvious. But it is a long journey from comprehension to concrete deeds. What is needed today is intensive, painstaking effort to reeducate individuals who have a tendency to break the law, as well as increased personal responsibility not only on the part of precinct inspectors and other police officials but also managers and administrators of enterprises, establishments, government agencies, and public organizations with any kind of authority or jurisdiction over persons who violate the law and who bring stress to human relations.

UkSSR Academy of Sciences Surveys Youth on Unofficial Groups

18110039a Kiev *FILOSOFSKA DUMKA* in Ukrainian
No 6, Nov-Dec 88 pp 20-21

[Article by T. Yu. Koshechkina under the rubric "Theoretical Problems of Perestroika": "Kiev Youth: Attitude Toward Unofficial Groups"]

[Text] Tetyana Yuriyivna Koshechkina is a senior engineer in the department of sociology of the mass media and public opinion at the UkSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy. Social problems of youth is her field of scholarly interest. She is a regular contributor to our journal.

Last fall the department of sociology of the mass media and public opinion of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy conducted a survey to determine the attitude of Kiev youth toward unofficial groups ("panki" ["subdebs"], "fanaty" ["fanats"], "rokery" ["rockers"], "metalisty" ["heavy metals"], "khippi" ["hippies"], "kultursty" ["bodybuilders"], "remontnyky" ["fixers"], "breykery" ["breakdancers"], "arkhayisty" ["archaics"]) existing in Kiev, and the factors which influence their attitude. The survey included 1,200 persons up to 30 years of age. 86 persons (7.2 percent) stated that they were involved in unofficial youth groups (NOM). They included (73.7 percent) vocational school students, while the remainder were young workers (17.5 percent), college students (7.0 percent), and one engineer. The vocational school students show great interest in mass media reports on the

problems of the NOM and have the most emotional attitude toward these groups. For example, they show an emotional evaluation index of 0.36 toward the "breakdancers," while college students show an index of 0.01. Incidentally, the "breakdancers" are the most popular group among Kiev youth (index of 0.14). The "subdebs" are the least popular (index of 0.72). Among those surveyed who are involved in NOM, the largest number favor the "fanats" and the "heavy metals" (each with 21 percent of the total).

Young people from 17 to 19 years of age comprise the bulk of NOM-involved youth. This group displays exceptional interest in the NOM. Their favorite leisure-time activities run heavily toward dancing and athletic events, get-togethers with friends, and listening to recorded music. At the same time those young people who more frequently visit museums and go to the theater, who are fond of literature, etc, are much less interested in NOM. Regular instruction classes within the political and economics education system also show a direct correlation with the degree of young people's liking of NOM. We shall note that young people with college-educated parents are also more reserved and moderate in their attitude toward NOM.

The magazine ROVESNIK has become the principal source of information about the unofficial groups (especially for "rocker" fans). It was ascertained that those who show preference for the TV program "I Serve the Soviet Union" [military-patriotic propaganda] more frequently express a negative opinion about the majority of NOM. Those who have started their own family as well as those who are older are beginning to have a more critical attitude toward the NOM.

It was ascertained that the attitude of a certain segment of young people toward a given NOM is determined not at all by significant (including ideological) characteristics of the group in question; a principal role is played by emotional evaluative stereotypes. For example, many of those who demand harsh measures against the "fanats" and "rockers" know practically nothing about these groups (5.2 percent for the former, and 6.5 percent for the latter).

We conducted a control experiment in order to ascertain that a noted aggressive attitude is determined not so much by the specific features of a group as by the inner motivations of the individual in question. We added a fictitious group, the "Tigers," to the list of actually existing NOM. Approximately 20 percent of respondents demand that the authorities take measures against this fictitious group. Apparently this social intolerance reflects certain mass consciousness stereotypes formed by the system of rule by administrative fiat. Of course we can take comfort in the fact that the attitude of young people toward the NOM is fairly specific, and therefore it cannot serve as a basis for excessively broad generalizations. One can explain that these stereotypes have been passed on to young people from their parents and

from the older generation. On the other hand, will these young people lose this stereotype when they grow up to adulthood? Or will they perhaps extend it to all domains of their "adult" activities, which at that time will be much broader and more responsible?

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**Survey on Knowledge of Environmental Law
Conducted in Lvov**

18110042a Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
5 Jan 89 p 4

[Article by G. Matsenko, Lvov: "The Land, Forests and Waters Need an Advocate"]

[Text] Are you familiar with environmental law? This was the principal question in a study conducted among various social groups within the general public in Lvov Oblast by scholars at Lvov State University.

"The results of this study are not very reassuring," stated Candidate of Legal Sciences S. M. Kravchenko. "Even among those whose job involves environmental protection—judges, public prosecutors—only half of those surveyed are familiar with the applicable laws. The level of knowledge is even poorer among persons working in Soviet bodies. And yet their area of responsibility includes monitoring reasonable and efficient utilization of natural resources, settling disputes over use of land, waters, forest, and mineral resources, and implementation of environmental protection measures on the territory under their jurisdiction.

Unfortunately knowledge by foresters and game management personnel, to whom the state has entrusted protection of our forests, is no greater. Forty-five percent of those surveyed are not acquainted with the laws. And yet they are empowered to go after violators.

"There is another unsettling item in the questionnaires. It was ascertained that almost 60 percent of those who replied to the question are satisfied with their level of knowledge and feel no need to increase it."

The scholars concluded that it is necessary to intensify dissemination of knowledge of environmental law and to improve the forms and methods of teaching and indoctrinating people. They are of the opinion that environmental protection measures must be made economically advantageous to enterprises and farm operations. Toward this end the system of evaluating performance should include consideration of environmental protection activities alongside production operations. In addition, an environmental protection and ecology area of specialization in investigative agencies and the courts as well as the establishment of special subdivisions to handle cases involving this area could help solve the problem.

**Odessa Environmentalists Contest Plans for
Chemical Plant**

18110042b Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
5 Jan 89 p 4

[Article by Igor Rozov, Odessa: "Should the Berezovka Chemical Plant Be Built?"]

[Text] Odessans have been in a state of agitation for two years now. During the most recent "Golden Duke" Film Festival huge signs were put up on the famous Deribasivska, bearing the following message: "Protest construction of the Berezovka Chemical Plant! It will destroy the Tiligul protected area." Unfortunately this appeal contains a substantial error of fact: we have not succeeded in having this liman near Odessa declared a protected area, just as we lost the chance 10 years ago to have the source of the Tiligul therapeutic mud declared a balneological zone.

We must give due credit to the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production: ministry specialists were quick to take advantage of mistakes by the local authorities. Construction of the Berezovka Chemical Plant was incorporated into government documents, and therefore (as the ministry sees it) the matter is settled. That is certainly the way things would have been five years ago. But the situation is changing. And eloquent signs of these changes include people's activeness and resistance to dictate by a union ministry.

Several tens of thousands of letters protesting construction of the Berezovka Chemical Plant were sent to the newspaper VECHERNYAYA ODESSA and the city executive committee. They contained a single demand: reexamine the government decision and conduct an independent environmental impact study. These protests by the public provided impetus toward a first practical step. During the 19th All-Union Party Conference a letter from the oblast executive committee was handed to Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. I. Ryzhkov, with a request that planning of this enterprise be delayed and that the proposed industrial process technology be restudied.

But the ministry has displayed fine "fighting qualities": it is defending itself with a response by the department of chemistry at Moscow University. Moscow State University scientists have stated that projected emissions do not exceed allowable standards. It is true that existing state standards have remained unchanged for many years, but from a formal point of view things would seem to be in order.

The next step taken by the Odessa environmentalists was an appeal to the USSR Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies, the membership of which includes eminent Soviet scientists. They had been sent an invitation to attend the large "Odessa Ecology" conference held at the beginning of October. Academicians M. Moiseyev and

B. Laskorin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection Ye. Minayev, as well as about 20 other experts came to discuss the situation at and around the site with local scientists. Moscow State University professor L. Firsova was given a hard time: it was she and her colleagues who had issued the "indulgence," declaring that building the chemical plant would have no adverse consequences.

Academicians M. Moiseyev and B. Laskorin, opponents of L. Firsova, stated their opinion: "Construction of the chemical plant will have a damaging effect on the environment. There are virtually no emissions-free industrial plants, and this means that one can expect the occurrence of acid rain and changes in the atmosphere. It is difficult to forecast damage to the recreational area—this would require elaborate calculations. But one thing is clear: work on the project must be halted until an independent environmental impact study is conducted."

Who is going to serve as arbiter in this dispute? Perhaps the USSR Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies. There should also be input by the local soviets and the UkSSR State Committee for Environmental Protection. Of course an independent environmental impact study does not come cheap, but what price can you put on a destroyed environment and people's health?

The results of the large "Odessa Ecology" conference inspire hope. The conference resolutions represent an

outspoken protest against construction of the Berezovka Chemical Plant. Materials are being prepared for conducting an independent environmental impact study, and a city permanent committee on ecology has been formed.

The USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production has even sent a commission to Odessa. The ministry is continuing the fight, but it clearly lacks a convincing argument. A heated debate lies ahead.

Balneological experts state that nature took 30 million years to form a source of therapeutic mud on the shore of Tiligul. If the chemical plant is built, acid rain will transform this rich resource into ordinary gypsum. And it will accomplish this considerably faster.

New KGB Chairman Appointed in Kirghiz SSR 18000634

[Editorial Report] Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian, 17 Jan 1989, publishes on page 3 a 150 word KirTAG (Kirghiz Telegraph Agency) news release announcing the appointment of D.A. Asankulov as KGB chairman of the Kirghiz SSR. According to the article Asankulov's predecessor, V.A. Pyabokon, is transferring to an unspecified "executive position in the KGB of the USSR."

Estonian People's Front Leader Savisaar Assailed

Accused of 'Demagoguery'

18000519 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 14 Jan 89 p 3

[Letter by A. Shibin, worker, to editors of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA: "From the Standpoint of Common Sense"]

[Text] It is confusion that has prompted me to take pen in hand. Think about it for yourselves. No sooner did Ya. Allik write in the newspaper RAHVA HAAL, where he allowed himself to mildly criticize one of the leaders of the PFE [People's Front of Estonia], E. Savisaar, than several days later a reaction to the criticism followed in the television broadcast entitled "Let Us Think Some More". I got to thinking—why is it that up until now, since October of last year, there has been no reaction on the part of the People's Front leadership to the critical articles of Zaytsev and Aksinin in SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA? Having analyzed the situation, I understood that two errors were allowed. First of all, the articles evidently were too general in nature, and secondly they were not addressed to a specific person.

Therefore, since I would nevertheless like a response, I should like to turn not to the People's Front governing board in general, but specifically to its leader E. Savisaar. Moreover, as Zhvanetskiy says, "we have some questions for him which have accumulated".

And in order to avoid an unpleasant situation where E. Savisaar can shrug his shoulders and answer: "I don't know", I will base my comments on the public speeches primarily of E. Savisaar himself.

ON MEANS OF MASS INFORMATION

Speaking on 22 December of last year at the town meeting held to discuss the People's Front measure "Politicheskii god-88" [Political year-88], E. Savisaar announced: "...I do not know of a single newspaper where critical articles by several Estonian and Russian scientists or simply workers and students which contain an analysis of the activity of the Intermovement and OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives] are not left to lie around for a long time, and even to the present day. And in this case they even dare to say that the press is under the influence of the People's Front..."

I will not count how many critical articles have been published against the Intermovement and the OSTK, and how many against the People's Front. Yet in regard to the PFE's influence on the means of mass information, I must object.

I do not think that the regular meeting of the People's Front council of representatives which was held on 7 January is such a great event for the republic. Yet the next day practically all the Sunday newspapers carried

the ETA [Estonian Wire Service] commentaries. It is true that the material this time did not reflect all that was said at the meeting, but more about this later. After another day the adopted resolutions were published in the Estonian newspapers, including the resolution on holding protest actions starting on 16 January.

Furthermore, as we know the People's Front leadership consists of 106 persons (7 governing board members and 99 council of representatives members). Thus, this number includes around 20 representatives of the republic's means of mass information, as for example M. Kadastik, editor of the newspaper EDAZI; L. Koyk, editor-in-chief of SOVETSKOYE PRAVO; R. Yarlik, associate of the Tartu editorial staff of ETV [Estonian Television]; E. Leyson, ETV editor; Yu. Peynar, editor of the newspaper VIRU SYNA; M. Tarmak, section chief of the newspaper SIRP YA VASAR; R. Sildam, section chief of the newspaper NOORTE HAAL; S. Kallas, assistant editor of RAHVA HAAL; S. Endre, editor-in-chief of the journal KULTUUR YA ELU; R. Veydemann, editor-in-chief of the journal VIKERKAAR, etc. Thus, we can probably dare say that the press has not slighted the People's Front by its attention.

ON ELECTIONS

In the ETV broadcast entitled "Let Us Think Some More", some of the speakers complained that the Law on Election of Deputies is unclear. Yet let us see—who is at fault here if not we ourselves? Let us recall the recent times when 900,000 signatures were collected in the republic against the adoption of Union laws. This figure was repeatedly mentioned in various measures, both with and without good reason. Yet no one counted how many specific proposals on improving drafts of laws were submitted. There were not that many of them, because the energy of the people was directed not toward a critical interpretation of the documents, but toward their mindless rejection, the fruits of which we are now harvesting. I would like to draw a parallel between the speech presented by E. Savisaar at the last meeting of People's Front representatives and the presentation whose essence is not reflected in the ETA information, because this part of the meeting was held behind closed doors.

What did E. Savisaar talk about? I do not claim to give a word-for-word recount of his speech, since I know of it from the words of one of the participants, whom I trust as myself. I do not think that he distorted the essence of E. Savisaar's presentation. [Savisaar] called upon the People's Front supporters to actively participate in the work of the electoral commissions and to promote, in his words, their own people within them.

He also gave the directive to hold resolution meetings of representatives prior to 25 January for the purpose of compiling lists of candidates whom the People's Front would support in the elections, as well as lists of those whom it would not support. On 26 January a general

meeting of rayon representatives will be held in Rapla, where the summary lists will be compiled. On 29 January at the council of representatives meeting these lists will once again be reviewed, and a final decision will be made as to whom the People's Front will support or oppose. Moreover, E. Savisaar proposed creating regional People's Front staffs for conducting the elections. It was specifically his idea to conduct protest actions starting on 16 January.

In the broadcast entitled "Let Us Think Some More", E. Savisaar complained that the People's Front is still not registered as a public organization and cannot promote its deputies. Here he is being a bit sly. Indeed, the People's Front is not registered, but this has not kept it from promoting a number of candidates, and specifically from among the People's Front leadership—M. Lauristin, S. Kallas, Yu. Vooglayd, V. Palm, and I. Gryazin. We may continue this list, but as we can see it is already quite representative for the 30-some deputy seats.

ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE'S FRONT TOWARD THE ESTONIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

First let us quote some rather curious statistics. Of 106 members of the People's Front leadership, almost half are communists. It would seem, how could there be any discussion of contradictions between the People's Front leadership and the Estonian CP? Particularly since E. Savisaar expressed his disagreement with the opinion of Ya. Allik that the People's Front contraposes itself to the Communist Party. I would not say that about the entire People's Front. This, of course, is incorrect. Nevertheless, I would like to cite some of E. Savisaar's comments regarding the Estonian CP:

"...People know that the realization of these goals is impossible with the aid of the current non-democratic party, where the apparatus rules... Calling us (People's Front) together with them (Intermovement) to the same table, the Estonian CP Central Committee has made a concession to the conservatives, and now has shifted the entire structure of political forces... We get a situation which is understood as the onset of extreme movements and the support of their activity by the Communist Party... If the Central Committee elects those (union members) who in their actions largely ignore the policy of perestroika, this means that it is not free in its choice..." (from a speech at the town hall meeting of 22 December).

Without commenting on these statements, since there is no need to do so as they speak for themselves, I would nevertheless like to ask: Has E. Savisaar gone far from those Intermovement leaders whom he accuses of attacks against the Estonian CP? I would particularly like to point out that part of E. Savisaar's speech at the town hall where he outlined the distribution of political forces in the republic, and having placed the People's Front in the center, the "independent movements" to the left of it, and the "conservatives" and "ultra-conservatives" to

the right, he found no room at all for the Communist Party, as if it did not exist or its influence on political life in the republic was so insignificant that it did not even deserve mention. Yet quite recently M. Lauristin placed the Estonian CP in the center together with the People's Front, as the axis of political power, while the Intermovement and PNNE [Estonian National Independence Party] were referred to in her speech as being extreme polar groups. Proceeding from these assumptions, need we say what the entire subsequent analysis of the political situation made by E. Savissar on 22 December was worth?

I will not present all his statements. I would only like to note that not one of E. Savisaar's speeches was without attacks addressed to his opponents. Judge for yourselves: "The internazists (Intermovement) are a movement who secretly harbor elements of the fascist movement, the movement of the Black Hundreds (Intermovement), the accoucheurs of the anti-perestroika movement (OSTK)", etc. etc.

And so, speaking on 22 December, he laments:

"...The Russian population, which back in May was ready to go with us, had lost its head by fall. It was placed in an unreliable position and under the guise of truth was taught to accept the most incredible hypotheses and fabrications..." And how does he explain the situation which has arisen? "...The publications and articles criticizing the extremist movements take a negative position in the interests of maintaining calm in the republic, and as a result of this a situation has arisen where no one can protect the Russian worker and the Russian man against the demagoguery of the Intermovement and OSTK..."

Yet why, E. Savisaar, turn everything upside down?

I am speaking of elementary things which you, who consider yourself to be a strong politician and a no less strong analyst, should know.

So there you are. You are right about one thing—that the Russian population really was ready to go along with the People's Front in May. But remember what happened at about this time in some of the means of mass information and in public speeches? There was a flood of unflattering epithets aimed at the Russian-speaking population. If the leaders of the People's Front had divested themselves of all this, not to mention themselves not allowing such expressions, then the development of the political situation would have taken an entirely different course. Today we need not be surprised that such a situation repelled the Russian-speaking population away from the People's Front and led to the creation of the Intermovement. But this would be only half the trouble if the leaders of the People's Front had immediately come to their senses and begun to smoothe over the dialogue. On the contrary, everything was done to deepen the schism, to make it impossible to hold a dialogue either with the Intermovement or with the

OSTK. It is no secret to anyone that the picketing of 30 November of last year at the House of Political Enlightenment was organized by certain leaders of the People's Front, specifically by Kh. Nurm, who called upon the picketers carrying signs insulting to the OSTK "not to leave until the television crews got there". This action was recently condemned on television also by the STKE [Estonian Union of Labor Collectives] directors Purga and Nugis. But how did it happen that the managers of a number of enterprises and kolkhozes suddenly decided to participate in this constituent conference? As it happened, at the meeting of the People's Front representatives held the previous day, 27 November, the decision was made to hastily call together the representatives of these enterprises and kolkhozes, which were later present at the town meeting on 30 November. And E. Savisaar was not the least instrumental in this. Yet to speak of consolidation and then to complain that the Russian-speaking population did not join the People's Front is strange in the very least.

ON DEMAGOGUERY

According to one of the definitions given by Ozhegov, the compiler of the comprehensive dictionary, demagoguery is the intentional influence on the feelings and instincts of the uninformed parts of the masses in order to achieve one's goals.

It is still unclear to me what goals some of the People's Front leaders are pursuing in the so-called "Armenian" question. However, there can be no doubt that their actions are demagogic. See for yourselves. When the union republic Supreme Soviet Presidium turned to Azerbaijan and Armenia with an appeal to show patience and wisdom in resolving the problem of the NKAO [Nagorniy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], some People's Front leaders accused the parliaments, including also the Estonian parliament, of intervening in the internal affairs of the Transcaucasus republics. Yet a little over 2 months later the People's Front congress adopted an appeal to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Presidium to give its consent for Nagorniy Karabakh to secede from the Azerbaijan SSR. Excuse me, but if we compare both these facts, who is it that is really intervening in the internal affairs of these republics—the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which appeals both to Armenia and Azerbaijan to exhibit restraint in an equal degree, or the People's Front congress, which addresses only one party? Perhaps the leadership of the Estonian People's Front has found a solution to the Karabakh problem which no one else has thought of? Why no, this is simply elementary demagoguery with **direct** intervention in the internal affairs of the two republics.

I would also like to point out the confusing contacts of our People's Front representatives with the infamous "Karabakh Committee".

On 7 November E. Savisaar, speaking at a meeting in Rakver, said (and I quote from the newspaper VIRU SYNA dated 10 November 1988): "...I have returned from Armenia. I can still hear ringing in my ears the chanting of the crowd numbering 100,000 people at the meeting held in the center of Yerevan: 'Estonia, Estonia, Estonia...'"

I am a meticulous person. So I contacted my Armenian friends, who told me that E. Savisaar did indeed speak in Yerevan, that there were 10,000 people at the meeting, and that it was organized by none other than the "Karabakh Committee". Here is the next fact. On 22 December in answer to the question posed from the audience at the town hall meeting, "What are your relations with the 'Karabakh Committee'?", E. Savisaar announced without embarrassment: "The 'Karabakh Committee' has repeatedly focused attention on democracy and on its questions. I myself know several members of the committee. Undoubtedly, I condemn their arrest. As for the questions which the 'Committee' raised, we have expressed our attitude at the People's Front Conference." Yes, you did express your attitude, and I have already made mention of this. But excuse me, E. Savisaar, I cannot understand your personal support of the "Karabakh Committee", whose activities are banned. It is clear even to a child that in order to arrest a person under present conditions it is necessary to have such convincing proof of his guilt, particularly under the conditions of the tense situation in Armenia, which are clear to everyone. And to flaunt one's friendship with such activists, much less to publicly express support for them is, in my opinion, not befitting an Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputy and a communist.

But let us continue our discussion about demagoguery.

The television broadcast, "Let Us Think Some More" on 4 January 1989 contained the following tirade by E. Savisaar (I present my questions in parentheses): "...But where did I begin—this is a question of mistrust. It is a serious matter, because today it seems (to whom?) that there is some confusion with the presentation of candidates (where? what facts?). They (who?) have already telephoned us (who?) and told of such an incredible thing, that the names of such candidates (which?) were published in the newspaper (which one?), that a certain collective (which one?) presented them, even though in fact no meeting was held..." He concludes with such a pearl of "eloquence": "...we could not verify this and we hope that we can say today that such a thing never happened..."

This quote contains around 70 words (in the Russian text), but what sense do they carry other than information about some unintelligible rumors, in regard to which, as E. Savisaar himself finally affirms, "we can say today that this never happened"? So why raise a hullabaloo over it? So that no one will think that I have found fault with some single comment, I will cite another, this time from the speech at the town hall meeting on 22 December:

"...the plenum did not adopt any position against those lies and slander (how was it expressed?) which are today being circulated (by whom, by what means?) about the People's Front..." I believe that is enough quotes.

Of course, we often joke about the scientists (and E. Savisaar is a candidate in philosophical sciences) and their ability to "cloud minds" with senseless phraseology. Maybe about 3 years ago this would have passed.

But now the people have become smarter. They demand specifics instead of fancy words coined in the style of the times of stagnation. Anyone can speak in this manner. Here is my example in the style of E. Savisaar:

"They have already called us and told us about such an incredible thing, that a certain director of one institution frequently drove his company automobile to a rayon where he campaigned for his own election. He took this same automobile during work time to public functions which were not associated with his primary work, and to other republics. They say that he paid well for the work of the translator he took with him, although we do not know from whose pocket. The collective does not understand how this man, who actively engaged in public activity during his work time, can still fulfill the duties of director, receiving for this a considerable sum of money from the state. The collective demands that it be made a matter of public knowledge—what benefit did this man bring to his enterprise and the institution from which he transferred?" Well, we might conclude this quote with these same words: "We could not verify this, and we hope that we can say today that this never happened". And everything is fine!

In conclusion I would like to express the hope that E. Savisaar will nevertheless give an answer to my questions.

But this is not the main thing. My letter was not dictated by the desire to offend E. Savisaar, and it is in no way directed either against the People's Front leadership or against its rank-and-file members. I am not defending certain Intermovement leaders, since I am firmly convinced that they have taken an incorrect position on a number of questions, which the Russian-speaking population will in no way accept. I hope that, having read my letter, the leaders of the People's Front and the Intermovement will stop and think—isn't it time they stopped their mutual bickering? Isn't it time to put an end to the confrontation which up until now has not yielded anything positive and, naturally, never will? The people are tired of it.

I hope that the communist leaders of the People's Front and the Intermovement will have enough common sense to in fact embark upon a consolidation of these movements with the Estonian CP. Also, we must hold strictly accountable those communists who do not understand or who do not want to understand the need for such a step. The time for specific actions has come.

Critic Answers Rebuttal

18000519 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 2 Feb 89 pp 2-3

[Article by A. Shibin: "Upside Down"]

[Text] After the publication of A. Shibin's letter in the 14 January issue of our newspaper, the editors received many responses. Words and phrases such as "I concur", "I support", "I am amazed that the author was able to read my thoughts", etc. in the letters of Korostelev from Rakver, Viltok from Tartu, Kutuzov from Vyayka-Maarya, and many others testify to the fact that the author of the above-mentioned correspondence is not alone in his views. We did not feel it necessary to publish these letters, since they contained nothing new other than support for A. Shibin.

There were also some negative responses. Specifically, from a member of the People's Front support group at the Tartu Instrument Making Plant, Ye. Aedviir, and from R. Sunts, whose letter is being published today. We have forwarded all the letters to the addressee so that he can answer them himself.

Since it is not E. Savisaar, but rather the People's Front governing board that responds through M. Lauristin to my letter to the editors of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA on 14 January of this year, I also consider it not as an interview by the editorial staff with M. Lauristin, but as a response by the governing board to me personally. In the first lines the People's Front governing board announces that my letter contains "clear over-exposure, misinformation and an effort to discredit one of the leaders of the People's Front...", and contains affirmations of a tendentious character which distort the real facts". Since such accusations place me in a rather embarrassing position before the readers and my comrades and friends, I will try to prove (and let the reader judge for himself) that these accusations are unfounded, and that there was no ill intent in the inaccuracies which were allowed, and which we will discuss below. However, I do apologize for them.

ON MEANS OF MASS INFORMATION

We get the impression that the People's Front governing board did not understand what I had in mind when I wrote the article. I was not trying to prove that the "People's Front monopolizes the press". Also, the article never stated that I was opposed to a union of the People's Front with the journalists (and the fact that it exists is not denied by the governing board, but rather confirmed). Yet I touched upon this topic only because E. Savisaar brought it up first. And this would be fine, except that having raised it, he placed it not on its feet, but on its head, trying to prove that the press is not kindly inclined toward the People's Front. Also, if the governing board considered it necessary to support such a statement by Savisaar, then evidently it should not

have followed the path it did (unsubstantiated affirmations), but should have confirmed it with facts. Unfortunately, as we can see, this was not done. Also, most certainly, it is difficult to prove the unprovable.

ON ELECTIONS

I did not complain in the article that "today we do not have the most democratic system of elections". On the contrary, I believe that it is incomparably more democratic than the preceding one, and hardly anyone can refute this. I am well aware of those comments and amendments which the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium introduced into the Commission of Legislative Proposals of the country's parliament. If the members of the governing board read the article over carefully one more time, they will see that the discussion in this chapter centered around something entirely different. It was said how much more complete and weighty the amendments and corrections by the Estonian SSR to the legislative draft would be if the energy of the people were directed not toward gathering signatures against the adoption of these legislative drafts in general, but toward the presentation of specific proposals for improving them. And if the People's Front leadership wants to continue to insist that 900,000 people, i.e. the entire adult population of the republic, submitted corrections and proposals, instead of simply presenting signatures against adoption of the laws, then let it prove that each of those who signed knew perfectly well what was demanded of him.

Let us recall the television reports of "Current Camera", which showed sacks [of mail], and in which the announcer told in a triumphant voice the number of letters received by the ESSR Supreme Soviet Presidium with demands (but not corrections and proposals!) to remove the legislative bill from consideration. And let us not be cunning and again place things upside down, but let us say directly—the people were pulled not into a discussion of the legislative drafts, but into a political adventure. Sometimes we have to find the courage for such admissions.

Yes, there were some letters with corrections and suggestions, but for some reason it was considered unpatriotic to speak of them at that time. Therefore, no one ever said: How many of them were there? And it is not quite correct that the receipt of such letters should be considered a merit, because they were not required.

Further in the article the People's Front governing board itself essentially condemns E. Savisaar, who complained that the People's Front cannot promote its own candidates. I prove that it can by citing specific names. My opponents now also confirm this, so what is the argument about? The only thing that I would like to note is this: In my letter neither the People's Front nor E. Savisaar are accused of the fact that the People's Front actively participates in the electoral campaigns. I simply told how this is done in the People's Front in the

resolution of such an important question as the pre-electoral campaign. And this is done privately, behind closed doors which, you must agree, in no way correlates with the current atmosphere of glasnost in the country, while the rank-and-file members of the People's Front are essentially excluded from this important socio-political question and they can do only what the small circle of their leaders decides. Of course, every organization can hold closed meetings when the discussion centers around certain internal problems. The matter here is not just of questions associated with the upcoming elections. It is something else that put us on guard. I do not know of a single representatives council meeting (if I am incorrect in this, then let the People's Front governing board correct and forgive me), which was not held fully or partially behind closed doors. Yet Paragraph 20 of the People's Front Charter states: "Access to the meetings of representatives is open to all citizens". How can the rank-and-file members of the People's Front, not to mention the people in general, realize this right?

Here is the last thing concerning this topic. The governing board maintains that to use the materials from a closed meeting or second-hand accounts "is incorrect from the standpoint of journalistic ethics". (I might add, by the way, that the content of E. Savisaar's comments at the meeting is not refuted). Here you are right, and I will not cover myself by the fact that I am not a journalist, but merely a worker. But tell me—did those two members of the People's Front governing board act more correctly when they filed in court against TASS journalists who used their privileged work (i.e., closed) information which was not intended for the press? The Bible states correctly on this point: "And why do you look at a mote in the eye of your brother, and do not see a log in your own? (Matthew 7:3).

ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PEOPLE'S FRONT WITH THE ESTONIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

The response of the People's Front leadership to my criticism is not to the point. First of all, I believe it is incorrect to affirm that the People's Front contraposes itself to the Estonian CP and to see here a desire "to emphasize those moments which may lead to conflict between the People's Front and the republic's party organization". This also means to place everything upside down. Thus, this accusation completely misses its mark (the reader may be convinced of this by re-reading the article). I criticized only one person on the basis of specific statements. It was not without substantiation that I placed in a single rank certain leaders of the Intermovement and E. Savisaar. While the former criticizes the Estonian CP for the decisions of the 11th Central Committee Plenum, he criticizes it for the decision of the 13th Plenum, and there is no other difference. And, if we become acquainted with his speech and then maintain that Savisaar did not do this on 22 December, that would simply be an attempt to prove the unprovable. To the quotes presented previously I will add one

more, so that the reader may be convinced of Savisaar's attitude toward the 13th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum. Thus: "...Interesting metamorphoses have taken place (in the Estonian CP Central Committee) also in regard to the People's Front, and this will be noted by everyone who compares the **subtexts** (boldface mine—A. Sh.) of the 11th and 13th Plenums. I do not exclude the possibility that in 1-2 years that which has just occurred will be evaluated as a revision of positions in relation to the People's Front. It is also notable that they tried to segregate themselves from the People's Front and intensively sought cooperation with those groupings which quite recently criticized the decisions of the 11th Plenum, the course of the Estonian CP, and primarily the People's Front... We also cannot overlook the ethical aspect of the question. The People's Front has called upon the people to defend the general line of the Estonian CP, but at the plenum this fact found no evaluation. There was no position taken at the plenum against those lies and slander which are currently being disseminated against the People's Front. Perhaps we may understand this silence as being a sign of agreement?..." And if we say who really does contrapose the People's Front and the Estonian CP, then I believe this quote gives a clear answer and confirms in sufficient degree the legitimacy of the question which I posed on 14 January (I repeat): "...has Savisaar gone far from those leaders of the Intermovement whom he accuses of attacks on the Estonian CP?" I agree that criticism is a part of intra-party life. However, for a communist there is one other condition—to discuss prior to adoption by the party a decision which later becomes mandatory for all its members. Furthermore, perhaps I should not have made a reference to M. Lauristin. I did this not to contrapose one leader to another. It turns out that Lauristin was simply repeating the words of Savisaar. I did not know this, and I apologize. However, this does not alter the fact that Savisaar willingly or unwillingly crossed the Estonian CP out of the system of the republic's political powers. Let the members of the governing board acquaint themselves with the primary source—I have not added or detracted anything from it.

ON DEMAGOGUERY

First I will ask the reader to note the epithet which resounds in that part of the article where the relations of Savisaar with the "Karabakh Committee" are explained—"political denunciation". Let us look a little closer. My letter stated that "...to flaunt one's friendship with such activists, and moreover to publicly support them is, in my opinion, unsuitable for an ESSR Supreme Soviet deputy and communist". Now judge for yourselves. I write a letter to the editors and express my point of view on this question. Since when has this been called political denunciation? Look in Ozhegov's dictionary: "Denunciation—secret report given to representative of authority or chief about someone's activity which from their point of view is reprehensible". What is there in fact in my letter? It is not "secret", but open, not addressed to a "representative of authority", but to the

community, not "from their point of view", but from mine. Can it really be that once again we cannot express our views out loud regarding certain events? I have already written that for 3 years now we are living not in Stalinist and not in stagnant times, so why is criticism still being perceived so painfully that it is necessary to attribute some label to one's opponent? Who really has mixed up the time and is trying to turn everything upside down?

It is for naught that the People's Front governing board is trying to accuse me here of giving "concealed advice to use...repressive measures" against Savisaar. It does not read like this in any way. I believe that this suspicion is caused specifically by that case where "when something hurts, one talks about it". And really, the attitude of certain People's Front leaders to those who think differently is intolerable. Let us recall—G. Naan, then L. Annus, and on 22 December the signal was given—V. Vakhit. And still the campaign against him does not die down in the means of mass information. Pardon me for the crude comparison, but to me personally this is reminiscent of a "witch hunt"—just as purposeful, but primitive and without proof. Such intolerance to a different point of view in no way testifies to the high political culture in our republic which we like to talk about. But let us continue. I do not know what purpose the People's Front leadership pursued in saying about E. Savisaar's trip to Yerevan that "here the time frame is intentionally shifted. Savisaar was in Armenia in August...". Are they trying to prove that at that time the "Karabakh Committee" was "good", and that it became "bad" later? Yet my letter spoke of Savisaar's visit to Armenia not in August, but significantly later, in November of last year. And these 3 months comprise a rather significant difference. (His speech which I mentioned was presented on 5 November). It was specifically by that time that the activity of the "Karabakh Committee" had in fact reached its apogee, and it was at about that time that the intelligentsia which comprised the flower of Armenia turned away from it, understanding quite clearly where this committee was headed. The reply by the governing board stated that Savisaar is charged with friendship with the "Karabakh" activists, "who were arrested only in January". What strange logic! Is their arrest really the point? Following this logic, it turns out that for a communist the best company would be the members of the PNNE, because they were not arrested? Or perhaps we should take some other criteria for evaluation here? Of course, judging by the response, Armenia is far away and from such a distance it is difficult to see all the prospects for development of the process in this republic. Yet if this is so, then should we intervene in that which is quite difficult to understand, and at the same time make heroes out of persons who have not contributed anything positive to the life of the Armenian people? As for the "protest among the country's democratic community", this is merely demagogic verbiage and nothing more, since these same words may be used to support anyone's point of view on any problem.

And the fact that "as an honest person, Savisaar does not conceal his views", i.e., his attitude toward the provocateurs—that I do not know even how to evaluate. Let that remain for the reader to judge.

Now I must apologize to the People's Front governing board, the SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA editorial staff and its readers for unwittingly bringing them to confusion in pointing out that the People's Front Congress adopted a resolution addressed to the Azerbaijan government with the proposal to hand over the NKAO to Armenia. After acquainting myself with this article, I once again closely examined the newspapers and my notes. It became apparent that for some reason the resolution on Nagorniy Karabakh pointed out by M. Lauristin was not published in the republic newspapers, although the texts of other resolutions were printed (Cf. SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA dated 12 October 1988 and RAKHVA KHYAEL dated 11 October 1988). I reconstructed the true picture through my notes. The confusion was caused by the fact that the resolution on Nagorniy Karabakh was not read aloud, and M. Lauristin, speaking on this question on the first day of the congress, cited only its title (the contents were known only to the delegates). When on the evening of that same day I was present at the meeting in the Town Hall, Aramyan who spoke there thanked the People's Front for its appeal to the Azerbaijan government requesting that the NKAO be allowed to join with Armenia, while the representative of the Estonian People's Forum E. Shaumyan, who spoke on the second day of the Congress, thanked the People's Front for its decision to send a letter of analogous content to Azerbaijan, adding that this "...fills us with hope for solidarity and mutual understanding of people who live on occupied territory..." From these presentations I drew the erroneous conclusion that the resolution and the appeal (letter) to the Azerbaijan government were one and the same document. I do not know whether this difference is significant or not (that is for the reader to judge). However, the accusation of boldface lies sounds unfounded, in my opinion. A document of one-sided orientation was nevertheless either forwarded by the People's Front to Azerbaijan, or Aramyan and Shaumyan presented the desired as the real, but in this case the responsibility lies with them.

IN REGARD TO SLANDER AGAINST E. SAVISAAR

What did I have in mind in my letter? I wanted to say, and I believe clearly expressed my idea, that it is not fitting for the leader of the People's Front to speak publicly before an audience of many thousands of people (be it on television or at a Town Hall meeting) using hints and allegations when, without presenting any specific facts, it is possible at the same time to formulate in the reader a definite negative attitude against certain "dark forces", which are always trying to hurt the People's Front. To show how easily this is done, I presented my example of such demagoguery which also did not name either the person, or the place, or the time

of the event. And if the People's Front governing board decided that these words refer to their leader, then they should not have limited themselves to this explanation, but rather should have brought it to its conclusion. Otherwise, we get the impression that the leaders of the People's Front are forced to agree in silence with everything else in my literary measure. As we can see by the reaction of the People's Front governing board, such a measure works quite effectively. The unsubstantiated speeches of E. Savisaar work just as well. The only thing that I would like to achieve by this is to motivate the People's Front leaders to reject such nonspecific, obscure presentations which, aside from formulating an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust for each other, cannot bring anything positive.

In summarizing this discussion, I must note with deep sorrow that the People's Front governing board approached it very superficially, in the manner of an "easy victory". There is a clear absence of interpretation of the criticism which resounded in my letter, an effort to refute one's opponent without any substantiated proof. The "inconvenient" questions were generally left without attention. There was no reaction to such moments which I mentioned as the insulting comments by E. Savisaar addressed to the Intermovement and the OSTK and the provocation organized at the House of Political Education on 30 November 1988. Should we understand this to mean that the People's Front leadership is in silent agreement with them? It also remains unclear what the People's Front leaders intend to do to consolidate their forces in support of perestroika. For now we get the impression that the People's Front leadership evidently considers this to be premature.

However, the most sorrowful is the fact that, like before, the People's Front leaders continue to have an intolerant attitude toward the criticism addressed to them. To suppress their opponents (cf. the People's Front article), like before, they use epithets and methods which are not very correct. Even the word "critical" itself is not perceived, and is replaced by "accusatory".

From this we may draw the fully definite conclusion that the People's Front leadership (at least those of its members in whose name the reply is given) are not ready to objectively approach the criticism levelled at them. Consequently, until they reinterpret and correct this position, the question of continuing the discussion cannot remain on the agenda, as it will be a futile shock of air. For now, the people who prepared the response to my letter, unfortunately, can be classed among those who, in the words of L. Tolstoy, "are ready to condemn the innocent, the holy, and God himself, so long as they are right".

I understand that the size of a newspaper article is limited, and cannot respond to the replies which came in to my first letter without being misunderstood. I will

only touch upon the critical ones (two of them were received). Individual responses may already emerge in this article, and I would like to respond to certain other questions.

Tallinn resident R. Sunts was interested in my degree of informedness on the situation in the republic and on the activity of the public organizations. This, in his opinion, does not correlate with my humble social position. He expressed surprise at my being aware of the situation in Armenia. Yes, I really am a worker, but at the same time I have not only a higher education, but also a candidate's degree. Why? This is a separate and long drawn-out discussion, the roots of which go back to the period of stagnation when I, like some others, defended my candidate's dissertation. However, when I became convinced that the return from my activity did not grow proportionally with my contribution to science and production, but that only my family was growing, I became a laborer. I also have my own account to settle (due to my relatives) with Stalinism. I know of the situation in Armenia not from hearsay, since I had occasion to live and work in the Caucasus, and specifically in Yerevan, and I still maintain ties with my Armenian friends. A knowledge of Estonian (although not to the degree to which I would like) facilitated the fact that I also have many friends among Estonians. I am interested in problems of social movements in Estonia. Whenever possible, my friends and I try to attend all the meetings of the People's Front, Intermovement, and other groups, and to closely monitor their publications and correspondences.

Naturally, we keep notes on what we have seen, heard and read. This turns out to be good and bad, but we try to interpret what is going on and formulate some kind of critical analysis. We are planning to prepare an article (also of critical content) which will examine the problems of the Intermovement. The author of the second letter (Ye. Aedviyr from Tartu) called the article "insulting and tendentious", and concluded his missal as follows: "I believe that you are not worthy of a discussion with the leadership of the People's Front, but even if they do respond to your letter, they will do so only for the sake of the Russian resident". I would like to note that her letter, unlike the letter from Sunts, which contained a critical analysis of my article, was in only two tones—black and pink. It is quite difficult to debate with a person who looks at the world in this way, since he does not even make an effort to perceive his opponent's point of view.

However, I have presented her words here in order to thank the People's Front leadership for the fact that it, to the envy of authors of other critical letters, nevertheless found it possible to respond to me, even if this was done "only for the sake of the Russian resident".

In conclusion, I have only to express my regrets that not one of the Estonian newspapers found it possible to publish my letter, and therefore it remained unclear to

the Estonian viewer of "Current Camera" (24 January 1989) who this worker Shibin is about whom M. Lauristin spoke, and what he wants.

I express the hope that both of my articles will not serve as cause for excluding me from the Russian language section of the Estonian People's Front, of which I am a member.

Interfront on Cooperation with State, Conciliation Commission With LPF

Interfront Announces Readiness for Cooperation
18000463a Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
11 Jan 89 p 4

[LATINFORM report: Interfront Announcement on Readiness for Cooperation]

[Text] On January 9, journalists covering the work of the constituent congress of the International Front of the Working People of the Latvian SSR were invited to a press conference at the House of Political Education under the Latvian CP Central Committee. A. Alekseyev, A. Belaychuk, I. Lopatin, and I. Machiyauskas, members of the Interfront Republic Council, answered questions from the representatives of mass media. The press conference was broadcast and shown on television.

In his introduction, I. Lopatin said that the congress participants discussed the future of restructuring in the republic and intra-national relations. He said that Interfront members showed high respect for all peoples of Latvia and, of course, for the ingenious Latvian population. "We understand their concerns and their pain and I want you to understand as well: we are in similar positions and are ready to solve together the problems that stand before us."

In the opinion of those who conducted the press conference, the congress as a whole went off successfully, but "it did not end without some unevenness, as the organizers did not have experience in conducting similar measures. Attention was drawn to the constructive proposals expressed in the introductions of the invited experts and series of delegates, although some excessive emotion came up.

However, as television viewers were able to satisfy themselves, the press conference at times was also more like an emotional and quite sharp discussion in connection with the speeches of some delegates at the conference. For this reason, the leaders of Interfront recommended they be guided "not by separate speeches but by congress documents" in which, as they announced, are expressed the position of Interfront on those and other problems. Several speakers acknowledged the criticism of the sponsors and participants in their replies. The leaders promised to give answers to a series of questions after studying the necessary materials.

During the press conference a declaration was conveyed on behalf of the Republic Council, that "Interfront is prepared to enter into contact with the Popular Front of Latvia in order to find common ways of resolving problems, including the question of consolidating the peoples of Latvia."

Interfront Open Letter to LPF Duma

18000463b Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
14 Jan 89 p 3

[Letter signed by the Republic Council of the Latvian SSR Workers' International Front: "Open Letter to the Latvian National Front Duma"]

[Text] Comrades! Fellow Citizens!

The formation of the International Front of our republic has been completed. We proceed from the position that in a free state every segment of the population, each of its strata, has the right to freely create a public organization for the expression of opinion and interests. If every organization will base its actions on the Constitution of the USSR and the Latvian SSR, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the display of the plurality of opinions will create a stable balance of public interests and in this way provide a firm basis to advance the progress of all of society. We feel disgust with Stalinist slogans such as "Those who are not with us are against us!" "Get united to face the enemy!" "If the enemy doesn't surrender, it has to be destroyed!"

There is a huge field of problems and interests where the combined actions of all wholesome forces of our society are necessary. We refer to the problems of ecology and increasing the standard of living, and the growth of culture. It would have been possible to enumerate many other problems where the interests of all of us coincide.

Notwithstanding the difference of opinion on many problems and the political interpretation of current and past events in our republic, there are no obstacles to joint efforts for the good of all the inhabitants of Latvia.

With the goal of developing the ideas of the Forum of the Peoples of Latvia, we suggest to the LPF Duma the creation of a conciliation committee made up of members of the Duma and our council. It will have few members but will include responsible persons from both movements. The mission of the committee should be the co-ordination of joint action by the LPF and Interfront in the interests of all the inhabitants of Latvia, the support of joint actions by our primary organizations. The conciliation committee could meet regularly or at the proposal of one of our organizations.

We think that during the crucial period of the election campaign to the Soviets of Peoples Deputies of all levels, it will be especially fruitful to co-ordinate our joint activities to elaborate proposals on regulating the emigration of the population, on intra-national relations, on

drafting a new Constitution of the Latvian SSR, as well as other issues that affect the fundamental interests of the Republic's entire population.

Causes, Cures Sought For Latvia's Nationality Conflicts

18300287 Moscow POLITICHESKOYE
OBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 18, Dec 88 pp 57-66

[Article by A. Petrik, Riga journalist: "The National Factor in Perestroyka"]

[Text] Many factors influence the course of perestroyka. Today we are beginning to better understand perestroyka, noted M. S. Gorbachev, as a dynamically developing contradictory process in which objective and subjective factors and phenomena interact. The role of the latter is constantly increasing as the transformation encompasses ever broader strata of our country's workers.

It is quite natural that in such a multi-national state as the USSR the national factor would have a significant effect on all of social development. The events which have taken place recently in a number of regions of the country, and specifically in the Prebaltic republics, testify to the fact that the role of this factor is rapidly increasing, and this has a non-synonymous effect on the processes of perestroyka.

"Like a Bolt Out of the Blue"

It would be incorrect to maintain that the national factor is some kind of new phenomenon, some hitherto unknown force. History knows of many examples when national self awareness and national pride helped peoples to overcome the most difficult obstacles in their path. But it also sometimes happened that national sentiments, becoming blown out of proportion, acted counter to the interests of progress.

This non-synonymous nature of the role of the national factor was often forgotten not only by many of our economic leaders, but also by social scientists and ideological workers. Some began to think that it is not that important to take into consideration the national peculiarities of the population of a certain region, the national specifics of a people's psychology, their traditions and customs in solving economic, social, political and educational problems. There was no clear understanding of the fact that all this, as well as the historical experience of each people, the light and dark pages of its history, must be taken into consideration in the process of international education. The prevailing opinion was that we all belong to a single new historical community—the Soviet people. We serve a common cause, have a single purpose, a single path, equal rights and equal opportunities. This means, what can there be to divide, what can there be to consider?

The widespread thesis that in our country the national question has been resolved fully, definitively, and irreversibly has helped to strengthen these sentiments. Although a number of party documents noted that [this question] was resolved only in the form in which it was inherited from the pre-revolutionary past, nevertheless during the times of stagnation they chose to overlook this rather basic stipulation. In essence, inter-ethnic relations were not subjected to serious analysis and their sphere remained outside of criticism. It was believed that the problems existing here are better not discussed aloud. And why worry if the living and cultural standard in various regions was becoming equalized, although slowly, if friendly ties were being strengthened between the republics, and if the unified national economic complex was gaining strength. Well, and even if there were some flaws in inter-ethnic relations, why, these were individual shortcomings which would disappear by themselves or would gradually be eliminated in the process of comprehensive development of nations and their increased rapprochement.

And then suddenly—such a sharp exacerbation of international relations in our various regions. What happened? What are the reasons for it? The answer, in essence, was given in the speech presented by M. S. Gorbachev at the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. First of all, it is the result of deviations from Leninist principles of national policy, the consequences of many years of inattention to specific socio-economic and spiritual demands of the nations and peoples populating our country. The state of affairs in Soviet Latvia confirms the accuracy of this conclusion.

Our republic has long been renowned for its international traditions. Nevertheless in Riga, as we know, there have been manifestations of a nationalistic and anti-Soviet character this year and last. The unrestrained youth and their spiritual advisors have shouted out nationalistic slogans at noisy meetings and have announced their hostile attitude toward the ideas of socialism.

"For us veterans these events were like a bolt out of the blue," admitted former Latvian Red Infantryman Petris Grishko. "Seventy years ago my comrades and I fought for the power of the Soviets together with Russians, Ukrainians, and the sons of other peoples. We gave all our efforts for strengthening the might of our Homeland. Yet today some of my irresponsible fellow countrymen are shaking their fists at the most sacred thing—at the friendship of the Latvian people with the other peoples of the country. This is difficult to understand, much less explain."

This indignation and bewilderment by the veteran is quite natural. After all, frankly speaking, the republic's ideological aktiv was also not psychologically prepared for these extremist pranks. It was unclear what caused

the emergence of nationalistically inclined elements, how to react to such demonstrations, and how to prevent their recurrence. The most contradictory opinions could be heard.

"It is the Western 'radio voices' that are at fault," maintained one. "They have confused people's reason with their preachings, and they have given reign to their emotions."

"This is not without the influence of the former rich and their heirs, who still dream of their land holdings and factories," noted others.

"This is the cost of democratization," still others lamented. "We do not know how to rebuff demagogues who are in a hurry to gain political capital from the national sentiments of the people."

Evidently, each of these judgements has its portion of truth. It is true that various "radio voices" spare no effort to sow distrust among the residents of the republic, especially Latvians, toward those changes which perestroika has introduced into their lives. There can be no doubt that the reactionary forces of the West have not yet rejected the plots to split the Soviet Prebaltic away from the other USSR republics. It is no accident that the USA has not recognized Soviet Latvia for 48 years now.

It is also true that there are still many former factory owners, major landowners, policemen and bandit accomplices from pre-war times still living in the republic who console themselves with the hope of a return to the old order.

We can also agree fully with the fact that under conditions of democratization and glasnost there are some who place their own ambitions above the interests of the people. They like to shout. It does not matter about what. The main thing is that it be loud and attract public attention. It is also true that there are some whose heads are turned by adventuristic appeals.

However, we must also remember that the poisonous seeds of nationalism can sprout only when there is proper soil for them to grow. It is being provided by the mistakes in national, economic, social and demographic policy and by shortcomings in international education.

What Has Given Rise to Tension

The negative occurrences in inter-national relations have not emerged all of a sudden, but have been building up for years. A ruinous role here, undoubtedly, was played by the extensive path of economic development and by the residual principle in allocating funds for the development of the material base of the social-cultural sphere.

For example, in the 11th Five-Year Plan, only 4.4 percent of the volume of capital investments were allocated for social-cultural-domestic development at the

large "Alfa" industrial association in Riga. As a result, the production volume increased by 2.4 times in 5 years, but alas, the waiting lists for housing and for kindergarten spaces have not decreased. A similar picture may be observed also at many other enterprises. The poorly planned development of labor consumptive types of production has led to the situation whereby the increase in the republic's population due to the influx from outside its boundaries has outstripped its natural growth. In Riga alone, the number of urban residents has increased by 238,000 people in a quarter of a century due to migration. This means that during these years the waiting lists for housing have grown longer, consumer and transport services have deteriorated, and the problem of supplying Riga residents with food products and consumer goods has grown more acute. It is thus quite natural that the native residents, and not only they, have become dissatisfied. It is this dissatisfaction that some have tried to redirect into the channel of conflict.

If we think about it, we see that the problems which have arisen from these defects are not those of interrelation of peoples, but of the interrelations of republic and union departments. The union departments have become accustomed to increasing production wherever the social infrastructure is best developed. Not only Latvia, but other regions of the country have also suffered from such a departmental dictate, from the habit of extensive methods of industrial development. This was noted by many of the speakers at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. There is no excuse for those ministry leaders who try to pass off departmental interests as all-state interests.

Is our state, for example, interested in polluting the water basin in the region of the Yurmala all-union health resorts with the drainage from the Slokskiy Cellulose Paper Combine? Of course not. Yet the changeover of paper production to imported cellulose was not profitable for the USSR Ministry of the Forestry Industry. It reviewed the proposals of the Yurmalskiy gorispolkom for a long time and in doing so evoked the just indignation of the population.

Distortions in centralization of management have also played their role in the growth of negative sentiments. Up until recently, the republic organs could not decide even the simplest questions locally. The situation got to be ridiculous. Thus, Riga confectioners were forced to go to Moscow to coordinate the recipes for their new products. For some this fact may evoke a smile. Yet for others it gave reason to speak of the wounding of national pride and to express doubts as to the independence of the republic's government.

However, it would be incorrect to explain the dissatisfaction of the people merely by the shortcomings in the economic and social sphere. There are also other reasons for the nationalistic manifestations. Their roots must be sought in the historical path of formulation of Soviet Latvia. It turned out that the rapid growth of national

self awareness here, as in the other Prebaltic republics, occurred already after 1917. For two decades of the bourgeois regime, the ideology of nationalism was skillfully propagandized. Public opinion did not synonymously evaluate the events of 1939-1940 and the entry of the Red Army onto the territory of the Prebaltic states. The distortions allowed in the years of Stalin's personality cult, during the collectivization of the Latvian peasants, and the actions on administrative resettlement of significant groups of the population in 1941 and 1949, when many innocent people suffered, all dealt a great blow to international education.

Of course, in the post-war years much has been done in the sphere of international education of the workers. We need not look far to find examples of true internationalism. The population of Latvia holds fresh memories of the courage and heroism of the Soviet soldiers who brought them liberation from the fascist occupation. The Latvians saw how the emissaries of other peoples helped them to restore from ruin the cities and villages which had been destroyed by the war. Unfortunately, today the propagandists, in telling about those days, do not always do so convincingly.

We also cannot overlook the fact that the republic's achievements in economic construction have given rise to self complacency among the leadership cadres. The counteraction to ideological enemies has also been weakened. New generations entered life who were acquainted with the history of the struggle for Soviet power in the republic only through textbooks. And their quality left something to be desired. Some began to forget that our Soviet republic is still young, that the roots of nationalistic vestiges are still retained in it, and that they might grow. Even worse, at times even the ideological workers themselves unwittingly fanned national self-conceit when they became carried away with showing what the republic gives to the country, and not what it receives from the other fraternal peoples. Posted at the enterprises in the most visible place is a map showing where the finished products go. Yet not many people know where the raw goods, assemblies and materials come from. As a result, not everyone realizes the importance of our ties with the country's unified national economic complex.

We know that conflicts bearing national overtones most often occur in everyday life. They are caused, as a rule, by shortcomings in the economy and in the social sphere. Yet they are tied also with defects in the culture of inter-national communication. Here are some typical examples of the manifestations of everyday nationalism. Someone will accidentally step on someone else's foot in a crowded bus, and the whole bus hears the outcry: "All kinds of people have come here, there isn't even room to turn around". And in response there are no less "choice" complaints. Or, for example, a customer from the heartland will come into a Riga store and begin asking

something in Latvian, and the young salesgirl will blurt out: "What's the matter, don't you want to speak Russian?" Why, where else can he speak Latvian but in his own republic?

Often there are two opposite approaches which come into conflict in solving linguistic problems. The proponents of one are convinced that everyone who comes to live in the republic must immediately learn Latvian (not stopping to think if there are always necessary conditions for this). Others believe that they can easily get along without it, since they know Russian.

The resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference entitled "On International Relations" provides clear guidelines on this question. This resolution notes that we should create all conditions for the harmonic and natural development of national-Russian bilingualism, show more concern for the active functioning of the national languages in various spheres of state, public and cultural life, and encourage the study of the language whose name the republic bears by all citizens of other nationalities living on its territory, and primarily by children and young people.

The need for specifically such an approach to the problem is felt most acutely in polyclinics, in legal consultation, in domestic management, and in offices of various institutions where the public is received. People come here every day with their problems and concerns, and of course it is easier for them to talk in their own native language. And how can we imagine a confidential discussion between people of different nationalities if each of them has a fluent mastery of only one language. Even worse, a person will write a letter to a department in one language, and receives an answer in another. Here is lack of contact for you. Here is reason for one more national insult.

And if to such everyday conflicts we add a superficial approach to the propaganda of Leninist national policy, the definite distortions in the national make-up of the cadres, the "gaps" in history textbooks, the anniversary-decade approach to international education, then it becomes clear that the current exacerbation in international relations and the difficulties which have arisen from it are certainly not unfounded.

For Perestroika—Positive Potential of the National Factor

In the course of perestroika, under conditions of democratization and glasnost, not only individuals, but entire nations have begun to manifest greater social and political activity, to react more acutely to the shortcomings which have accumulated in our society. Naturally, each people is concerned primarily by those problems which have accumulated in its native region.

The desire of the workers, kolkhoz farmers, and intelligentsia of Soviet Latvia to bring about order at home as quickly as possible is quite understandable. This desire has turned into real actions directed toward solving numerous problems. Thus, at the demand of the community the decision was made to stop construction of the Daugavpils GES [hydroelectrical station], which threatened to significantly complicate the ecological situation in the Daugava River basin. At the initiative of writers, the Celebration of Languages has become a tradition.

The growth of national self awareness, the awakened social activity of the workers, and the involvement of the most varied strata of the population into the process of transformation—all this has led to the formation of a new mass socio-political organization in Latvia—the People's Front. It has taken on the responsibility of helping the party and Soviets in solving the most acute problems of life in the republic and accelerating perestroika.

We must say directly that among the announcements and actions of certain participants in the People's Front, especially on questions of national relations, we have occasion to encounter that which, mildly speaking, does not evoke general approval and gives rise to concern, particularly among the Russian speaking population. At times they give serious cause for reproach in their exchanges of nationalist outbursts.

The formation of the International Front is also in progress. This is a unique response reaction by that part of the population of Latvia whose interests have not been duly reflected in the make-up and program documents of the People's Front. It would probably be incorrect to counterpose one front to the other. The party committees are striving to bring the positions of the two movements closer together. Much here will be done already in the course of preparing for and conducting the forum of all peoples of the Latvian SSR, which is being planned for mid- December. The communists, who are present in the ranks of both fronts, are being called upon to play a major role in consolidating all healthy forces. In their actions they must proceed from the Leninist principles of internationalism.

This was particularly emphasized at the meeting of Politburo Member and CPSU Central Committee Secretary V. A. Medvedev with the party-economic aktiv of the Latvian SSR on 14 November 1988. The consolidation of public forces, he said, "is not a concession in someone's favor. It is necessary to all whose hearts bleed for perestroika, and who are not cunning in glorifying it".

It is very important that we give maximal involvement specifically to the positive potential of the national factor in the process of perestroika and in the revolutionary renovation of our society, and that the influence of its negative manifestations be reduced to a minimum.

Perestroika is undoubtedly an international matter. It cannot be achieved in only one republic. Here we need unity of effort. The greater the contribution each republic makes to the solution of common problems, the more quickly success will be achieved. And what people do not want to be in the front ranks of the fighters for a better future? What people do not want to prove in deed that they understand their responsibility for the fate of the country no worse than the others? This raises feelings of national dignity and national pride. Such feelings are inherent to all conscientious workers of Latvia. They help them to increase the republic's contribution to the development of the country's unified national-economic complex and to the resolution of such important social problems as the production of food products and consumer goods. The implementation of the republic integrated program "Kachestvo-90" [Quality-90] has been notably accelerated. Remembering that high quality is a matter not only of professional honor, but also of national pride, the republic's workers have created around 2,000 volunteer quality control groups at the enterprises, and are doing much to enhance the good name of the Latvian trademark. Thanks to their efforts, already 74 percent of the products subject to certification are marked with the Seal of Quality.

Understanding that the best manifestation of internationalism is a cause for the common good of all the Soviet people, the republic's labor collectives have begun paying greater attention to the discipline of contract deliveries. The orders of the union republics have been taken under special control and are fulfilled, as a rule, in first priority order. This has made it possible to notably improve the fulfillment of economic contract agreements.

The best forces of the Latvian people have actively included themselves in the struggle against the negative consequences of the stagnant period in the moral sphere, and in increasing the spiritual potential of the nation. All these are healthy manifestations of the national factor, which are making themselves known ever more strongly in the course of perestroika.

However, it would be incorrect to assume that the growth of national self awareness is occurring painlessly and only accelerates perestroika. There are cases when the national factor turns into national egoism and becomes an obstacle in the path of socio-economic development.

It is difficult to term constructive the actions of those people who, in their concern for environmental protection, speak out against the development of any new power sources in the republic. After all, today we receive almost half of the electrical power we need from neighboring republics. The proposal to transfer a number of chemical industry enterprises to other regions of the country also does not serve the cause of perestroika. Will they present a lesser danger to the environment there?

It is no secret to anyone that perestroika has awakened in people the desire to live better. Most of them understand very well that they can achieve this only through better work. However, there are also those who prefer simply to demand the best piece of the common pie for themselves. They interpret the principles of social justice in a rather one-sided manner and believe that the country owes them a great debt.

The reduction in the relative share of Latvians among the republic's population, the restricted sphere of application of the Latvian language, the deterioration of the ecological situation through the fault of a number of enterprises of union subordination have all instilled in the people a natural concern for the fate of their nation, and have even been interpreted as national insults. It is on these sentiments that various demagogues and extremists play.

In such a situation it is especially important not to allow the fanning of passions and the prevalence of emotions over reason. The republic's party organs are well aware of this fact. Eloquent testimony to this fact is the speech presented by B. K. Pugo at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, which stressed that it is the duty of communists to do everything possible to see that the national factor does not hinder, but rather accelerates perestroika. This concern permeates also the decisions of the Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum, which reviewed the state of inter-national relations and outlined ways for developing them and for improving international and patriotic education.

At the current stage of perestroika, the emphasis, as we know, must be placed on practical matters. Much is already being done in Latvia to solve the problems which have accumulated. The republic's Supreme Soviet has formed a permanent deputy commission on questions of inter-national relations. A sector on inter-national relations has also been created within the Latvian CP Central Committee. At the beginning of the current year, the Central Committee addressed a special letter to all the communists in the republic, in which it called upon them to redouble their contribution to the fulfillment of the integrated plan of measures for developing the patriotic and international education of the workers. This letter was discussed in all the primary party organizations, and made it possible to intensify their work in this important sector.

At the initiative of party and Soviet organs, a number of effective measures for improving the supply of food products to the population have been adopted. In three quarters of 1988, the market funds for meat and milk have increased by 4,900 and 5,000 tons, respectively. There have been 145 new sections opened in the shops for commission sale of farm produce. The production of locally-grown produce has increased in public catering.

Since the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, agriculture in Latvia has been given the main priority. The financial, material and labor resources at the disposal of the republic are being directed primarily to the farm. Many enterprises of union subordination have been involved in accelerating technical retooling of the processing sectors.

The program "Zhilishche-90" [Housing-90] has been developed and is being implemented. In 1987 the volume of housing construction increased by 10 percent. Expenditures for strengthening the material base of the social-cultural sphere have also increased.

A thorough study of the ecological situation has been conducted in Ventspils, Olayne, and Yurmala, and plans for its improvement have been developed. In Riga the construction of citywide purification structures has been significantly accelerated.

More attention is being given to the study of the history of the Latvian SSR in schools and other educational institutions. There are 35 more hours allocated to its study in the current school year than before. Special seminars on the study of the most complex periods have been organized for history teachers. A good basis for eliminating the "gaps" in history found in the textbooks has become the series of books which the "Avots" publishing house has timely released.

Latvian has currently been given the status of the state language. Its study has been significantly improved in many Russian-language schools. Latvian language days have become traditional in a number of schools, when the teachers and students speak primarily in Latvian. Hundreds of clubs have been formed at enterprises and institutions, including also in the Latvian CP Central Committee, where people voluntarily study the melodious language of Yan Raynis. Latvian television, which conducts open practice lessons, has become actively involved in teaching Latvian. A Latvian-Russian phrase book has been published in mass edition. For the first time, an instructional group for training professional translators of Latvian literature into the languages of the USSR peoples has been created at Latvian State University. The number of VUZ students studying to become Latvian language instructors has increased.

Leaders and party and trade union organizations at enterprises, in trade, consumer services, and public health institutions are devoting ever more attention to developing Latvian-Russian bilingualism. They believe with some justification that for workers who provide direct service to the public, a knowledge of both languages is an important element in their professional training. Funds are persistently sought out to provide moral and material incentive for workers in the sphere of services to voluntarily learn both languages.

The National Factor and Ideological Work

Much is new also in the approaches to the international and patriotic education of the workers, and particularly the youth. Here a great role is given to the school, where much is instilled in the views and in the convictions of the young person. Frankly speaking, the spirit of internationalism does not always reign in the extracurricular surroundings of the youth. Here he often comes in contact with people who perceive even ordinary everyday mishaps with a false sense of infringement upon their national interests. Their attitudes and unhealthy reasoning have a far from favorable effect on the youth. And who but a teacher can better notice a negative influence and dispell the confusion of the student? There are sufficient opportunities for this both during lessons and during extracurricular work.

Not only among youthful audiences, but also among adult listeners, more debates and "roundtable" discussions are being held instead of lectures on questions of national relations. In the labor collectives and at the place of residence, individual work is coming to replace the fascination with mass measures. Former Latvian Red infantrymen, party veterans, and internationalist soldiers returned from Afghanistan are being ever more widely involved in it. Meetings and frank discussions of the republic's leaders with various categories of people are also of great benefit. The people, as they say, get first-hand answers to the questions which concern them. Sociological public opinion studies are being conducted ever more broadly to study the problems of international relations. This topic occupies an ever greater place in the work of the republic's Center for the Study and Prediction of Public Opinion created under the Latvian CP Central Committee.

Considering the force of influence of the creative intelligentsia on the formulation of mass consciousness and culture of inter-national relations, the party organs are persistently developing work with the artist's unions. Measures have been taken to increase the party strata within them. Many creative workers have been given specific and crucial party assignments. For example, the well-known Latvian actor Girts Yakovlev has been elected member of the Riga party gorkom buro, while musicologist Arvid Bomiks has been elected member of the Kirov party raykom buro. The party organs have supported the constructive proposals of the creative intelligentsia for developing national culture.

This is far from a complete list of the measures which have been taken in the republic just recently for improving the culture of inter-national relations and developing international and patriotic education. Their effect could be much greater if all the party, Soviet and economic management cadres were better acquainted with the principles of Leninist national policy and consistently followed them in practice.

Nevertheless, we may often still find a secretary of a party organization who does not know specifically what the national make-up of his collective is, or who sees nothing wrong in the fact that all the managers in it are of one nationality. Some economic managers believe it to be practically the height of internationalism that they are not interested in the national profile of their subordinates. "The main thing is that they work well, and the rest does not concern us", they believe. I believe this position is incorrect. It is necessary to know and to take into consideration the national peculiarities of one's subordinates, to respect their traditions and customs. And every people has these. Perhaps today for a Russian it is not so important when his name-day is, but for Latvians this is one of the most respected holidays. They are even noted in the calendars. To overlook this means to insult the person.

Sometimes there is no clarity in questions of national policy, not only among the economic managers but also among certain ideological workers and propagandists. Their outdated theoretical baggage is clearly inadequate in the face of the emerging problems. Therefore, we may sometimes hear them espouse versions stating that internationalism and patriotism are incompatible, that true equal rights of languages may be ensured only by some inter-republic language, that under socialism there must be not only rapprochement, but even merging of nations.

Up until quite recently, the mass forms of political instruction did not give proper attention to the study of the theory and practice of national policy. For example, in the Latvian public universities the faculty of "Current questions of national relations and international education" up until quite recently accounted for only 0.3 percent of the overall number of auditors.

We will say openly that many scientists and theoreticians on the national question have not found themselves in a high position. The exacerbation of inter-national relations has evoked in them a certain confusion. It is difficult for practical workers to get clear answers from them on questions of where the national ends and the nationalistic begins, on when national pride grows into national conceit and egoism. Partially, of course, we can understand such difficulties. Nationalism knows how to very quickly adapt to the emerging situation, dressing itself in various disguises. In some cases it pretends to be a fighter for preserving the cultural heritage of the past, while in others it speculates on the problems of ecology.

Yet the director of the Latvian CP Central Committee Institute of Party History Lyubov Zilye is also correct in assuming that scientists still owe a great debt to party and Soviet workers. First of all, social scientists have overlooked the emergence and exacerbation of a number of problems in inter-national relations. Secondly, they are not yet ready to give substantiated recommendations for solving many questions. Recently this institute has

significantly increased its attention to national problems. A special sector has already been created here. Yet it is difficult for it to raise such a great number of topics by itself. The efforts of academic science are needed here.

The problems of inter-national relations are so complex and delicate that they cannot be dealt with at the dilettante level, especially if we speak of the theoretical substantiation of decisions which touch upon the interests of all the peoples of our country. Evidently the time is right for creating a special all-union institute which would study the peculiarities and interaction of the peoples of the Soviet Union. It would probably be expedient to resume publication of the all-union journal *ZHIZN Natsionalnostey* which was published in the 40's.

I believe that the recommendations of science will appear for tomorrow. Yet the answers to many acute questions are needed already today. They are needed by party workers and teachers, by lecturers and propagandists. They are needed to more convincingly explain to the people the essence of the processes going on in the development of nations, and to help direct the national factor toward the benefit of perestroika. Evidently the republic is acting correctly by not losing time in waiting, but seeking through its own efforts the answers to the emerging problems and developing the study of the theory and practice of Leninist national policy.

Thus, the House of Political Enlightenment under the Latvian CP Central Committee, together with the leading scientists of the republic, has developed a special program on this topic. It is already being studied by about 35,000 auditors within the system of party and mass political instruction. All the workers in public education are also undergoing a similar course. The republic's University of Marxism-Leninism is creating a one-year department for training propagandists on questions of inter-national relations. The lecturers of the "Znaniye" society have also intensified their work in this direction. Many republic VUZes have introduced a special course on "Development of inter-national relations in the USSR" in the current instructional year. The "Avots" publishing house is preparing the publication of a new edition of a terminological dictionary on questions of inter-national relations.

A Well Planned Conception Is Needed

Even a cursory analysis of the results and prospects of work on improving international and patriotic education testifies to the fact that Soviet Latvia has seriously tackled these most acute problems. The efforts of the party and Soviet workers, the propagandists and lecturers are beginning to pay off.

More and more people are beginning to realize that many questions cannot be resolved at a single stroke. For example, the influx of manpower into the republic, and

especially into Riga, which greatly concerns the native population, cannot be stopped by administrative means alone. People cannot be prohibited from striving to go where they believe life is better, and it is impossible to stop technical progress. Also, it demands new types of production and new specialists.

Yet undoubtedly it is possible to reduce the migration. Much has been done in the republic to accomplish this. At the initiative of the Riga gorispolkom, a fee has been introduced for each worker over an established limit who is invited to work at a Riga enterprise. The integrated program "Rekonstruktsiya-90" [Reconstruction-90] has been developed and is persistently being introduced in the city. This program makes it possible to significantly reduce the demand for labor resources. The decisive role in this must belong to scientific-technical progress and to a reduction of the portion of manual labor. The new concept for economic and social development of the republic worked out to the year 2005 provides for re-profiling a number of enterprises for the production of less labor- and material-consumptive products. Such measures are beneficial not only to the republic, but also to the entire country. Really, is it expedient to continue to increase in Latvia the capacities for spinning and weaving production, for which raw materials and manpower must be imported into the republic from afar?

There is one other sure means of reducing the above-norm influx of manpower from other regions into the enterprises and the sphere of services. This is to seek out labor resources in the republic itself. It would seem, what could be simpler? Invite the local residents and let them replenish the ranks of the working class. But this is not the case. The native population of Latvia (just like the residents of Moscow, Leningrad and other large cities) is in no hurry to occupy the vacant non-prestigious positions. Yet someone has to operate the machine tools, clean out the sewers, wash the dishes, and shovel coal into the furnaces. It is not for an easy life that managers must seek manpower from miles and miles away. So it happens that in some cities there are "limit" residents, and in others—"migrants".

The attitude toward both groups leaves something to be desired. Yet, in my opinion, those who willfully or unwittingly facilitate the expansion of such migration are the ones who are more deserving of the criticism. It is they who are responsible for having "lucrative" and "non-lucrative" types of work. It is managers who have little concern for improving the working conditions. Those parents and teachers who prepare children only for "clean" work, leaving the dirty work to "limit residents" and "migrants" also deserve reproach. We are speaking here not of some specific national self-conceit, but of an alarming phenomenon of all-union scope which must not only be studied, but also eradicated from our life through our common efforts.

If we analyze the other problems of inter-national relations more closely, we must inevitably come to the conclusion that their solution also requires the unification of effort of all USSR peoples, and of the central and

republic ministries and departments. Many such problems have emerged not due to violations of the principles of Leninist national policy, but because the changes taking place in the country were not given proper consideration in its implementation.

For example, before the system of training cadres for the backward regions operated toward the acceleration of their socio-economic development. Today it causes overproduction of specialists. The advantageous conditions for the socio-economic development of a number of regions which were created in the 20's-30's today give rise to many social and economic contradictions. I believe that we cannot consider to be normal the order under which the purchase prices for a kilogram of citrus fruit is several times higher than for a kilogram of potatoes, even though the labor expenditures are about the same in both cases. And how can we explain the fact that the farm labor wage in a number of the southern regions is significantly higher than in the Prebaltic?

Such facts lead to the conclusion that the time has come to perform significant correction of the purchase prices and the budget and tax policy. The fact that this work is lagging behind the changes taking place in the USSR is largely determined by the fact that for a long time we have had no working agency which dealt with questions of inter-national relations within the scope of the entire country and the regions, and bore responsibility for their resolution. There are many who deal with them. Yet, as we know, the child with 7 nannies is untended. I believe the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference "On Inter-National Relations" correctly states that we should review the question of forming a special state agency on the affairs of nationalities and national relations.

Evidently, the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and primarily its Council of Nationalities, requires significant changes. We need a well planned, clear conception for restructuring inter-national relations and a long-term integrated all-union program whose realization would help us strengthen the friendship of USSR peoples and utilize the national factor more effectively in the interests of general progress. It would be desirable to develop such a concept already in the course of preparing for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum coming up in mid-1989, at which questions of inter-national relations are to be reviewed.

History has shown that multinationality in our country is one of the sources of its strength, and we do not have the right to turn it into a source of weakness. The national factor will not begin to work in favor of perestroika by itself. Even the best planned measures will not yield an effect if they are not followed up by practical work, if people do not begin to feel their own personal responsibility for the fate not only of their kray and their people, but also of the entire country. It is important to clearly

understand the following: so as not to allow transformation of the national factor into a means of inhibition, we cannot place the interests of one nation above the interests of all the country's peoples.

Efforts to heat up hostilities between representatives of different nations and peoples would pose a threat to our perestroika. We cannot allow the actions of extremists of a nationalistic ilk to have free reign. It is vitally necessary to ensure support for perestroika on the part of all the peoples of the country, as well as their active participation—political and labor—in the solution of the problems of revolutionary renovation of our society.

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Criticism of Yedinstvo Evokes Sharp, Widespread Response

18000533a Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
15 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by G. Afanasyeva: "Review of Letters: Not Just Black and White..."; Visotskas article previously published in JPRS-UPA-89-010, 7 February 1989 pp 74-75]

[Text] It would be hard to think of any recent publication in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA on various aspects of social life in our republic that has not evoked a response from our readers. But the volume of mail generated by A. Visotskas' article "On Destruction of Unity Disguised by Proclamations of Unity," published on 1 December 1988, exceeded all expectations. Readers from literally every rayon in our republic responded to it, as well as readers from Kaliningrad Oblast, Leningrad, Latvia and even distant Bakhchisarayskiy Rayon.

Some people, for example the Sokolov family, the collective of Vilnius Standards Publishing House Printing Plant, A. Bekisheva, A. Vasilets and many others, completely reject the article, while others (Sh. Veliyev, B. Vorobey, F. Filkevich and Kalinichenko [sic]) disagree strongly with it. Some of our readers, for example V. Malyshev and R. Simovskiy, suggest that it should not have been published at all, while others like R. Samokhvalov feel that "the editors acted completely correctly in publishing various viewpoints on issues of great importance to the people of our republic, even 'angry' ones like A. Visotskas' article. For they help the attentive and thoughtful reader draw his or her own conclusions with regard to problems and, specifically, to determine who is who in the movements." There were also some completely unexpected responses. For example, a group of readers of various nationalities from the city of Druskininkay (V. Klimchuk, A. Gladinas, Ye. Kats and others) decided to join the Yedinstvo movement precisely because they read A. Visotskas' article, in order to "defend the movement against those who are striking blows against friendship among the peoples living in Lithuania."

Our newspaper's space is limited, so we cannot quote from or even list all the names of those who wrote in response to the article. Regardless of whether they agreed with A. Visotskas' opinion or not an overwhelming majority of the letter writers agreed that the tone in which he presented his polemical arguments was intolerable. Many people expressed puzzlement as to why the aforementioned author is so intolerant toward other people's opinions and does not want to distinguish any other colors besides black and white, why he must make accusations and paste labels on people.

"I think that the statements that the establishment of the Yedinstvo Socialist Movement for Restructuring was like a 'cold shower' for Visotskas and that, in his opinion, it 'evokes a strong sense of dissatisfaction' in everyone are exaggerated," writes V. Dorokhin, a worker from Kedaynyay. "For me personally this event prompted a slight sense of puzzlement. But there was nothing dramatic about it. Obviously it seemed to the people who created Yedinstvo that the program put forward by Sayudis was in some way unacceptable to them. Indeed, was there any need to ban and 'exclude'?" Incidentally, that is the way things have been done for decades, among other things using the practice of hiding behind principles and employing reasoning based on authoritative quotes."

"...In what way did Yedinstvo's declaration abundantly confirm the writer's 'worst fears'?"

"A. Visotskas also should probably not have armed himself with quotes and debatable historical analogies and then gone about pinning political labels on people right and left. He probably regards a lack of restraint as adherence to principle and is intentionally attempting to provoke rudeness in response. But for what purpose? Like it or not, the sense that one gets from the article is that 'whoever is not for us is against us.' Are we not aware that demands like that are an appeal for suppression of dissent, intolerance and dictatorship?"

"The point in the article with which I do agree is that the establishment of Yedinstvo was a hasty and shortsighted step which sows dissension among us over trivialities."

P. Melofey, a reader from Shalchininkay, writes: "A. Visotskas feels that no one needs the Yedinstvo movement, since Sayudis exists and has an exhaustive and constructive program, and he spares no epithets against those who agree with the establishment of Yedinstvo. Why? On the basis that the aforementioned program does not require 'anything fundamentally new.' In this respect the author is obviously at odds with Marxist-Leninist dialectics, which reject petrified phenomena and absolute truths in the development of society."

"I myself am not a member of either movement. Although I find Sayudis' economic program closer to my own views I am closer to Yedinstvo on nationalities issues. I cannot understand how the author of the article

can assert in all seriousness that anyone who is not a member of Sayudis is opposed to it... I also feel compelled to comment on the tone of the article. The ancients had a saying: 'Jupiter, you are angry; that means that you are wrong.'

The Klaipeda Yedinstvo group also responded to the article; V. Vetrov wrote a letter to the editor at their request. Responding to Visotskas' suggestion that "people of good will, those who do not regard Lithuania as an oblast of the Russian Federation, who do not think that Vilnius should be ceded to Poland or Klaipeda to Germany," should express their opinion, he writes, among other things, the following: "...we are in fact in favor of good will; we acknowledge the right of the Lithuanian people to control its own destiny; we feel that Klaipeda is a splendid city in Lithuania and we have also contributed our labor toward making that city a flourishing one."

"We cannot say and never have said that we have no points of agreement with Sayudis. We are prepared to work together on a basis of mutual respect in all things that contribute to the welfare of Lithuania as a Soviet republic. We support Sayudis' efforts toward a renaissance of the Lithuania nation and toward development of its culture and language, and even if we cannot always be active participants in this process ourselves we do observe it with understanding and sympathy."

"Yet now we see that although the movement's program asserts that it is in favor of pluralism the appearance of Yedinstvo on the scene was all that it took to make many people forget that section. Virtually every day we are accused in the press and on television of causing dissension and we cannot respond or explain our position to our opponents. Even the appeal to the people of Lithuania which was adopted at our first city conference was turned down by the party gorkom for publication in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KLAIPEDA."

"So far the persistent appeal by the Klaipeda Yedinstvo group to create an economic model for our city under conditions of cost-accounting and to project its development has not gained the support either of our 'city fathers' or of our Sayudis leaders. This disturbs us much more than any real or alleged differences of opinions with our city Sayudis group. We think that in the end we will find a common language. Assuming, of course, that articles similar to A. Visotskas' do not 'inflare passions.'"

In the opinion of V. Petrov, a reader from Panevezhis, an abundance of quotes from the classics most often is used to compensate for a lack of one's own ideas, and the unconcealed imitation which he noticed in the article "On the Destruction of Unity..." is substituted for the author's objective arguments in favor of his own conviction and faith in the truth. While declining to debate the objectives of the two social movements, he poses a legitimate question: "How did it come about that the

republic's communist party organization, trade union organization and Komsomol were not able to enter in a timely manner into a working dialogue with the growing movement for restructuring in order to come up with a unified program of action? What we have is something of a paradox: the goal and tasks are the same, but for some reason they are being approached by different routes."

It was Ye. Glavatskene, an author from Vilnius, who perhaps gave the fullest and most exhaustive answer to the many questions raised in Visotskas' article. "A. Visotskas writes that many questions arise unbidden which cause one to doubt the noble objectives of the Venibe- Yedinstvo-Yednost movement for restructuring. 'Why,' he says, 'bother to establish a new movement when Sayudis would be happy to welcome both Lithuanians and members of all the other nationalities living in Lithuania as members, when there are already Russians, Poles, Jews and members of other nationalities among the leaders of Sayudis?'"

This question was answered with extreme clarity by A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, in a televised speech on 19 November 1988. "The leaders of Sayudis," he stated, "have submitted a resolution and proposed fundamental changes in the current Constitution of Lithuania. What do these amendments signify? In practical terms they signify a confrontation with the existing USSR Constitution. On the other hand, from a legal standpoint that would signify Lithuania's de facto withdrawal from the USSR or noncompliance with the laws of the USSR."

"Incidentally, in his article A. Visotskas cannot resist the temptation to pin labels on people. He writes: 'It would be very interesting to watch them (i.e. Yedinstvo's supporters—editor's note) curse and gnash their teeth with rage... It is a pity some Lithuanian Stalinists have been found who are willing to 'save socialism' along with Yedinstvo.'"

"Evidently Comrade Visotskas feels that one movement has a monopoly on the right to exist. And he attempts to prop up this idea by quoting V. I. Lenin's work "On the Destruction of Unity Disguised by Appeals for Unity," which was written in 1914 and was devoted to the struggle against the liquidators and Trotskiyites who sought to divide the workers' movement in czarist Russia. This sort of artificial, mechanical grafting of a Leninist thesis onto an analysis of the present-day political situation in Soviet Lithuania is dogmatism at the very least."

"Pluralism of opinion and glasnost rest upon the ability of our republic's people to choose by democratic means the optimal way of restructuring socialist relationships without resorting to mutual accusations. The establishment of other informal associations on this basis is also possible; their methods and work style must simply further the cause of renewal of socialism and improvement of working people's living conditions."

"The activities of any movement should be examined dialectically. The service done by Sayudis was in being the first to prompt the Lithuanian CP Central Committee and the republic government to resolve urgent problems of restructuring, arouse and activate the people's creative forces and do a great deal in conjunction with party and state organs to renew life in Lithuania. On the other hand, it has attracted something of a train of stooges who operate on the principle that restructuring means 'reverse everything': withdraw from the USSR, reestablish a bourgeois system in Lithuania, etc."

I would like to conclude this review of letters by quoting from another article sent to our editorial office by A. Visotskas. Its title speaks for itself: "Two Views on Yedinstvo: Coincidence or Intentional Efforts To Neutralize Criticism?" In this article the author casts doubts on our editorial board's right to publish two opposing opinions regarding a social phenomenon. This tells him "something about the style of and tendencies in the editorial board's work."

"The juxtaposition of a very positive and a very negative opinion and the comparison between them will hopelessly confuse and knock off balance the uninformed reader. Thoughts descend of their own accord to the stereotypical level of thinking which says that this time, too, the truth must lie somewhere in the middle between these opposing viewpoints."

This so displeased the author that he simultaneously sent off a copy of the article to the LiSSR CP Central Committee and to another republic newspaper. Well, like they say, that is his right. However, we cannot agree with his attempt to monopolize the truth. Virtually everyone who writes to the newspaper thinks that he or she is in the right. We are going to take advantage of our editorial right to bring this discussion to a close on the basis of the fact that A. Visotskas' first article did, despite his apprehensions, reach the readers and was in no way adversely affected by its proximity to an article written by an author having a different point of view. Judging by the example presented by this article we see once again that aggressivity on one person's part provokes a no less fervent reaction from others. When that happens one cannot hear the two sides' arguments and what results is not the kind of constructive debate which brings forth truth. A discussion is transformed into a vicious circle which, as many times in the past, revolves around one dangerous point: "whoever is not with us is against us."

It was precisely for that reason that we have attempted to reflect the spectrum of our readers' opinions as fully as possible. But these are only opinions, because we selected from the great volume of mail letters by authors who avoided maximalist views that separate everything into black and white. Only by discerning all the shades and colors will we be able to overcome alienation and misunderstanding.

BSSR Officials Discuss Chernobyl's Aftermath
18000550 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 9 Feb 89 p 2

[Report on public meeting on 2 February with Belorussian SSR officials, reported by Yu. Bekhterev and Ye. Gorelik, BELTA correspondents, and M. Kuchko and N. Mikhalechik, ZVEZDA correspondents: "One Thousand Days After Chernobyl"]

[Text] Almost three years have passed since that April day when we became firmly aware of the bitter word, "Chernobyl". The explosion at the AES, like an x-ray, lighted up both some criminal negligence and our general lack of readiness for defense against the "peaceful atom" which had become disobedient, and revealed the unparalleled courage and staunchness of some, and the indifference and cowardice of others.... Need we repeat how greedily we kept trying, all this time, to grasp the meaning of the newspaper lines, how anxiously we scrutinized the close-ups of a newsreel, hoping to obtain answers to the questions that multiplied and grew like snowballs after the accident. The information, we will say honestly, was filled in. As happens in such cases, rumors and conjectures began to take over. They excited minds and hearts, and accumulated in the already heated atmosphere around Chernobyl.

To remove it and clarify the situation, on 2 February a public meeting was organized with the community, made up of a commission of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Buro and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers on eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. The interest which it aroused can be judged by this: long before it started, people began to gather at the entrance to the Palace of Culture of the Belorussian Council of Trade Unions.

The accustomed presidium was not on the stage, but for the first time there were published maps of the radiation contamination for the rayons of the republic. There were microphones installed not only on the stage, but also on the mezzanine and in the balconies: you could go up to them, ask questions and object.

In opening the meeting, V.G. Yevtukh, chairman of the commission, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, emphasized the fact that the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the republic's Council of Ministers felt it necessary to inform the public about the work of the commission, and on what measures were being taken to protect the health of the people and safe residence in the rayons that had suffered.

"I should like to note," he said further, "that from the moment of the accident the problems of eliminating its consequences and ensuring the safety of the population have been the constant focus of attention of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the government of the republic. N.N. Slyunkov, former first secretary of the

Belorussian CP Central Committee, is actively concerned with them. From the first days after the accident, he went out to the rayons that had suffered and took efficient measures on the spot to give party assistance to the local party and Soviet organs in normalizing the situation. He directly guided the strategy for combating the calamity that our people had suffered."

Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, G.S. Tarazezich, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, and M.V. Kovalev, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, the directors of the republic, are paying fixed attention to this problem today.

To coordinate the activity of the republic ministries, departments and organizations, a commission of Belorussian CP Central Committee Buro and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers was created, including the secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, three deputy chairmen of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, and directors of the interested ministries, departments and oblispolkoms.

In the first few days after the accident, extreme measures were taken, and evacuation of the 11,400 inhabitants from the 50 population centers of the 30-kilometer zone of the AES was completed as early as 5 May 1986. Then, as the radiation situation changed, the need arose for evacuation of an additional 6000 inhabitants from 28 villages (in June 1986) and another 7300 persons from 29 population points (in August-September 1986).

All the evacuees were immediately given temporary housing, and the able-bodied, in addition—work.

Some 170 new, well-appointed rural settlements were created in the territory of Gomel Oblast, outside the limits of the radioactive contamination zone, where 9770 apartments were constructed in country-type houses with outbuildings.

In the middle of May 1986, on the territory of 11 rayons in Gomel Oblast and 6 rayons in Mogilev Oblast, a zone of radioactive contamination with cesium-137, with a contamination density of 15 Curie units and more per square kilometer, was discovered, in which 415 population centers with over 100,000 inhabitants were located.

In these population centers a great deal of work will be done to decontaminate all the housing, public, administrative and farm buildings. A great amount of work is being done for public service and amenities, in order to create normal living conditions and carry out a set of land improvement and agrochemical measures.

Over 140,000 children, students and pregnant women yearly undergo health treatment in sanatoriums, rest homes and pioneer camps, for which 30 million rubles a year is spent.

Delivery of clean food products was organized for the people in rayons that proved to be in the zone of radioactive contamination.

A scientific software system was set up for problems related to eliminating the consequences of the accident on the territory of the republic. General direction was entrusted to the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, within which a special Institute of Radiobiology was formed. In addition to this institute on radiation subjects, 19 other academic institutes are in operation. An Institute of Medical Radiology with a polyclinic was created within the system of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health. The Sanatorium of Main Administration No 4 of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health at Aksakovshchina was turned over to house it. A Belorussian branch of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Radiology was opened in Gomel. Divisions of radiation monitoring were organized at all 10 scientific research institutes of the Belorussian SSR Gosagroprom [State Agro-Industrial Committee].

Because of all the work done to eliminate the consequences of the calamity, not a single case of a health violation for people, caused by radiation factors, was permitted. The total dose of irradiation for people in the years that have passed does not exceed the established norms.

At the same time, the situation in the zones contaminated by radionuclides, as before, requires steady attention, both along the line of republic and local organs and on the part of union ministries and departments. Not long ago the directors of the republic made an appeal with a letter addressed to M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. We are sincerely grateful to the CPSU Central Committee for their constant attention to our problem, and for the positive evaluation given by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee of the work done in the republic and the concern shown for the Belorussian people, which was reflected in the resolution adopted.

This year already, 243 million rubles of state centralized capital investments and the necessary material-technical resources have been allotted for the express intention of eliminating the consequences of the accident. The total amount of these resources for the four years since the accident is about 1.15 billion rubles. The problem of additional supply this year has been solved for Mogilev and Gomel oblasts with 110,000 square meters of factory manufactured homes, a large quantity of pipes, petroleum bitumen, cable products, equipment and other material resources sent from other regions of the country.

We have not yet fully succeeded in solving problems along the line of the USSR Gosagroprom and particularly, those connected with allotting the necessary capital

investments to construct livestock breeding and other production facilities to replace those left in the confiscated and depopulated zones. We should intensify work in this direction.

A great deal of work must be done for additional resettling of people living in those population centers which cannot ensure staying within the maximum permissible irradiation dose, recently established in our country, of the 35 roentgen equivalents which a person can receive in his lifetime. Incidentally, this dose meets international norms.

In connection with this, I should like to emphasize the fact that this by no means indicates that we permitted any errors or omissions earlier. I wish to repeat—in the last three years, no exceeding of the maximum irradiation doses established through the years has been permitted. It is now a question of not permitting the lifetime human doses that we first established to be exceeded. Here the situation must also be borne in mind: people from some small population centers with decrepit houses will resettle into new, well-appointed houses, built on clean territory, for the reason that the expenditures for this are considerably less than the resources that would be required to put the old ones in order.

Are We Safeguarding the Health of the People?

The Opinion of a Specialist

V.N. Buryak, Belorussian SSR deputy minister of Health, chief State Sanitation Physician of the Belorussian SSR:

Let us begin with the figures. Over 520,000 persons living in the republic were exposed to radionuclides with a varying level of contamination. You will agree that the situation that has formed is not a simple one, and required from doctors a concentration of efforts, coordinating the action of all the services and determination of the priority directions in safeguarding the health of the people. Today, three stages can be singled out, according to the time of their implementation.

The first—is the stage of extreme measures, determined by the limits of the predicted doses through external radiation and irradiation of the thyroid gland in children. It is precisely on the basis of the possible exceeding of the safe limits of irradiation that, soon after the accident, the decision was made to evacuate the people and give a preventive dose of iodine preparations.

The second—is the stage of restrictions and monitoring of living conditions. It is urgent even today for a large number of population centers where, as has already been mentioned, over 100,000 people are living. The criteria on which we judge living to be hazardous consist of two indicators: the density of the soil contaminated with

radionuclides and the yearly maximum dose of irradiation. We will recall that for cesium-137, the most widespread in the republic, they are 15 Curie units per square kilometer and 10 roentgen equivalents for the first year after the accident, 3—for the second and 2.5 roentgen units each for the third and fourth year.

The general efforts of all those participating in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the first stages proved to be quite efficient: none of the inhabitants evacuated received the maximum dose of 75 roentgen units. The irradiation doses of the thyroid gland also proved to be lower by a factor of 5-20 than those anticipated. The total irradiation dose for the inhabitants of the zone being monitored in 1986-1988 was 9 roentgen units, and on the other territories—3.3 roentgen units, with a permissible limit of 15.5 roentgen units.

Several persons, true, exceeded this limit: 38 in Mogilev Oblast and 10 in Gomel. I will note that all of them were pensioners and elderly people, who openly ignored the recommendations not to use their own products and did not maintain the prescribed sanitary conditions.

On the whole we can safely state that we succeeded in safeguarding radiation safety for the people. This, incidentally, was also confirmed at the all-union conference in Kiev, in which many scientists from foreign countries participated. Last fall, the concept of safe living for the people on the territories contaminated with radionuclides was worked out, substantiated and confirmed. It is based on one criterion—the maximum dose for a lifetime—and consists, as has already been mentioned here, of 35 roentgen units for approximately 70 years. This value also includes the emergency dose. The concept stipulated returning to the accustomed life style and removing all restrictions on living conditions and use of local products.

Within the framework of this concept, a prediction was made of the doses for 70 years for each population center where a stable change in the radiation situation had been noted. For places where this level might exceed the maximum, a list of measurers for engineering and agro-technical decontamination was prepared. If these measures do not yield the necessary effect, the inhabitants will have to be evacuated to safe places. That is precisely the reason that in the next two years it is planned to move away the inhabitants of approximately 20 population centers. About 3000 persons are presently living in them.

In a few dozen more villages, additional inspections are to be made this year, and a specific decision will be made according to their results. As for the rest of the villages in the stricken rayons, all the restrictions there can be removed, since the predicted lifetime dose here is less than 35 roentgen units.

I shall speak now in more detail on the greatest worry of the republic's population today: the state of health of the people and the possible increase in the number of illnesses. On the basis of recommendations and documents of the International Committee on Radiation Protection, we predicted the morbidity in consideration of the late somatic, genetic effects or oncological risk. Calculations show that, for example, the additional number of cases of oncological sickness will not exceed 0.5 percent of today's level. It should be noted that with the present growth rate of spontaneous cancer disease in the republic, which is 3-5 percent a year, even statistically it will not be possible to establish this addition. The evaluation of the genetic risk is analogous: it exists of course, but its value too can hardly be detected.

A few words on the state of health of the population of Gomel and Mogilev oblasts. The structure of general morbidity in them last year did not change. The level of infant mortality in the last three years has a stable trend toward reduction, including that in the stricken areas. The increase in those suffering from malignant tumors here is also no different from the level formed.

Today it is possible to speak of certain progress in providing the stricken areas with a sufficient quantity of medical workers. Over 600 physicians and 1687 intermediate medical workers were sent here in 1987. This year, in the distribution of graduates from medical teaching institutions, over 2000 additional medical workers with higher and secondary qualifications were sent. The purposeful acceptance of entrants from Gomel and Mogilev oblasts to medical VUZ's and schools has been expanded, training of paramedics and laboratory assistants, dental technicians and physicians has been organized at schools in Gomel and Mogilev oblasts.

Still, it must be said, that these regions are not fully provided with medical personnel. We cannot, unfortunately, satisfy their demands for medications, medical materials and equipment. The funds allotted to the republic for them is still clearly insufficient.

[Question] Many medical workers have left the radiation zone. Does this not indicate that specialists who really know the situation well, do not want to risk their health and stick their head in a noose

[V. Buryak] Physicians really know the situation well enough, and therefore many of them have gone to work in the zone without any hesitation. At the beginning of this year, in all the rayons except for Krasnopol'skiy and Vetkovskiy, the number of personnel has been re-established. In addition, some medical personnel who went away "from the radiation" in 1986, have now returned to their hospitals.

[Question] The number of sick people in Khoynikskiy Rayon has risen sharply. The otolaryngological division of the local hospital has had to expand five-fold, and still does not have enough beds. What can you say about this?

[V. Buryak] The number of acute respiratory ailments has increased, not only in Khoynikskiy Rayon. Remember, though: last year an influenza epidemic rolled through the republic. Up until then, we had somehow been spared from this disease for about four years. The increase in the sickness rate, paradoxical as it may be, also called for the best work of the medical personnel. The first stage of the dispensary system always leads to a rise in these indicators. This is a general conformity to principle, in no way related to the radiation situation. The point here lies in something different. Many chronically ill people, who had not once turned to a physician (some of them even boast: "I went through the flu on my feet"), have now been put under supervision. Here you have an improvement in medical service and deterioration in statistics. There were cases of acute respiratory illnesses even among children who were taken away to pioneer camps in other oblasts. I would not take the liberty of blaming radiation for this, however. Parents whose children go to kindergarten well know that the little ones always become sick first. Some sort of period of adaptation must be undergone, until the organism adjusts to the new conditions.

I do not want to deceive anyone and state that in general we have no basis for worry. Recent studies of students have revealed preclinical health disturbances in some groups of the population. Fortunately, they are not so great that they fail to be compensated for and thus cause diseases. The most serious studies in this field are continuing, and these directions in medicine, just as child hematology and endocrinology, are being developed very actively in the republic.

At the same time, and I emphasize this once again, there were and are no outbreaks of sickness. Here are the official data: the level of temporary inability to work in 1988 increased by approximately 8 percent: the influenza epidemic had its effect, as well as the increase in leaves of absence to care for sick children.

[Question] At children's preschool institutions in the stricken rayons, they are still making soups using marrow broth. Is this not dangerous?

[V. Buryak] We have made special studies. It turned out that in boiling, only hundredths of the percent of strontium contained in bones pass into the broth. There is no health hazard in this.

[Question] To what was the recent ban against giving children vegetables related?

[V. Buryak] Not to radiation. It has already been precisely established that even on the most contaminated lands, the vegetables are growing clean. The autumn ban against giving vegetables to small children in kindergarten was connected to the threat of infectious disease which arose during that period.

[Question] Why do you name only Union norms for the permissible radiation contamination of food products and not mention analogous norms in other countries?

[V. Buryak] I can inform you that the absolute majority of our norms do not exceed the existing parameters adopted in other countries of the world, and by MAG-ATE [IAEA] and the Scientific Committee on the Effect of Nuclear Radiation for the UN.

[Question] When can the inhabitants of the republic obtain individual dosimeters to use at their own discretion?

[V. Buryak] We need individual dosimeters today not so much from the medical, as from the psychological standpoint, as one more measure capable of dispelling people's doubts and keeping them calm. Where there is a real risk of the population's receiving increased doses of irradiation, the medical institutions carry out tests constantly. Many lumbermen, machine operators and livestock breeders have individual dosimeters, in addition to which they are regularly checked at radiological laboratories equipped with the most precise instruments.

If someone wishes to check his health, I can give an address where he can undergo a full course of testing: Minsk, Institute of Radiation Medicine, Krasnoarmeyskaya Street, 15.

[Question] What is the total amount of money allotted by the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers directly for health needs connected with Chernobyl?

[V. Buryak] The Ministry of Health has received approximately five million additional rubles to increase health payments to medical workers. I will add, that we are not at this time involved in any restrictions in wages. If a specialist comes to the stricken areas, we are always ready to assign him a wage rate. About five million rubles have been used to purchase equipment. In addition, industrial enterprises transferred about seven million rubles in five categories of currency to us for equipment. About 152 million rubles were allotted for construction and development of the material-technical base. Unfortunately, the construction workers did not succeed in utilizing all the funds.

[Question] Why was the May Day demonstration not forbidden in Minsk in 1986?

[V. Buryak] Although the radiation situation in Minsk actually changed somewhat after the Chernobyl accident, the levels of the gamma background presented no danger. Therefore, there was no need to postpone the demonstration. In a word, rumors concerning the fact that on 1 May 1986 the demonstrators were under a radioactive rainfall are simply absurd. We checked with meteorologists, and there was no rain in Minsk on that

day. The radioactivity of the precipitation, even in the first few days after the accident, were negligibly higher, and represented no danger to the people's health.

Is Radiation Yielding Its Position?

The Opinion of a Specialist

Yu. M. Pokumeyko, chief of Belgidromet

Before the accident, inspections of the radiation levels were made once a week at all the meteorological stations of the republic at the same time. Early in May, a center for radiation-ecological control was organized—laboratories which regularly took samples of the air, soil, water and bottom deposits—and gamma-photographs were made of the locality by airplanes and helicopters. An automated telemetering system was installed in a 30-kilometer zone, which made it possible to obtain information on the levels of gamma-radiation, air temperature, amount of liquid precipitation and wind parameters.

The main zones of contamination had been intensively studied by September 1986. It was possible to determine their boundaries and to draw them on a map. The picture proved to be very spotty. Two main "patches" were clearly established: the southern—the south of Gomel Oblast and the northern—the north of Gomel and south of Mogilev oblasts. The first patch was characterized by high levels of gamma-radiation in the first few days after the accident, through fallout of the short-lived iodine-131 radionuclides. In addition, isotopes of cesium-137 were detected here, and on the boundaries of the 30-kilometer zone—strontium-90 and plutonium—239-240. Inhabitants of the population centers that had been subjected to strong contamination were resettled, and others went to a constant-monitoring zone.

The northern patch was formed through fallout, mainly of cesium-137 radionuclides, with the rains. The level of gamma-radiation here did not rise to dangerous limits, and therefore there was no need for immediate resettling of the people. Many population centers, however, are in a constant-monitoring zone.

Precise determination of the situation continued. Over 2000 population centers were thoroughly examined, and as a result, a map of the radioactive contamination of the entire territory of the republic was compiled. Incidentally, it was impossible to publish these maps until all the data was in. Thus, about 18 percent of the republic territory was subjected to contamination. There are 415 population centers in the constant-monitoring zone.

Today, as the result of the decay of the short-lived radionuclides and decontamination, the dose rates of gamma-irradiation have been greatly reduced. At the same time, the natural burying of radionuclides is taking place very slowly: in the first years, 80-90 percent of them were held in the upper five-centimeter layer of soil.

In ten years, according to our calculations, the radionuclides could lower to a depth of 10-20 centimeters. We are transmitting data on the radionuclide situation to interested organizations.

A.L. Grishagin, chief of staff of Belorussian SSR Civil Defense:

[A.L. Grishagin] Before the accident we had largely instructed the people on how to organize evacuation to cities in the rural area. In practice, we had to carry out the removal from the rural areas. In addition, the administrative organs and civil defense subdivisions proved to be poorly trained. All the same, the confusion of the first few days quickly passed, and the actual attack on the radiation had already begun in May. In 1986, some 246 population centers in Gomel and 20 in Mogilev oblasts had been decontaminated. In the next two years, 432 population centers were decontaminated. In addition to the civil defense subdivisions, representatives of over ten ministries and departments worked on decontamination and public services and amenities for the villages. It is simply impossible to enumerate everything that they did. One thing I can say for certain: after all the work was completed, the gamma-background was reduced by a factor of 2-3 and the density of contamination with cesium-137 was lowered several-fold.

[Question] How is the level of radioactivity now being monitored?

[Yu. Pokumeyko] The quick-analysis system, in effect throughout the territory of the republic, sets the daily level of radiation. In addition, twice a year we make a comprehensive examination and determine the density of radionuclide contamination of the soil. While the first time we experienced many difficulties because of the shortage of and imperfections in the diagnostic apparatus, today all the laboratories, both in the center and in the outlying regions, are equipped with modern instruments, reacting to the slightest change in the radiation background.

[Question] Why has construction not been completed on centers for special processing of motor transport and equipment at Bragin and Narovl?

[A. Grishagin] The decision on constructing these centers was made in the initial period, when a great deal of equipment and transport was drawn from other rayons and oblasts to eliminate the consequences of the accident. This zone now contains mainly equipment from the local kolkhozes, sovkhoses and organizations. Because of this, it was decided to create internal decontamination centers at all the machine yards in the constant monitoring zone. The uncompleted facilities should be equipped as technical service stations for motor vehicles.

[Question] Many civil defense subdivisions have been equipped with dosimeters, but immediately after the accident they were removed for some reason.

[A. Grishagin] This was not done in order to conceal the irradiation doses obtained. The dosimeters removed were for military purposes, calculated for work under radiation conditions with an intensity of over 2 roentgens an hour. For us, however, the count was made for tenths and hundredths of a roentgen. This required completely different, much more "precise" instruments. All interested organizations now have these, by the way, and no secret is made of their readings.

[Comment] I am deeply convinced: it is civil defense that is to blame for the fact that our people proved to be unprepared for an encounter with radiation. Apparently, it is time for us to restructure the methodology and practical work of instruction and to put it on a practical course. Only in this event will there be any benefit from the knowledge.

[Question] Do you know how many people are today living "beyond the pale"—in the 30-kilometer zone?

[A. Grishagin] Some 104 people are living in Braginskiy Rayon in the village of Sobol, 78—in Savichi, and 18—in Krasnaya Gora. All of these people settled in voluntarily. Only, these villages are not "beyond the pale," but "in front of the pale," and moreover, several tens of kilometers away. No one is living in the actual zone of "alienation."

[Question] How will civil defense be occupied this year?

[A. Grishagin] Additional decontamination work is to be done at 415 population centers in the zone of constant monitoring.

[Question] Is there any danger of the radiation zones expanding?

[V. Yevtukh] Essentially—no, but all the same, a unique redistribution (by the wind, let us say) of radionuclides cannot be ruled out. Therefore we have also created an expensive, multi-stage monitoring system, in order to have constant exhaustive information on the radiation situation on the entire territory of the republic and, if necessary, to take efficient measures.

Is There "Clean" Grain in the "Contaminated" Zone?

In the Opinion of a Specialist

Yu. M. Khusainov, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Gosagroprom:

To live or not to live on the wounded land? Does the answer to this question depend not only on whether we are protected from radiation, and "wash" the dangerous

dust from houses and roads? Who needs these houses, if a person cannot lay his hands on anything? Therefore, a few days after the accident, the republic Gosagroprom began to work out a concept of conduct for agricultural production in a contaminated locality. Today its basic premises have been quite clearly outlined. In conjunction with the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health and an interdepartmental committee of scientific radiology experts, we have sent appropriate recommendations to the farmers three times. By following them, feed and grain can be grown on practically the entire territory of the republic, and livestock breeding products can be obtained with a radionuclide contamination level not exceeding the norms. What sort of recommendations are these?

On the basis of over 40,000 analyses of the soil from 5 million measurements of the radiation product, detailed maps were compiled of the contamination of the soil surface at each farm and rayon. It became clear where, and which crops could be raised. For example, on the basis of a three-year observation we were convinced that grain crops need not fear fields with a contamination density of up to 40 Curie units per square kilometer, potatoes—50, rape seed—up to 20, clover and vetch—up to 10 curies on water-logged and up to 20-30 curies on automorphic soils. Hay from natural feed harvests, particularly on water-logged soils, can be procured, if there are not over 2 curies. It turns out that it is only necessary to select correctly the fields for each crop, and the product will be clean. Where it is impossible to grow such a product—in the zone with a contamination density of over 80 curies per square kilometer—all production is in general curtailed, and these sections will be planted with forest.

Can a clean product in practice be obtained from a "contaminated" field? Here are the figures. In 1986 over 5.3 percent of the feed procured failed the examination for radioactivity, in 1987, 2.8 percent of it, and last year—1.6 percent. The dynamics for grain are analogous. As you can see, the people have learned to work under the most complex conditions.

Now about meat. We obtain clean pork practically everywhere. Unfortunately, beef and milk "absorb" radiation more actively. Many people know about this and are afraid in advance. I wish to read from a letter which came to Gosagroprom. The comrade writes that they sent a consignment of beef from their farm to a meat combine. At first it was not accepted, and was returned. A month later they sent these animals off and they were turned over without any complications. What sort of control is this, the authors ask indignantly. Meanwhile, it is all very simple—cesium 134 and cesium 137 are biologically very mobile radionuclides. By replacing rations that include contaminated fodder, the nuclides are carried off from the body of the beef cattle in two or three months. The government of the republic

allotted, especially for 1989, 274 thousand tons of concentrated fodders to kolkhozes and sovkhozes in Gomel and Mogilev oblasts, in order to organize final fattening there and obtain a "clean" product.

This means that the "contaminated" land is not infertile. It can feed people if, of course, the farmers use it competently.

A few words on the product quality control. Today, in each rayon in Gomel and Mogilev oblasts, as well as in individual rayons of Brest, Minsk and Vitebsk oblasts, 393 radiological laboratories have been set up, including 124 veterinarian, 60 agrochemical, 24 at meat combines, 93 at processing enterprises, 58 at food enterprises and 34 at fruit and vegetable enterprises. Every farm located in a zone of contamination of over 15 curies per square kilometer has its own dosimetric posts. A total of 356 such posts is in operation at kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

Depending on the extent of radiation contamination, each republic is divided into three zones: "clean," "monitored periodically," and a "restricted" zone, or, as it is called, of "constant monitoring." There is occasional radiation monitoring in the "clean" zone. In the second zone—selective monitoring. In the third zone all the products are monitored—it is carried out both at the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and at individual subsidiary farms. All the laboratories are well equipped. Today we have over 16,000 different instruments, amounting to a total sum of over 9 million rubles. The system created ensures reliable monitoring of the product quality.

[Question] You said that a small percentage of the products is contaminated. Where, in this case, are the radioactive meat and milk used?

[Yu. Khusainov] Most of the contaminated products were obtained in 1986. Of 28,000 tons of this meat, which passed through the meat combines, 3900 tons were buried, 5000 tons were used to prepare dry feed, and 15,000 tons were exported for this purpose to other regions of the country. Some 400 tons were sent to fatten up fur bearing animals. The rest is so far in storage. When construction of a grave in the Chernobyl area is completed, all of this meat will be buried there. The possibility is not ruled out that individual batches of this meat, for example, in case of the enforced emergency slaughter of cattle, still remain radioactive. They are proposed for processing at a special unit for radionuclide decontamination, which is now being tested. The meat decontaminated by this method will be fully suitable for preparation of dry feed—for cattle.

The situation with milk is analogous. Technology making it possible to obtain a product safe for human health from contaminated milk has been processed and tested. If, we assume, the contamination of whole milk is taken as 100 percent, skimmed milk will have 90 percent, and the cream and sour cream with 20

fat—70, butter—15 percent, and milk fat—0.6 percent. By using the property of the fat that does not retain radionuclides, we process all the contaminated milk into butter that meets the sanitation norms. An experimental unit is being tested today that fully inhibits radionuclides, which may also be used for cattle fodder. The contaminated remainder—the sorbent—can easily be buried.

[Question] Why are plans to sell agricultural products not taken away from farms located in the constant monitoring zone? After all, it is practically impossible to obtain really clean output there.

[Yu. Khusainov] Nothing is being grown where the contamination level is too high. For example, in Gomel Oblast alone, buckwheat crops have been reduced by 8000 hectares. The plot of legumes, potatoes and vegetables has been cut down considerably, and sheep farms have been eliminated. But tell us, if people are permitted to live, how does one forbid them to work: to grow grain, mow hay and tend livestock? This work will not be in vain. Fulfillment of the recommendations of which I have already spoken guarantees obtaining a safe product.

[Question] These products will, after all, be very expensive. Perhaps it would be more economically advantageous to redistribute funds to grow products on clean land?

[Yu. Khusainov] This is a very complex question, and in the present situation it can hardly be answered unequivocally. Of course, such calculations will be made, and farm specialization will not remain unchanged. Where, however, it touches on the interests of the people, bare rubles cannot be the only counselor. Many peasants do not want to abandon their homes, and it is impossible not to take their wishes into consideration.

[Question] Why can you not find out the extent of contamination of dairy products and meat on the labels? Why do some stores sell meat in packets and, alongside—by weight?

[Yu. Khusainov] Because the product with the content of radioactive substances above the norm is not put out for sale, and there is simply no need for additional markings. Everything that lies on the counters is clean. We cannot repackage an entire product simply because there is not enough packaging equipment and material.

[Question] This is the third year that talk has been going on concerning the fact that equipment with hermetically sealed cabs is needed for field work in the zone, but so far it is not there. When will it finally come?

[Yu. Khusainov] Gosagroprom and the republic government have several times appealed to the union ministries with a request to help in making the work of the machine operator safer. The high offices do not stint on promises, but so far there is no sign of actual assistance. In three

years only 825 cabs have been obtained, which is several times less than needed. Indeed, those are without air conditioners. Even the Minsk Tractor Plant can in no way set up series output of the protective equipment.

[Question] The most contaminated milk of all comes from privately owned cows. It is clear: where can a peasant get clean hay? Fodder is still being taken to the farms from other oblasts, and animals from the home-steads eat only what grows in the field beyond the outskirts.

[Yu. Khusainov] Every year we send 3-4000 tons of hay to the stricken rayons for the privately owned herd. This is, of course, not very much. We need to prepare clean fodder at the site, and to allot safe pastures. It is not for nothing that at the stricken farms, hundreds of hectares of swampy land have been dried out, and the fields are well supplemented with mineral fertilizers. If, however, suitable areas are still not found—you can do nothing, and must give up the cows.

[Question] I heard that when Moscow specialists go to the stricken areas, they take their own food products. What do you do?

[Yu. Khusainov] I have often been and will again be in those areas. I always eat just what the local population does. I take no "spares in a container" with me.

[Question] Is it true that the government agreed to bury the radioactive wastes from the AES on the republic's territory?

[V. Yevtukh] This is an illusion. I must categorically state: the government gave no such permission. These rumors are started by dishonorable people and are calculated for the inhabitant. There are no storehouses of radioactive wastes on the territory of the republic and no one is planning to construct them here.

[Question] The first scientific recommendations for performing agricultural work were given as early as the summer of 1986. Have they changed in consideration of the experience accumulated?

[Yu. Khusainov] In the three years, Gosagroprom has revised the recommendations for performing agricultural work in contaminated areas three times. Each new variant differed qualitatively from the preceding one. Above all, the radiation norms were made stricter. Some of them, particularly on drinking water and milk, were reduced by a factor of 10 and even 100.

Will We Lay Asphalt in the Area?

The Opinion of a Specialist

V.F. Smirnov, deputy minister of the Belorussian SSR Housing-Municipal Operations:

I shall probably not err against the truth if I say that in the early days, the fate of the stricken rayons was decided—earthenware pots. The radioactive houses could be decontaminated or removed, and new ones built, the roads asphalted, the soil—stripped. The clean products could even be sent to the stores. The people should have found clean water there, however, on the spot. That is why in the first months after the accident over 3000 wells were decontaminated. Where the open water appeared hazardous for sick people—in Bragin, Khoyniki and Narovl—by May 30, 11 additional artesian wells were included in the city network. A plant to remove iron at the city water intake in Khoyniki was put into operation. A particularly complex situation formed in Gomel, where after all, half the city drank the Sozh. In an unprecedentedly short time, a new artesian water intake and water pipeline networks were built, which made it possible to transfer the city fully to underground water supply sources. Additional water intakes were built at other population centers, and now the people can drink water with complete calm on all the contaminated territory.

The question may arise: what will happen to the contaminated water? Quite a bit of it actually remains after the deactivation of structures, roads and equipment. I can inform you that, in conjunction with the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, our specialists tested an electrocoagulation unit for radionuclide decontamination of water. An analogous test-experimental unit is already in operation at Khoyniki.

[Question] Peasants in Bragin and Khoyniki are not permitted to eat their own products. What can one buy in the stores there?

[G.Z. Grishchenkov] The population of the stricken villages and settlements are provided with an estimated 180 grams of meat per person per day. We are trying to keep the stores here from having irregularities in the supply of milk, groats and other products. True, it does happen that the store counters are empty. The reason is—the lack of transport. There is a particular shortage of refrigerator storage. We send almost the entire available republic specialized transport to the stricken rayons, and indeed, there are not many of these. All the same, this year the shortage of motor transport should be eliminated.

[Question] You said that the inhabitants of the stricken rayons are issued meat, estimated at 180 grams per day, at state prices. I live in Khoyniki and I see no products in the store other than cooperative products. There is even a shortage of eggs and vegetables. Children's preschool institutions are obliged to purchase cooperative meat, because the state gives them none. Can you explain this situation?

[G. Grishchenkov] I can only repeat once again the figures already cited here. Belkoopsoyuz cannot answer for the distribution of products—that is the affair of the

local organs. Here is one more thing that must be taken into consideration: according to the norms that I have named, the inhabitants of only those villages and settlements located in the constant monitoring zone are provided for. All the other population centers are supplied according to the ordinary norms.

[Question] I am the chief sanitation physician of Slavgorodskiy Rayon. We have made calculations and feel that for normal supply for the people living in the zone of rigid control, the rayon needs 740 tons of meat. In 1988, 460 tons were obtained. The funds for 1989 have not increased. We cannot ensure full-valued nutrition even for pregnant women and children.

[G. Grishchenkov] To satisfy the demand of the population in the constant control zone of Slavgorodskiy Rayon would take 228 tons of meat products. This much is allotted, but allowing for the sale of approximately 92 kilograms of tinned meat per person per year. This year this indicator will be 100 kilograms.

[Question] "Clean" milk is sent to 34 population centers in Slavgorodskiy Rayon, but to 94, located in the zone—none.

[G. Grishchenkov] In reality, up to the second half of 1988, the Mogilev oblsposkom determined 34 population centers where dairy products had to be sent. The rayon potreboyuz organized the sending of clean dairy products to another 16 centers. So far we can do no more—we do not have enough transport. In this situation, the motor vehicles of local farms and organizations must be more widely utilized to transport products.

[Question] There are schools in which some students obtain free food, and others—none. The children do not understand and do not accept this division into those deserving a free meal and those not meriting it. Can you suggest how the teachers can explain the logic of this situation to the students intelligibly?

A. Fomich, chairman of the Belorussian SSR State Committee on Labor:

It is a familiar problem. It is stated correctly, for after all, we are dealing with children. The answer, unfortunately, is so far this: only students who come to a "clean" school from a "contaminated" village receive free food. It is within the competence of the Ministry of Finances and the USSR National Education Committee to change the situation. What sum the solution to this problem will run to is by no means a school task—so far it is not known. But it must be solved.

[Suggestion] The children are the wealth of the nation. They are the most defenseless against radiation. Apparently there is a need to work out a comprehensive program to protect children against the consequences of

the accident. A group from the government of the republic, the Belorussian Division of the Soviet Children's Fund and the Society of Mercy simply must do this. The sooner, the better.

[Question] The assertion was made here that the health of not one single person had suffered. Then what is indicated by the double wages and additional pay of 30 rubles for each member of a family living in the constant monitoring zone?

[V. Yevtukh] In reality: the people are fortunately healthy. The additional money paid is for the complexity of the work, for the enforced adherence to certain precautionary measures and finally, for the fact that part of the produce cultivated in the gardens was confiscated. After all, labor was expended, and it should be paid for.

[Question] Why, then, did people not receive additional pay in the contaminated rayons in Mogilev Oblast?

[A. Fomich] The union organs answered the question that we asked by saying that unified norms were established for additional pay for the Ukraine, for Belorussia and for Bryansk Oblast. They were paid out on only one condition: if the contamination level was 15 curies per square kilometer and above. In most of the rayons of Mogilev Oblast, this indicator was lower. This means that with all due respect to the Mogilev residents, we so far can do nothing to help them in this respect.

[Question] Why did Belorussia refuse help from other countries, even though it suffered more than the Ukraine?

[V. Yevtukh] If this help had been offered us, we would have taken it gratefully. We appealed to the union organs and received great support—we were allotted 1 billion, 150 million rubles.

[Question] Volunteers are being sent to the areas of the calamity. Upon returning from there, they are appealing to their trade union committees with a plea to grant them certain benefits. Conflicts are arising. Is it not time to make things clear?

[A. Fomich] Benefits are specified for a small group of people: those who worked not in the contaminated areas in general, but only at the sections settled farther out. As for the priority installation of a telephone for these people, their children being granted places in preschool institutions and housing, these claims are groundless.

[Suggestion] I am Aleksandr Prokopov, chairman of the Braginskiy Rayispolkom. I wish to ask the journalists defending those who voluntarily returned to the evacuated villages, why they make heroes of the "self-made villages." What heroism do they see in the fact that the people, mainly pensioners, undergo risking their far from ideal health? Then the claims arise—something is not there, there is not enough of something else, they

have forgotten us, they say. Where can they obtain anything, if all the services—stores, complete receiving centers and even the post offices in these villages are closed? We do not have enough transport to organize normal supply for those living in the villages, nor are there sufficient funds for the products—I categorically refuse to share the extreme optimism of G. Grishchenkov.

In a word, I propose immediately drawing up legislative acts which would give the right to local Soviets, independently, right up to enforced eviction, to solve these problems. I ask the government of the republic to discuss this proposal, to take it, if necessary, to the union authorities, since this document—and here I am supported by all the soviet workers, without exception, from the stricken rayons—is extremely necessary.

The Opinion of a Participant in the Meeting

T.F. Krutovtsova, deputy chairman of the Gomel Oblispolkom:

Almost 40 representatives of our oblast are present at this hall today. We have listened very attentively to everything that the specialists have said, and we understand the anxiety heard in the questions and answers. We are grateful to you for this.

Life, however, presents us with problems related not only to production, but also to the psychological state of the population. It should be said that, despite the measures taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident, no active explanatory work has enabled us to avoid radiation phobia.

Here I should like to address those representatives of creative unions who are present in the hall. I, just as all my colleagues, attentively read the materials from the stricken rayons, which appear on the pages of the newspapers and journals, and impatiently await the television and radio broadcasts. Believe me, the most grateful reader of such publications and viewer of television is the Gomel inhabitant. How annoying it is, though, when journalists see only shortcomings, or else misinform and even frighten the reader and the viewer. After these reports in the newspaper or on television, no information from a specialist can be taken on trust. Let us say, we are informed of the measures taken for a certain problem, and we say that 700 million rubles have been invested in eliminating the consequences of the accident, that an extensive program of health improvement awaits us and that we have a most human government, which does not bargain with its conscience, and they say to us in response: you heard what Ales Adamovich said, and have you really not watched the "Krok" Program?

We should like to see in the journalists, writers and in the cultured figures of our comrades, unanimous thinkers and helpers. We should very much like their public reports to be weightier and better-reasoned, and for them never to forget how their words are echoed.

A few words on problems that affect personnel. The rayons that suffered from the accident are today short about 200 physicians and about 300 nurses. For some reason, though, not a single newspaper has told of the courage and selflessness of those who are working and living there. If such accounts appeared more often on the pages of the newspapers and on television screens, I am sure that the young specialists would be more willing to go to the stricken rayons. So far, in reading the newspapers, people are beginning simply to be afraid of us, the Gomel inhabitants. Even the children who have come from the stricken rayons in Minsk Oblast have been met by some people in respirators and rubber boots. And after all, fear is not a soil on which anything good can grow.

A reproach was heard here to the effect that in Gomel, a year after the accident, children went to the May Day demonstration. This is not true, we had no demonstrations. The main thing for the directors of the oblast has always been to protect the health of the population.

And one more thing: The specialists of our oblast themselves write all the sanitation memorandums on radiation safety for the population. Why do we not have any popular-scientific editions, when after all, the republic has the Academy of Sciences, a multitude of sectorial institutes and many literary forces?

Questions, questions...sharp, impartial, but filled with sincere alarm for the fate of the corners of the earth that are dear to each of us, and for the health of today's and tomorrow's generations. Many of them were asked during this meeting, which continued for almost seven hours. The answers to most of them sounded convincing and weighty. One of the participants in the meeting spoke well of this: "I came here fervently pessimistic, and I left—with hope, because I had found out an objective picture of what has happened."

"You will agree that we held an exacting talk, but one useful for everyone," said V.G. Yevtukh, in summing up the meeting. "We could more precisely define the position and direction of the republic and of the public. I think that it will help us to understand each other better, to have greater trust. Of course, we did not go through our discussion without offensive words. It showed once again that all of us must study polemics, the standard of communication and democracy. We are, after all, engaged in one common cause."

"Many suggestions were heard here, which the directors of the ministries and departments should carefully examine and, if necessary, go out to the site, take exhaustive measures to solve the problems and inform the population of them."

"I am sure that today's talk, which was known about by a wide mass of the public, will not only have moral and political significance. It will help in working more efficiently to eliminate the consequences of the accident."

"The participants in the meeting were unanimous on the fact that the ministry and department workers should go more often to the stricken rayons, the inhabitants of which are awaiting answers, not to global, but to simple, vital questions, determining their vital tonus today, their faith or lack of faith in tomorrow and their working mood."

**Armenian Procurators Punished for
'Unsatisfactory' Work During Unrest**
18300369a Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
4 Jan 89 p 2

[Armenpress report under rubric "At the Armenian SSR Procuracy": "Guaranteeing the Strict Observance of Legality in Interethnic Relations"]

[Text] An expanded session of the board of the Armenian SSR Procuracy discussed the tasks of the procuracy agencies in fulfilling the resolution of the Armenian CP Central Committee Buro, entitled "Urgent Measures to Prevent Instances of Interethnic Conflicts in the Republic."

It was noted that, on the soil of unhealthy speculations concerning the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh, and as a result of the illegal and unpunished actions of the activists in the so-called Karabakh Committee and the extremist elements that are acting with them, an extremely tense, explosive situation has been created in the republic.

Organized unsanctioned rallies and meetings, at which the passions were constantly brought to a fever pitch, and the group actions of hooligans that followed them and that were accompanied by blackmail, threats, physical reprisals, encroachments on the life and dignity of citizens, and resistance toward representatives of the authority, demonstrated the existence in the republic of serious anti-perestroyka groups who were disturbed by the changes that are occurring in the country and that create a threat to their welfare and impunity.

The extremists and the corrupted individuals who are following after them provoked mass disorders in many parts of the republic, which actions led to pogroms and the burning of homes, murders, robbery and looting, and various kinds of violations of people's constitutional rights, and caused Azerbaijanis to flee from the republic en masse.

To a large extent, this extremely dangerous development of events in the republic was promoted by the yielding of the initiative to figures in the dissolute Karabakh Committee, and by the fact that a number of the administrators of Soviet and economic agencies had slipped away

from well-principled, internationalistic positions, in the face of the permissiveness and inactivity of the procurators in a number of cities and rayons in the republic. As the passions built up amid a definite part of the republic's population, the procurators and the administrators of the internal affairs agencies lost control of the development of events and failed to guarantee the presence of law and order or the public's social safety, or the observance of the requirements of the USSR Constitution and other laws by all the republic's officials and citizens.

It was noted at the board that many procurators failed to guarantee the proper monitoring of the observance of legality in the activities of the republic's internal affairs agencies, their fulfillment of their official duties with respect to the taking of prompt steps to prevent or to stop any interethnic conflicts or any acts of violence or lawlessness. Certain procurators forgot the basic principle of organizing and activity of the procuracy that had been formulated by V. I. Lenin in his famous letter for the Politburo, entitled "'Dual' Subordination and Legality," which demanded the unity of legality and the need actually to oppose the local authorities, as a guarantee of the durability of the Soviet state and the stability of law and order and legality.

The board noted serious shortcomings also in the actions of the apparatus of the republic's Procuracy, which apparatus had not been able to organize properly the work of the Procuracy agencies in the fight against offenses on interethnic grounds. The participants at the meeting listened to reports given by the procurators of Gugarkskiy, Gorisskiy, Kalininskiy, Sevanskiy, Stepanavanskiy, Masisskiy, Araratskiy, and certain other rayons where there had been mass disorders, murders, and other serious crimes as a result of the aggravation of interethnic relations.

In view of their failure to organize successfully the work of preventing violations of the law and their having to display responsibility and decisiveness, by decision of the board of the Armenian SSR Procuracy, the following persons have been removed from the positions that they occupied: N. Pakhlevanyan, procurator of Sevanskiy Rayon; R. Saryan, procurator of Kalininskiy Rayon; and V. Vasilyan, procurator of Abovianskiy Rayon.

The following persons have been brought to strict disciplinary responsibility: G. Sardaryan, procurator of Stepanavanskiy Rayon; S. Tsagikyan, procurator of Masisskiy Rayon; R. Adamyan, procurator of Araratskiy Rayon; and T. Khandzhyan, procurator of Gorisskiy Rayon. The board voted not to recommend G. Markaryan, procurator of Gugarkskiy Rayon, for a new constitutional term in that position. His personal question will be discussed after the completion of the investigation of cases involving murders in Gugarkskiy Rayon.

After acknowledging the work of the procurators in a number of the republic's cities and rayons to be unsatisfactory, the board of the Armenian SSR Procuracy

demanded that they immediately take the necessary steps to eliminate the gross errors, miscalculations, and shortcomings in their work and to ensure the strict fulfillment of the requirements stated in the resolution of the Armenian CP Central Committee Buro, entitled "Urgent Measures to Prevent Instances of Interethnic Conflicts in the Republic."

The board recognized as a very important task of the city and rayon procurators the carrying out of active work to improve the situation in the republic and to reinforce the internationalism, friendship, and unity of the Soviet nations.

It was recommended to all the workers in the procuracy that they take active steps to combat irresponsible, adventuristically minded individuals, to respond to absolutely every violation of the law on interethnic grounds, and to organize their activities in such a way that any person guilty of any violation or nonfulfillment of the law is brought to strict disciplinary, administrative, and criminal responsibility.

It was recommended to the procurators that they devote special attention to promptly identifying and stopping illegal actions by instigators and rabblers that are carried out on interethnic grounds, and to the role and responsibility for this that is borne by the enterprise administrators and other officials.

Other specific steps have been planned to reinforce the legality and the public's safety, and to ensure the strict observance of the constitutional rights and interests of Soviet citizens.

It has been noted that, with regard to instances of crimes on interethnic grounds, criminal cases have been instituted and are investigated by USSR Procuracy and USSR MVD investigators, with the participation of employees of Armenian SSR law-enforcement agencies.

The procurators' attention was directed toward the need to be constantly on guard, and to continue the dynamic, purposeful work of reinforcing legality in the sphere of interethnic relations, and of protecting the rights and interests of the citizens, the need to take a sensitive and attentive attitude toward their complaints and their statements, and to take all the legally stipulated steps to compensate citizens for any psychological or material damages that they have incurred.

Workers in the procuracies of cities and rayons have been the responsibility of ensuring that the steps to introduce the proper social order will be carried out in close interaction with the labor collectives and with the strictest observance of socialist legality.

**ArSSR: Internal Affairs Ministry Cites Charges
Against Karabakh Committee**

*18300369b Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
11 Jan 89 pp 3-4*

[Unattributed report: "At Armenian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[Text] Beginning in February 1988 the situation in the republic became complicated as a result of the events in and around Nagornyy Karabakh and it has continued to be strained. On the threshold of the session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet that was planned for 22 November, the leaders of the so-called Karabakh Committee sharply increased their activities both in Yerevan and in other cities and rayons in Armenia. A wave of mass demonstrations and refusals to go to work encompassed practically the entire republic. Classes at institutions of higher learning and at other educational institutions were regularly disrupted.

Taking into consideration the extremely tense situation, a curfew was introduced in Yerevan, effective 0001 hours, 25 November. Starting on 5 December, for purposes of guaranteeing the safety of the citizens' life, a curfew was also introduced in 16 rayons in the republic (Amasiyskiy, Gugarkskiy, Spitakskiy, Idzhevanskiy, Noyemberyanskiy, Tumanyanskiy, Krasnoselskiy, Kalininskiy, Stepanavanskiy, Araratskiy, Masisskiy, Kafanskiy, Gorisskiy, Sisianskiy, Yekhegnadzorskiy, and Vardenisskiy). This measure made it possible to stabilize the situation in the capital. The enterprises and institutions, and public transportation, gradually began to operate again. At the same time, there was a slight expansion in the geography of the rallies and marches being held (cities of Leninakan, Kirovakan, Charentsavan, Artashat, Kamo, and Razdan—a total of 28 cities and rayons in the republic), which led at times to conflicts between persons of Armenian and Azerbaijani nationality. Frequently the population was incited to carry out such actions by the provocational rumors being spread by undesirable elements. A serious aggravation of the inter-ethnic relations was caused by the influx of persons of Armenian nationality who were refugees from Azerbaijan. In individual documented instances they participated directly in conflicts with Azerbaijanis. The illegal actions were frequently aimed at forcing the Azerbaijanis out of Armenia. It should be noted that, despite the extension geography of the rallies and marches, the slogans and demands that were voiced in Yerevan could be heard literally the very next day in other cities and rayons in the republic.

In eight rayons in the republic, the conflicts were accompanied by murders, serious bodily harm, and arson involving homes and personal property.

The operational situation was also seriously complicated by the illegal actions of the so-called self-defense groups made up of persons of Armenian nationality who blocked the highways (Gugarkskiy, Stepanavanskiy,

Kalininskiy, Sevanskiy, Artashatskiy, and other rayons). With the purpose of stopping such situations, patrols that were reinforced by militia details and specially attached forces were carried out in an organized manner on the busiest highways. As a result of the decisive steps that were taken, 27 posts were eliminated, 275 persons were given an official warning, 6 persons were administratively detained, and 17 persons were fined.

During the period after 24 November, approximately 5000 persons were brought to internal affairs agencies for having broken the curfew, and more than 270 persons were administratively detained. Special measures are being carried out to discover and confiscate objects that can serve as weapons for encroaching upon the life and health of citizens and military personnel. As a result of the implementation of operational data, and also by employing mobile posts on the main arteries, since 22 November 39 firearms and 27 knives of various kinds, and a large amount of ammunition and explosives, were confiscated.

The natural calamity that overtook our republic, to a certain degree, cooled the atmosphere with regard to the interethnic relations. However, the leaders of the Karabakh Committee, even under those conditions, did not cease their activities. After creating their "headquarters" in the building of the republic's Writers' Union, they attempted to inveigle themselves into the work being carried out to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake, and to appropriate to themselves the functions of state agencies.

The so-called official representatives of the 10 December committee stopped trucks in the city of Yerevan; made changes in their trip sheets, certifying them with their "seal"; and attempted to send those trucks into the earthquake areas. A document with the following content was discovered in the committee room: "The Armenian Committee of the Karabakh Movement, with the consent of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, officially sends to the city of Leninakan Vazgen Manukyan as an official representative of the committee in order to participate in the commission's work to render aid to the victims. We request all state and public agencies to provide assistance to the committee's official representative. For the committee: L. Ter-Petrosyan."

They issued the requirement that no aid should be given to Azerbaijan, and they spread various anti-ethnic rumors. In response to a demand issued by the commandant to cease these actions and to leave the building housing the Writers' Union, the committee members refused. As a result of that "activity" and the unauthorized assembly of the public in front of the building of the Writers' Union, the following persons were administratively detained for 30 days: V. M. Manukyan, L. A. Ter-Petrosyan, B. G. Arakyan, S. V. Gevorkyan, A. A. Akopyan, and S. S. Akopyan.

The next day, 11 December, committee activists organized in the city of Yerevan several assemblies with a total number of as many as 5000 persons, headed by committee members Siradegyan, Manucharyan, etc. Then the crowd started moving in the direction of the Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon OVD [Internal Affairs Department], where the detained individuals were being kept; the crowd's intention was to free them. When the military details ordered them to disperse, they refused to do so. In three places (near the Gayane department store; in the area of Moskovskaya ulitsa and Ulitsa Tuman-yana; and near Teatralnaya ploshchad), they provoked a conflict with the military personnel. Manucharyan shouted, "We'll force the soldiers to shoot at us." Near Teatralnaya ploshchad, a group of hooligans armed with metal bars, sticks, and bottles, attacked a military detail. All these assemblies were broken up. While attempting to restore order, a number of military personnel received bodily injuries of varying degrees of severity.

It must be noted that even during the subsequent period after the earthquake the representatives of the Karabakh Committee did not stop their provocative activity. The basic emphasis was placed on schoolchildren and university students. There were no open demonstrations after 11 December, but in the institutions of higher learning, and particularly the Polytechnical Institute, the Armenian Pedagogical Institute, and the university, individuals conducted discussions concerning the need to continue the struggle. In a number of collectives, committee activists incited people to engage in protest demonstrations. In Yerevan, leaflets were circulated, calling upon people to engage in strikes to protest the detention of the committee members, and slanderous fabrications were also spread.

These situations show how far the activities of the committee went—from rallies in February to direct conflicts against the forces of law and order in December.

As a result of organizing and taking active part in group actions that crudely violated the public order, that displayed obvious disobedience of the lawful demands made by representatives of the authority, and that disrupted the operation of public transportation, criminal charges were brought against a number of persons.

In the work of stopping the openly instigative actions of the most zealous activists of the Karabakh Committee and of putting up prompt resistance to such forms of civil disobedience as the conducting of numerous unauthorized rallies and marches that lead to the worsening of the situation, miscalculations and shortcomings occurred in the activities of the internal affairs agencies.

In this matter, insufficient use has been made of the legal possibilities stipulated by the 28 July 1988 Ukase of USSR PVS [Presidium of the Supreme Soviet], entitled "Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Meetings, Rallies, Marches, and Demonstrations in the USSR," or

the corresponding 29 July Ukase of the Armenian SSR PVS (during the period when that Ukase was in effect, 85 unauthorized meetings were conducted, and administrative measures were applied to 267 persons). No uncompromising fight was waged against those who speculated in today's real difficulties, who spread provocative rumors that were aimed at inciting interethnic animosity, and who directly instigated the people to create disturbances.

In the extreme situation that was created, many of the administrators of internal affairs agencies failed to be in complete control of the operational situation, proved to be insufficiently trained from a professional point of view, and demonstrated passivity, or simply their complete confusion. That factor had an extremely negative effect primarily on the prevention of conflicts, and then upon the results of the work to uncover the crimes that had been committed on an interethnic basis.

Insufficiently dynamic or purposeful use was made of the opportunities of the mass information media for stopping various kinds of provocative rumors and conjectures, for informing the public about the true state of affairs, or for organizing broad explanatory work with them.

Under conditions of the complication of the operational situation, there were also miscalculations and omissions in the organizing of party-political, ideological, and cadre work, primarily in educating the employees in the spirit of internationalism and Soviet patriotism, in developing ideologically stable and reliable political warriors, and in guaranteeing the maximum state of mobilization among the personnel.

As a consequence of the political shortsightedness, as well as the criminally sloppy attitude that had been taken toward the fulfillment of official duties, it proved to be impossible to take prompt steps to prevent the mass disorders that led to serious consequences in Gugarkskiy Rayon. The republic's MVD has given a well-principled evaluation of this shameful situation. By a 5 December board decision, S. Sh. Abovyan, chief of the Rayon OVD; his deputies R. G. Mkhoyan and A. Kh Saakyan; and 14 workers in that department were fired from internal affairs agencies.

For remaining inactive and failing to take the proper steps promptly to prevent the conflicts that arose on interethnic grounds, and also for having discredited the rank of militia worker, 24 employees have been fired from internal affairs agencies; the chiefs of the Araratskiy, Kalininskiy, Stepanavanskiy, and Megrinskiy rayon internal affairs departments (G. A. Papoyan, L. L. Vartanyan, A. R. Geraryan, and A. M. Danielyan) have been removed from the positions that they occupied; and 54 employees have been given disciplinary punishment.

As a result of the preventive-explanatory work that was carried out by the party, soviet, and law-enforcement agencies, the mass information media, and public organizations and the effect of the curfew in a number of rayons in the republic, it has been possible to achieve somewhat of a stabilization of the situation in the sphere of interethnic relations, a noticeable reduction in the number of offenses committed on those grounds, and somewhat of an increase in the work of uncovering crimes.

Since the beginning of 1988, a total of 154 criminal cases have been initiated for crimes that were committed on interethnic grounds. Work to uncover murders, severe bodily injury, instances of arson, and other crimes has been organized and is being carried out. Operational-investigation groups headed by administrative workers of Armenian SSR MVD have been created. The steps that were taken have already uncovered 28 crimes, and 20 persons have been arrested.

With a consideration of the complete analysis of the serious shortcomings and omissions, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is re-examining the entire series of preventive and operational-investigative measures to assure the prompt prevention and localization of possible conflicts on interethnic grounds. The efforts of all the personnel, and of all the political and party organizations are aimed at this, on the basis of the strictest observance of socialist legality, discipline, and the exemplary fulfillment of official duties.

ArSSR, AzSSR Internal Affairs Ministries Coordinate Efforts

18300369c Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
12 Jan 89 p 3

[Armenpress-Azerinform report: "Building Up Joint Efforts"]

[Text] One of the most important tasks that have to be resolved in Azerbaijan and Armenia is the stabilizing of the situation in the region, the creation of normal living and working conditions for every family. A large amount of the responsibility for implementing these tasks lies on the internal affairs agencies in both republics. The operational situation in the region, the most effective forms and methods of carrying out joint actions to stop the attempts being made by irresponsible individuals to cause disturbances and to incite interethnic enmity, and other questions were discussed in the course of a working meeting of the leadership of Armenian SSR MVD and Azerbaijan SSR MVD.

Armenian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs U. Arutyunyan and Azerbaijan SSR Minister of Internal Affairs A. Mamedov exchanged information on the organizational and practical measures being undertaken to establish the proper public order in the region. Special attention was devoted to the work of guaranteeing the security of the

constitutional protection of the citizens' rights, of preventing offenses and crimes on interethnic grounds, of stopping the subversive activities of extremist-minded corrupted circles, and identifying and unmasking instigators and spreaders of rumors and fabrications that are aimed at inciting interethnic passions. Emphasis was made of the responsibility borne by the internal affairs agencies for improving the situation in the regions, for executing the Leninist principle of the irreversibility of punishment for one's misdeeds, for restoring justice, and for creating the necessary conditions for returning resettled individuals to the areas from which they came.

The conferees adopted the text of a message from the ministers and chiefs of the political departments of Armenian SSR MVD and Azerbaijan SSR MVD to the personnel of the internal affairs agencies of both republics. That text reflects the complete support of the message of the Armenian CP Central Committee and Azerbaijan CP Central Committee and the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets and Councils of Ministers of Armenian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR to citizens who left their permanent place of residence, and emphasizes the need to be true to one's international, patriotic, and official duty and to defend reliably the citizens' constitutional rights. Measures that are well thought out, carefully considered, and decisive, and that are based on the law, that text states, will promote the restoration of the friendship between the peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the creation of the conditions for the fruitful labor of the republic's inhabitants in the interests of their further prosperity, in the interests of our single multinational socialist state.

One of the practical steps in normalizing the situation has been the creation of a coordination council from among the representatives of the branch services of the MVD of both republics under the leadership of the first deputy ministers.

Local Armenian CP Officials Scored for Failure To Control Disorder

18300369d Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
17 Jan 89 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "At the Armenian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] A session of the Armenian CP Central Committee Buro was held. It considered the question of the illegal actions of certain officials in resolving interethnic questions.

It was noted that, for having allowed the destabilization of the situation, for being unable to prevent the incitement of interethnic enmity and illegal actions, for having demonstrated inaction, and for having committed a number of other violations, individuals were given the following punishments in December 1988 alone: 13 administrators were excluded from the ranks of the CPSU; 24 administrative workers at party, soviet, and

economic agencies were removed from the duties that they occupied; and 68 party punishments were applied. Twelve administrators of law-enforcement agencies at the city and rayon level were removed from their assignments or given party punishment.

However, the state of affairs in the republic continues to be complicated as a consequence of the fact that not all the administrators of party, soviet, economic, and law-enforcement agencies have made well-principled conclusions from the serious mistakes that were made in the area of interethnic relations. There has been no waging of the proper uncompromising offensive against persons with nationalistic moods. Many primary party, trade-union, Komsomol, and other public organizations are continuing to remain aloof from this work.

Gross violations of the citizens' constitutional rights, and disorders that have been accompanied by blackmail and threats, have occurred in Stepanavanskiy, Idzhevanskiy, Gugarkskiy, Yekhegnadzorskiy, Krasnoselskiy, Araratskiy, Masisskiy, Vardenisskiy, Amasiyskiy, and Noyemberyanskiy rayons and certain other locations.

Under these conditions a number of Communist administrators have shown the lack of principles in evaluating the events occurring in the republic, and the state of affairs in the collectives and subordinate organizations that they head.

The Armenian CP Central Committee Buro has noted the unsatisfactory work of the number of party raykoms and gorkoms, the ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies, and administrators of ministries and departments and law-enforcement agencies in reinforcing law and order and legality, and in ensuring the strict observance of the citizens' constitutional rights and duties.

For failing to take decisive steps to normalize the situation in the rayon and to prevent interethnic conflicts, which failure led to human losses and the mass exodus of the Azerbaijani population, Yu. G. Chshmarityan, first secretary of the Stepanavanskiy Armenian CP Rayon Committee, has been given a severe reprimand, with a notation of such action in his party record card. R. A. Mirzoyan, chairman of the ispolkom of the Stepanavanskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, and CPSU member, has been given a severe reprimand, with a notation of such action in his party record card. His continued stay in the position that he occupied has been deemed to be undesirable.

For failing to provide the political guidance of the interethnic relations in the rayon, which failure led to their collapse and the intensive migration of persons of Azerbaijani nationality, Dzh. G. Ananyan, first secretary of the Idzhevanskiy Armenian CP Rayon, has been given a reprimand, with a notation of such action in his party record. L. Ye. Ordinyan, chairman of the ispolkom of the

Idzhevanskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, and CPSU member, has been given a severe reprimand, with a notation of such action in his party record card.

For having demonstrated a lack of principles, as expressed by his failure to prevent the disruption of classes at educational institutions, and also for having failed to take steps to protect the schoolchildren and young university students from the politically detrimental influence and allowing a certain number of instructors and teachers to play a negative role in this matter, S. T. Akhumyan, Armenian SSR Minister of Public Education, and CPSU member, has been given a severe reprimand, with a notation of such action in his party record card.

U. S. Arutyunyan, Armenian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, was sharply criticized for failing to take prompt and effective steps to reinforce the protection of public order and for being insufficiently demanding toward the personnel. For his low demandingness toward the administrators of the subordinate agencies, and for having taken a conciliatory attitude toward their passive position in the question of preventing mass disturbances and crimes on interethnic grounds, G. G. Grigoryan, Armenian SSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, and CPSU member, was given a severe reprimand, with a notation of such action in his party record card.

For having made gross omissions in selecting and assigning cadres, and for having reduced his demandingness toward them, as a result of which there were instances, on a mass scale, of gross violations of legality and severe crimes, G. A. Gukasyan, Armenian SSR deputy procurator, and CPSU member, was given a severe reprimand, with a notation of such action in his party record card.

The boards of the Armenian SSR Procuracy and MVD have been instructed to intensify the coordination of their actions and their subordinate agencies, to carry out effective steps to reinforce socialist legality and law and order in the republic, to guarantee the reliable protection of the citizens' constitutional rights and duties, and to hold strictly accountable the administrators and other officials who fail to take immediate steps to stop violations of the law. Special attention is to be devoted to the fundamental improvement of the work with cadres, and the supplementing of those agencies with politically mature, well principled, and competent people. The boards must strive to establish closer ties between the internal affairs and procuracy agencies, on the one hand, and the labor collectives and the public, on the other, and must regularly inform the party committees and the soviet agencies about the state of legality and the steps being taken to reinforce it.

The Armenian CP Central Committee Buro has required the Armenian CP gorkoms and raykoms, the soviet and economic agencies, and the ministries and departments to carry out a thorough analysis of the political situation and the state of interethnic relations in the cities, rayons,

branches, enterprises, and organizations, and to take the necessary steps to achieve the further normalization of the situation in conformity with the requirements of the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers that have been enacted in this regard.

The Armenian CP Central Committee Buro has given the party committees the responsibility of bringing to strict responsibility any Communist Party members who pander in causing divisiveness among people on the basis of nationality, and who allow extremist attacks that incite interethnic hatred.

Officials Review Central Asian Regional Development Issues

18300366a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
4 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by I. Khisamov, UzTAG correspondent: "Our Region: A Crossword Puzzle for Economists": "Notes from the Academy's Auditorium"]

[Text] "But was the boy there?"

This question, which tormented Gorky's hero, was brought to mind in the auditorium of the republic Academy of Sciences. The occasion was the founding meeting of a commission on the regional problems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Theses words by one participant evoked the literary connection: "In economic terms there is no such region as Central Asia and Kazakhstan."

Then he proceeded to give his arguments in support of that:

The Central Asian republics' economic ties among themselves are not equal to more than 10 percent of the volume of their interregional ties.

Each of the Central Asian republics has broader economic contacts with the center, and the RSFSR in particular, than with its neighbors.

Each of Kazakhstan's five economic regions are more closely linked with the center than they are with each other...

Can one say that an economic region exists if it has no unified economy or even a coordinating system?

Obviously this issue was intentionally framed in a somewhat startling way in order to better convey the extent of the problem that must be solved. Our economic system can with confidence be likened to a clever crossword puzzle in which the departments' interests are the verticals and the interests of a given territory—in this case the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan—are the horizontals. Our regional crossword puzzle is being redrawn along vertical

lines; hence the great number of particular aberrations in the economic and social realms. Hence greater difficulties in our ethnic and interethnic problems.

"It was precisely in order to help create harmony between the verticals and the horizontals of our economic mechanism that what is at the present time a unique union commission on the problems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was established," says N. Sultanov, scientific secretary of the Uzbekistan Council for the Study of Productive Forces (SOPS [Sovet po izucheniyu proizvoditelnykh sil]). "In this respect it is important that the scientific council on regional problems in connection with which it was established has access to the USSR Academy of Sciences and USSR Gosplan. This means that there is hope that scientists' proposals will be quickly and effectively taken into account in state planning of our region's development..."

A report by S. Ziyadullayev, commission chairman and member of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences, included the following data: per capita consumer goods production, including food production, in Uzbekistan is approximately 40 percent less than the all-union average, and less than in the Baltic republics by a factor of four or five. The situation in Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan is a bit better, the situation in Turkmenistan a bit worse.

Generally speaking the social and economic situation in our region can be summed up by this gloomy formula: the slowest increase in production efficiency in our country is occurring against a backdrop of the country's lowest standard of living and highest rate of population growth.

This in spite of very rich natural and climatic resources, in spite of our tremendous underground wealth, in spite of an adequate and even excessive labor force. How did this happen? And what should be done to correct this situation, which is unworthy of our system?

The founding meeting in Tashkent was attended by leading economists from Alma-Ata, Dushanbe, Frunze and Ashkhabad, as well as specialists from the union departments. Each one had his own answers to the above questions.

E. Yusupov, vice-president of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences: "It is very difficult to understand why a peasant can work the fields without either weekends or official holidays off yet only be paid 40 rubles a month. This must be talked about and thought about. Improved price-setting should be one of the main thrusts of our work."

"We must also improve our methods for determining our republic's economic contribution. Unfortunately, an incorrect perception of that contribution is becoming part of the public's thinking. When people say that the

Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan are not self-supporting and receive large subsidies, that is both factually incorrect and carries a serious psychological stigma. How does it come about that Uzbekistan, for example, which produces a large portion of our country's cotton fiber, receives three billion rubles in subsidies? This figure results from a calculation based on incorrect initial parameters. The economists of our region must come up with correct calculations and recommendations and submit them to the directive organs."

R. Dosumov, director of the Uzbek branch of the All-Union Labor Research Institute: "Today the union SOPS is virtually alone in making any effort to coordinate republic plans, but its efforts have not had any real effect. For example, there is no connection between republic and all-union demographic plans."

"We must pool our efforts in order to come up with a unified program for the rational use of labor resources in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. Today this is the approach we are seeing: let's develop industry and the machine building complex. Yet when we start analyzing the machine building complex itself we find that a large part of it is not performing tasks for our region. We need to develop those things which will help intensify our region's specialization within the all-union system, above all the processing sectors of the agroindustrial complex."

M. Abdusalyanov, doctor of economic sciences (Tashkent): "In recent years no other region of our country has had so many directives issued concerning it as ours has. We have had resolutions on the Karakalpakskaya ASSR, on the Aral Sea, on unsatisfactory utilization of natural potential, on a comprehensive program for the development of Central Asia, and so on. But life here goes on as before; those documents have not produced any real effect. What is the reason for that? Remember Khrushchev's economic councils. We criticized them with great success. The commission which regulated and coordinated development plans in the Central Asian republics was eliminated along with them. Even though its decisions were only recommendations, they nonetheless were of great practical benefit. Until we have a regulatory organ like that we will not be able to change the situation."

"Water and the condition of the Aral Sea are among our most disturbing problems. Until we establish a basis for clear-cut interaction among all those who use Central Asian water, until we lay the groundwork for integrative ties and intraregional specialization we will not be able to solve this problem or any others. Until that happens we will not be able to raise our peoples' standard of living."

R. Ubaydullayeva, deputy director of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute: "One of our region's most pressing problems is the labor surplus. In order to solve this problem we must change our structural policy.

We must not only develop our own labor-intensive industries—e.g. light industry and the food industry—as we are already doing. We must develop machine building, instrument building and electric equipment manufacture: these are the sectors which will bring other production facilities in their wake and will ultimately create the greatest number of jobs."

"I would like to underscore a thought expressed by our Academician K. Lapkin concerning the need for an approach to resolution of the employment problem that would be specific to each zone within our region. Indeed, this problem should be dealt with differently in the desert zone or the non-irrigated-crops zone than, for instance, in the valleys and oases. So far we have not taken this sort of differentiated approach. Generally speaking the flow of new ideas with regard to solutions to the employment problem is slow. We are still saying today all the things we saying 20 years ago. There is some sort of crisis of scientific ideas in this regard."

"Not surprising," interjected **R. Mirzoyev, SOPS chairman.** "If the problems defined by science are not solved that is the way it will continue to be. Scientists long ago determined ways of solving the employment problem, determined what production sectors should be developed. There is no scientific problem here. But too little practical work is being done, therefore these problems are continually reproduced, each time on a new and more complex level. And they will continued to be reproduced. We have already had "theories" about the labor surplus in our area and about the need to resettle part of our population in other regions of the country. What are the reasons for that? Once again I repeat: because practical work is not being done toward resolving our problems. Yet could it solve them? No. In order to do that we must change existing production relations. And our people are to a great extent working in vain because in our country the individual sectors have seized economic power. They never listen to recommendations from regional scientists."

"We, especially in Tajikistan, have many restrictions on the development of production. Such development is not concerned solely with quantitative expansion of jobs, is not concerned with the task of, say, getting all mothers of large families to join the work force. How can we talk about a labor surplus when each worker supports between five and seven children? On the contrary, this indicates that we do not have enough able-bodied workers to feed our entire population."

"No, it is not quantity that we must increase. What are needed are fundamental changes in the economic structure. We must break the spell of cotton which has beguiled all branches of administration. Let us all study together ways of using the cotton we produce, study where it goes and what needs it fills. Why are those sectors find ways of replacing synthetic materials with cotton not functioning? Why is a substantial portion of our cotton being consumed for technical needs? And why

should cotton account for 70-80 percent of our agricultural production when this has a detrimental effect on nature and on people's health?"

"And why, for example, is the level of instruction in our schools so poor? Is it not primarily because there is no need to teach complicated skills to people who are going to end up picking cotton? As long as we keep on harvesting the cotton fields like we did in primitive times there will be no need for higher education. In short, we need to reduce substantially the amount of cotton we plant and expand the food sector and the textile complex."

"We must all work together to achieve this; all our state planning committees must think. There is all-union integration, and so must there be regional integration. We all know how many redundant shipments of the very same goods back and forth between republics occur. This is all arranged for the benefit of the departments, along vertical lines. It is time we set up horizontal connections. We must develop a common system for supplying the most important items and for the siting of production facilities. A significant portion of enterprises should be placed under the jurisdiction of local organs."

D. Bayramov, director of the TuSSR Gosplan Economics Institute: "We must create a unified balance of labor resources, land, water and fuel for our region. Recently our republic proposed to Uzbekistan that it develop our irrigated land, since you in the neighboring republics have surplus workers. Already 150,000 hectares are being cultivated by Uzbek peasants. And that is good experience. Why take people from Central Asia to develop Amurskaya or Magadan oblasts, when there is plenty for them to do here? We propose that the Tajiks participate as well, for the water is our common property."

"Yet overall there are strong tendencies toward isolationism and mistrust in interrepublic relations. The Turkmen become offended when they hear that voices are being raised in neighboring republics in protest against the Karakum Canal. It is a vitally important artery for our republic. As for the amount of water lost, it is not five billion cubic meters per year, but only one billion—this has been confirmed by an authoritative commission. Of course that is a lot. But who is to blame? Six billion rubles were allocated for construction of the canal and but only 3.5 billion of them were utilized. This kind of 'economizing' has caused the losses."

"Lack of coordination between republics' actions also hampers regional utilization of fuel resources. We are supplying natural gas to the European part of the country while Uzbekistan is already experiencing a fuel shortage. Should we not perhaps be sending more there? USSR Gosplan tells us: no, we will supply Uzbekistan with energy from Siberia. That is hardly the most efficient alternative. Or another example: we want to build a chemical combine to process our wealth of ethane gas. To produce especially durable irrigation pipe. There is

an urgent need for this in all the Central Asian republics. Yet we stand alone in our efforts to defend this project before the central government. We do not sense any support from our neighbors. Yet this kind of pipe would help perform the water conservation tasks required to save the Aral Sea, our common treasure."

"In our republic as well we are still running up against concepts left over from the time of stagnation. Our plant hybridizers are working to develop strains of cotton which drop their foliage naturally. This year we had 15 hectares of plants which lost their leaves on their own by mid-September. One can easily imagine what this would mean to Central Asia. But in order to bring these new strains into widespread use much work still remains to be done."

"So we suggested to our hybridization specialists: let us pool our efforts with your counterparts in Uzbekistan. Ours did not want to do that. They said that later they could sell seed to them and make money doing it. Yet working alone they will spend decades producing this new strain, though it could be done much faster through a cooperative effort. We have not yet been able to convince them of this. We will keep trying. We must realize that the last 20 years of isolated development of each republic has created a crises in our region. We simply cannot go on like this."

A first impression of the discussion: scientists are much more confident about answering the question of what caused the critical situation in our region than they are about means of getting out of it. It was rightly noted that if fulfillment of government programs for the development of our region are farmed out to the departments (as is currently taking place) then those programs will meet the same sad fate as their predecessors. But what can be done to prevent this? How can we overcome the dominance of vertical planning and develop horizontal, interrepublic ties?

Obviously it would be naive to expect clear and precise answers here today to questions that are being debated by our entire society. Much work remains to be done. The participants in the Tashkent meeting agreed on plans for joint scientific research and on-site commission meetings to be held in all the republics in our region. And perhaps through joint efforts we ways will be found to solve this hard economic crossword puzzle.

Uzbek Informal Group 'Birlik' Chided Over Cotton Monoculture Issue

18300366b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
13 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by R. Nazarov, head of the UzSSR Gosagroprom Administration for the Development of Cotton Production and the Production of Other Crops, candidate of biological sciences: "How Can a Billion Be Lost?"]

[Text] The state order for cotton fiber will increase during the next five-year plan, and that is only natural.

However, even last year, a favorable year for cotton production, procurement of raw cotton was not sufficient to meet the customers' needs. Production capacity is still not commensurate to consumer demand. Violations of agricultural practices, massive account-padding, fraud, corruption and other negative phenomena which have occurred in our republic have resulted in the devaluation of "white gold." The dictatorship of monoculture, soil exhaustion, increasing wilt infection and the spread of agricultural pests have resulted in lower yields and a poorer quality of raw cotton. As a result cotton farming in Uzbekistan has become increasingly vulnerable to the caprices of the weather; the total harvest has varied by as much as half a million tons over the past three years.

In view of this situation our republic's leading scientists have come up with a comprehensive program for the development of cotton farming. Today the bulk of funding is not being allocated for the opening up of new areas of cultivation but instead for improvement of existing fields. Intensive efforts are being made to introduce crop rotation, the area of cotton fields is being reduced and the percentage of land sown to fodder crops is increasing. However, according to republic Gosagroprom figures measures to reduce disproportions in the cotton-growing complex are not being implemented to the fullest.

Not all areas have yet rid themselves of an old malady: above-plan sowing of cotton. The dictatorship of the plan in terms of quantity continues to restrict farm heads' economic independence. Last year the area sown in cotton was reduced by 90,000 hectares as compared to the previous year, yet above-plan sowing—as "insurance" against crop failure—totalled approximately 40,000 hectares. Flagrant violations of the crop structure have been committed in the Karakalpakskaya ASSR, Andizhan, Namangan, Fergana and Syrdarinskaya oblasts. In the majority of cases planning organs were the instigators of these violations. Economic administrators have lost their right to choose; control figures for the volume of raw cotton procurements are set in advance. These figures are must higher than what is realistically attainable; actual yields on worn-out land will not equal "planned" yield.

In the article "What Is the Truth and What Is a Lie?" (PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 7 January) M. Solikh, secretary of the board of the UzSSR Writers' Union, wrote that "we have ceased to worship man and have begun worshipping cotton... For the sake of cotton gardens and pastures have been razed, villages have been destroyed and people are suffering. That is what monoculture means."

The gist of certain of M. Solikh's statements is that Uzbekistan must, in order to break the dominance of monoculture, reduce its cotton procurement volume.

This is not stated directly in the article, but it is not difficult for the reader to arrive at that conclusion. For according to Solikh the Uzbek people are "a people dependent on cotton."

Facts are facts: the prosperity of our republic's citizens depends to a large extent on the amount of cotton we produce. It could be claimed, for example, that the Bulgarian people are a people dependent on foreign tourists, since tourism is one of the main sources of Bulgaria's national income. Any country's economy depends upon the profitability of certain production sectors. What is there about this that is insulting or degrading to a country's people?

The leaders of the informal organization "Birlik" are also calling for sharp curtailment of cotton procurements. Their reasons are the same: the rule of monoculture, the populace's low standard of living and ecological problems. But in essence M. Solikh and the informal group members are proposing to saw off the bough upon which they are sitting.

At a recent republic scientific-practical conference on the problems of rational utilization of water and land resources some scientists suggested the need for a sharp reduction (by as much as 20 percent) in cotton production. Weighty arguments were presented in support of this proposal. Specifically, attempts were made to prove that reduction of the land area devoted to cotton and an increase in the production of vegetable and fodder crops are the only possible way to restore worn-out land. But one must also take into account the fact that **in that case our republic's agricultural sector alone would lose over one billion rubles, not counting the loss of taxes imposed on shipments of cotton to customers.** This is one aspect of the problem. The other is the shortage of facilities for the processing and storage of fruits and vegetables. We are not even capable of processing and storing what we now produce. So how can we talk about a sharp increase in the production of those things? Redrawing the planting structure according to administrative-command "methodology" has never produced good results. An increase in vegetable and fruit production at the expense of cotton production should not be an end in itself; we cannot eliminate the dominance of monoculture in this fashion. Before we change anything we must have economically balanced viewpoints and scientifically based calculations. Whether we like it or not, a sharp reduction in the volume of cotton production would inevitably be reflected above all in ordinary rural workers' standard of living.

It is important that we soberly assess and not dramatize the situation that exists in the area of cotton growing. There have been many positive changes. Last year the entire gross increase in the harvest—over half a million tons—was obtained through improved yield per hectare. A total of 5,364,000 tons of raw cotton were procured, including 560,000 tons of fine-fiber varieties. A total of 214,000 tons of raw cotton were produced above plan.

Machines were used to harvest 2.6 million tons of cotton, one-third more than in 1986-87. There was an increase of 600,000 tons in the production of first-quality cotton, and a decrease of 210,000 tons in the production of fourth-quality.

The introduction of collective, family and lease contracts in rural areas helped improve the situation in this sector. The contract collectives brought in their entire harvest by themselves, without additional laborers, and they made efficient use of their equipment. As a result they were able to grow inexpensive, high-quality cotton.

However, a poorly-planned system of payments for raw cotton converted into fiber, as well as unjustified standards for its fiber content, forced farms to plant more land in high-yield cotton strains (An-Buyat #2, An-Uzbekistan #3) and strains with high-fiber content (Andizhan #60, S-4880 and An #402). Naturally cotton growers profited by this, but textile manufacturers are unwilling to accept these strains due to their poor quality.

Sowing of these strains, which produce a high total yield yet prompt complaints, will be sharply reduced this year and completely eliminated by the beginning of the 13th Five-Year Plan. In return there are plans to increase the area sown in cotton with fourth- and fifth-type fibers. In order to stimulate production of high-quality cotton we must revise prices and fiber-content standards for each strain and also revise the state order for fiber. Unless we do this we will not be able to harmonize the interests of textile manufacturers and cotton growers.

Science and practical experience have demonstrated that unless crop rotation is introduced we will not be able to increase either cotton yield or fiber quality. Therefore we cannot stop halfway: we need fundamental measures to complete the introduction of scientifically-based systems of cotton-alfalfa rotation and to reduce cotton's preponderance in our agricultural system.

In order to achieve these goals our main efforts during the coming five-year plan must be directed toward production of high-quality raw cotton through temporary stabilization of gross production indices at the level of or slightly above the level of the current five-year plan. There is no other alternative for the development of cotton production in our republic.

Uzbek Academician on Solving Cotton Monoculture 'Crisis'

18300366c Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
26 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by M. Mukhamedzhanov, member of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences: "A Cotton 'Ariadne's Thread': It Is Taking Too Long To Lead Cotton Growing in Our Republic Out of the Blind Alleys of the Administrative-Command Labyrinth"]

[Text] During the years we have come to call the time of stagnation there was a popular anecdote about a train with the blinds pulled down in which we were all sitting and rocking from side to side, creating the illusion of motion. Yet all the while we were not going anywhere.

For decades cotton growing in our republic was in that kind of "motion." Scientists, economists and administrators confidently rocked in unison, afraid to raise their heads above the close ranks of their fellows and peek out around the edge of the blinds. It was easier and more convenient for them to breathe the air in the comfortable cars, or in their comfortable offices.

But now the blinds have been lifted, and when that happened many people quickly turned to look the other way. They still have not made up their minds to look the truth in the face.

What was it they saw?

Cotton fields worn out by monoculture. Peasants driven from their land. Rivers, lakes, soil and air polluted with industrial wastes and high concentrations of chemical toxins. The "white gold" won with the most arduous labor failing to bring a top price. "White gold"—the pride and pain of the Uzbek people—devaluated by machinations, bribery and corruption. Millions of rubles in subsidies and billions of rubles in losses. Incalculable social and moral damage. Degeneration of thousands of people's moral values, psyche and way of thinking...

Cotton, a highly valuable and expensive raw material, slowly but surely brought our republic's agroindustrial complex to the brink of bankruptcy. How could that happen in a region whose geographical and climatic conditions permit high yields from all the crops grown here with only minimal expenditures and a scientifically-based cultivation system?

Our republic's agriculture was smothered by a wave of cotton.

Scientists estimate that with its current economic production potential Uzbekistan could obtain an average of 45-50 hundredweights of cotton per hectare, 250-270 hundredweights of alfalfa hay, 700-800 hundredweights of silage, 80-100 hundredweights of corn, 600-800 hundredweights of vegetable and cucurbit crops and 200-250 hundredweights of fruit and grapes. From every 100 hectares of arable land it would be possible to produce a yield of 130-140 hundredweights of meat and 800-850 hundredweights of milk.

Today we are doing worse than this by a factor of four or five.

Our republic's per capital national income is 4,000 rubles—less than the national average by a factor of two. Our consumption of meat, milk, vegetables, cucurbits, fruit and other produce is less by a factor of between two and two-and-one-half. Our rural population consumes eight kilograms of meat per capita annually—less than in

the RSFSR by a factor of eight! Each worker in our agroindustrial complex produces less per capita than our nationwide average by a factor of two, and less than the U.S. average by a factor of 10. One-third of our kolkhozes and sovkhozes are losing money, and less than one-half of our farms show a profit of more than 15 percent.

In the past two years the increase in Uzbekistan's agricultural production has barely kept pace with its rate of natural population growth.

Does that not seem like a lot of arguments to counter those who regard monoculture as the basis for our republic's economic development? Let some champions of "the people's prosperity" have their way and I am convinced that within five to ten years they will have allowed the "optimum" amount of cotton production to exhaust the land completely and scatter our peasants to the four winds. By that time it will be too late to do anything to correct the problem.

Excessive specialization of any region in the cultivation of a single crop inevitably leads to degeneration of that crop. On a majority of farms in our republic this process is already far advanced. The sectorial structure in cultivation here has assumed a self-degenerative nature which is a far cry from scientifically-based requirements.

What have we inherited from the monoculture cult?

Of a total of 3.4 million hectares of irrigated farmland approximately one million hectares have potentially low fertility; 600,000-700,000 hectares are covered with pebbles, are located in steep adyry [low foothills bordering the Fergana depression], have thick gypsum layers, or have sandy, marshy or heavily salinized soils. Of this area half a million hectares are planted in cotton, with yields ranging from 5-20 hundredweights per hectare. Even with an average yield of 15 hundredweights this land could not yield more than 750,000 tons of cotton. The total income from one hectare would be 900-1,000 rubles as compared to costs of not less than 1,700-2,000 rubles; four to five times as much water would be required as for, say, gardens and vineyards. These lands take a bite of hundreds of millions of rubles out of farm budgets every year. So who benefits from their cultivation?

The way to increase crop yield and shore up the kolkhoz and sovkhoz economy is to make a transition to economically advantageous crops, carry out purposeful land reclamation work, introduce intensive cultivation systems, enrich the soil organically by sowing more alfalfa and other fodder and food grain crops, and introduce crop rotation.

The area of poorly suited land sown in cotton must be reduced to at least 500,000 hectares. The volume of cotton procurement should be reduced accordingly by

750,000 tons. The bulk of work to fundamentally restructure cropland should be concentrated on a portion of the land thus made available.

There is an urgent need for revision of the planting structure in the old irrigation zone, where cotton monoculture still prevails, accounting for 70-75 percent of all production, with a view toward reducing cotton to a 55-60 percent share of total crop yield. The experience of the past two years has shown that in spite of a certain reduction in the volume of procurements of raw cotton in 1988 a majority of cotton-growing sovkhozes and kolkhozes did not reduce the area they sowed, this on account of their high procurement plans. This was confirmed by measurements of cropland in 12 rayons which turned up 7,000 hectares of above-plan planting. Despite last year's favorable climatic conditions cotton yield was only 26.3 hundredweights per hectare. In Andizhan and Samarkand oblasts this figure was only 25 hundredweights. Out of a total of 112 rayons 27 obtained average yields of only 20-25 hundredweights on an area of 468,000 hectares.

The sowing of cotton on unsuitable land has further complicated our republic's economic and ecological situation. Monoculture has not only taken over the land, it has also taken control of administrators' minds and way of thinking.

In view of all this it would be appropriate to reduce the area sown to cotton in the old irrigation zone to 150,000 hectares. Over the long term, as yields increase, the average proportion of cotton in our republic's agricultural system should be reduced to 50 percent.

Thus all that needs to be done is to reduce cotton planting by an area of 650,000 hectares and the volume of raw cotton procurements by 1.2 million tons. This would permit the cultivation of cotton on an area of 1.4-1.5 million hectares and the production of 4-4.2 million tons of cotton in 1989-90, with an average yield of 28-30 hundredweights per hectare.

Will revision of the sectorial structure of the agroindustrial complex and a reduction in the area of cotton planted result, as some specialists feel, in a decrease in our total income? The answer to this question is provided by Savay Sovkhoz in Andizhan Oblast. Due to a loss of soil fertility it was forced to reduce cotton production to 40 percent of its total production volume. It is estimated that the sovkhoz's total income increased from 13 million to 21-22 million rubles within five years through development of vegetable farming and fodder production.

Starting this year all the subdepartments of our republic Gosagroprom will make the transition to full cost-accounting. Under these conditions the market and actual demand can and should regulate agricultural production.

Then it will be possible to exclude the principle of "plan fulfillment at any price" from management practice and weaken the grip of monoculture.

I hope that that is what will happen. Reduction of the area of cotton planted is not a whim on the part of scientists and economists; it is the only means of bringing cotton growing out of a protracted state of crisis. The heads of USSR Gosplan and Gosagroprom realize that this is an objective necessity, yet they continue to do everything in their power to bend republic ministries and departments to their will; they do not want to lift the too-heavy cotton burden from our republic, a burden that is being borne at the cost of irreparable damage. In the process narrow departmental interests are passed off as the interests of the state as a whole. Republic administrative organs, the agroindustrial complex and the UzSSR Council of Ministers as well are often told what to do by the "center."

For many years cotton growing in our republic was conducted in the shadows of administrative-command

labyrinths in a search for ways to reach the mythical six-million mark. But the corridors of uncontrolled power and the exchange of favors between administrators and speculators from the scientific community inevitably lead into blind alleys. The "Ariadne's threat" which heroes in search of the way out of the "cotton affairs" has begun to break more and more often...

Glasnost and democratization of all aspects of Soviet society have given us a unique opportunity to discuss together one of Uzbekistan's most important economic and social problems. We must not waste this chance. The decision that will be made depends on us, on every citizen of our republic.

Editor's note: We are publishing this article as part of the discussion in preparation for the upcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and we invite specialists and administrators from farms and party, soviet and planning organs to express their opinions on this matter.

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